City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.

From Conservapedia

In City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 9309 (2d Cir. April 30, 2008), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rendered a sweeping decision in favor of withdrawal of jurisdiction by Congress over federal and state courts with respect to pending and future lawsuits against gun manufacturers. The City of New York thereby lost in its attempt to obtain damages from gun manufacturers for crimes committed by their firearms.

The statute at issue was the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901--03) (the "PLCAA" or the "Act"). The PLCAA provides that any "qualified civil liability action that is pending on October 26, 2005, shall be immediately dismissed by the court in which the action was brought or is currently pending." 15 U.S.C. § 7902(b). A "qualified civil liability action" is defined as:

a civil action or proceeding ... brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a [firearm distributed in interstate or foreign commerce] ... for damages, punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or penalties, or other relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a [firearm distributed in interstate or foreign commerce] by the person or a third party.

15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A). On the day the PLCAA was enacted, the Firearms Suppliers moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to section 7902(b), and ultimately prevailed in this appellate decision despite losing in the trial court.

The PLCAA bars the commencement or the prosecution of qualified civil liability actions by providing as follows:

(a) In general

A qualified civil liability action may not be brought in any Federal or State court.

(b) Dismissal of pending actions A qualified civil liability action that is pending on October 26, 2005, shall [*36] be immediately dismissed by the court in which the action was brought or is currently pending.

15 U.S.C. § 7902. The Act also sets forth certain exceptions to the definition of qualified civil liability action, allowing suits to proceed that meet any of the following criteria:

(iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product [i.e., a firearm that has been shipped or transported through interstate or foreign commerce] knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought, including --

(I) any case in which the manufacturer or seller knowingly made any false entry in, or failed to make appropriate entry in, any record required to be kept under Federal or State law with respect to the qualified product, or aided, abetted, or conspired with any person in making any false or fictitious oral or written statement with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of a qualified product; or

(II) any case in which the manufacturer or seller aided, abetted, or conspired with any other person to sell or otherwise dispose of a qualified product, knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the actual buyer of the qualified product was prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm or ammunition under subsection (g) or (n) of section 922 of Title 18;

15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).

The City of New York claimed an exception from this law based on a state criminal statute, but the Court rejected that argument by a 2-1 margin. The dissenting judge sought certification of the issue relating to the state statute to the highest state court.

The Court held that Congress has full power under the Commerce Clause to withdraw jurisdiction over this issue because it affects interstate commerce.

The Court rejected a claim that this denied access to the courts by finding that:

The PLCAA immunizes a specific type of defendant from a specific type of suit. It does not impede, let alone entirely foreclose, general use of the courts by would-be plaintiffs such as the City. Cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 527, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 158 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2004) (upholding a statutory provision that sought to provide relief to individuals who "were being excluded from courthouses and court proceedings by reason of their disabilities"); Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413 (noting that right-of-access concerns are triggered when "official action ... den[ies] an opportunity to litigate [to] a class of potential plaintiffs" and citing illustrative cases); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963) (striking down a state statute that had the effect of preventing "Negro litigants" from obtaining counsel); Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that Congressional "alter[ation] ... [of] prior rights and remedies" does not provoke right-of-access concerns because "t]here is no fundamental right to particular state-law tort claims"). For these reasons, the PLCAA cannot be said to deprive the City of its First Amendment right of access to the courts.