Evolutionarily stable strategy
From Conservapedia
In the field of evolutionary game theory, an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS is one which cannot be bettered by others in a population. The concept was proposed by population geneticists John Maynard Smith and George R. Price[1]. Alternatively, Richard Dawkins describes it as a strategy which performs well against itself.[2]
See also
References
- ↑ Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) The logic of animal conflict. Nature 246: 15-18.
- ↑ Dawkins, R. (1976) The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-286092-5
Further reading
- Maynard Smith, J. (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games. ISBN 0-521-28884-3
