Jackson v. Homechoice, Inc.

From Conservapedia

In Jackson v. Homechoice, Inc., 368 F.3d 997, 999 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the limitation period for Section 1981 claims is four years.

The Court noted that "the Supreme Court held in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 158 L. Ed. 2d 645, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3236, 124 S. Ct. 1836 (2004), that the four-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1658 applies to any claim that was made possible by an Act of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990. Thus, any claim created by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which expanded the scope of section 1981, is governed by a four-year limitations period."

The Court then applied this rule to the facts before it:

Jackson's claims that he was discriminated against and discharged from employment because of his race, and that he was harassed and terminated in retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, were not cognizable under section 1981 prior to 1991. As originally enacted, the statute did not protect against harassing conduct that occurred after the formation of a contract. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-78, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). Claims alleging wrongful discharge or hostile work environment did not state violations of the original version of section 1981. Jones, 124 S. Ct. at 1840. The 1991 Act, however, expanded the statute to include the "termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). It is this post-1990 version of section 1981 that Jackson invokes as the basis for his claims under section 1981. Accordingly, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Jones, the applicable statute of limitation is four years, and the claims should not have been dismissed based on the one-year statute of limitations in ACRA.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the grant of summary judgment with respect to Jackson's Title VII claims, but remand to the district court for further proceedings on claims brought under section 1981 that arise within the four-year limitations period.