Quasi-War

From Conservapedia

The Quasi-War was an undeclared naval war between the U.S. and France, 1798-1800. It was inconclusive militarily, but had a profound impact on American politics, as war opponent Thomas Jefferson defeated President John Adams for reelection in 1800, even as Adams was ending the war.

Contents 1 Origins 2 The War at Sea 3 Negotiating Peace 4 Results of the War 5 Bibliography 5.1 Primary sources 5.1.1 Notes

Origins

Although the United States had gained British recognition in 1783 following the American Revolution, it remained endangered by European economic and military rivalries and by insecure possession of the Ohio Valley. Indeed, both Britain and Spain were attempting to separate the western region from the United States. Of particular concern to the Federalist-mercantile classes of the Northeast was the fear that France also was planning to surround the new republic by gaining or regaining possession of Canada, Florida, and the Louisiana country. The agrarian planters led by Thomas Jefferson discounted this fear and instead admired the ideals of the French Revolution. They said that British monarchism represented a grave threat to American republicanism, and British influence had to be reduced. Foreign policy became the major force behind the creation of the first voter-based political parties in the world during the First Party System. The Federalist Party of Adams (and especially Alexander Hamilton) thus favored Britain and the Democratic-Republican Party of Jefferson favored the French.Cite error: Closing </ref> missing for <ref> tag

The War at Sea

The ensuing two years (1798-1800) of undeclared hostilities witnessed no land engagements, although Hamilton proposed the seizure of Florida and New Orleans, which belonged to France's ally, Spain. Regular naval engagements were few, since the British Navy held the bulk of the French battle squadrons under strict blockade. Actions were confined to the American Atlantic coastline and to the West Indies, the scenes of French depredations and of the surviving French commerce. The inexperienced U.S. Navy was represented chiefly by Thomas Truxtun, commander of the "Constellation," a 48-gun heavy frigate. On Feb. 9, 1799, off St. Kitts, Truxtun ran down and captured the French 40-gun cruiser "L'Insurgente" after an hour's fight. A year later, on Feb. 2, 1800, off Basse Terre, Truxtun nearly destroyed but failed to make a prize of the "Vengeance," a vastly superior 52-gun battle cruiser. The 30-gun light cruiser "Boston," under George Little, fought and took the 24-gun "Berceau" on Oct. 12, 1800, after another hard action.

During the war, the U.S. Navy took 84 armed French vessels, most of which were raiding privateers, and lost only the 14-gun "Retaliation" to overwhelming force. In the course of the conflict, U.S. foreign trade increased by $21,000,000 as a result of the protection afforded it by the navy. By the end of the war, the navy consisted of six heavy cruisers, six light cruisers, and one brig-of-war, in addition to twenty-one merchantmen converted to naval duty.

Negotiating Peace

The unexpected fighting ability of the U.S. Navy, which destroyed the French West Indian trade, together with the growing weaknesses and final overthrow of the Directory in France, combined to produce in Talleyrand a desire to reopen negotiations. At the same time, an embarrassing quarrel with Hamilton, and the increasing Republican outcry against his tottering administration, caused Adams to take sudden and unexpected action rejecting the hawks in his own party and offering peace to France. On Feb. 18, 1800, he sent to the Senate his nomination of William Murray as minister to France to negotiate peace, as Federalists cried betrayal.

The subsequent negotiations, embodied in the Treaty of Mortefontaine of Sept. 30, 1800, affirmed the rights of Americans as neutrals upon the sea and abrogated the alliance with France of 1778, but failed to provide compensation for the $20,000,000 "French Spoliation Claims" of the United States. The treaty also implicitly ensured that the United States would remain neutral toward France in the wars of Napoleon.

Results of the War

The Federalist capitalization upon the war fever of 1798, embodied in the Alien and Sedition Acts, however, recoiled against Adams. These statutes provided a rallying cry for the Republicans who nominated Jefferson and defeated Adams in the presidential election of 1800. Even though opposed in principle to the employment of force, the Republicans themselves were later forced to subdue the Barbary pirates, wage war against Britain in 1812, and again coerce France before securing general recognition of the territorial and maritime rights of the United States.

Bibliography

• Brown, Ralph A. The Presidency of John Adams. (1988). excerpt and text search
• DeConde, Alexander. The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France 1797–1801 (1966)
• Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism. (1993), the standard history of the 1790s enline edition
• Ferling, John. John Adams: A Life. (1992) excerpt and text search
• Ferling, John. "'Oh That I Was a Soldier': John Adams and the Anguish of War," American Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer, 1984), pp. 258-275 in JSTOR
• Fowler, Jr. William M. Jack Tars and Commodores: The American Navy, 1783-1815 (1984)
• Hale, Matthew Rainbow. "'Many Who Wandered in Darkness': the Contest over American National Identity, 1795-1798." Early American Studies 2003 1(1): 127-175. Issn: 1543-4273
• Kohn, Richard H. Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (1975)
• Kurtz, Stephen G. The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of Federalism, 1795-1800 (1957). Detailed political narrative. online edition
• McCullough, David. John Adams. (2002). Pulitzer Prize popular biography, excerpt and text search
• Miller, John C. The Federalist Era: 1789-1801 (1960), pp 210-227
• Murphy, Jr. William J. "John Adams: The Politics of the Additional Army, 1798-1800," The New England Quarterly Vol. 52, No. 2 (Jun., 1979), pp. 234-249 in JSTOR
• Palmer, Michael A. Stoddert's War: Naval Operations During the Quasi-War With France, 1798-1801 (2000) excerpt and text search
• Phillips, James Duncan. "Salem's Part in the Naval War with France," The New England Quarterly Vol. 16, No. 4 (Dec., 1943), pp. 543-566 in JSTOR
• Ray, Thomas M. "'Not One Cent for Tribute': The Public Addresses and American Popular Reaction to the XYZ Affair, 1798-1799." Journal of the Early Republic (1983) 3(4): 389-412. Issn: 0275-1275 in Jstor
• Sharp, James. American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis. (1995), detailed political narrative of 1790s.
• Smelser, Marshall. The Congress Founds the Navy, 1787-1798 (1959)
• Smith, Jean Edward John Marshall: Definer Of A Nation, (1996).
• Stinchcombe, William. The XYZ Affair. (1980). 167 pp.
• Stinchcombe, William. "The Diplomacy of the WXYZ Affair," in William and Mary Quarterly, 34:590-617 (October 1977); in JSTOR; note the "W". in JSTOR
• Stinchcombe, William. "Talleyrand and the American Negotiations of 1797-1798." Journal of American History 1975 62(3): 575-590. Issn: 0021-8723 Fulltext: in Jstor

Primary sources

• Knox, Dudley W. ed. Naval Documents Related to the Quasi-War between the United States and France (1935) online edition
• Marsall, John. "Letters of John Marshall When Envoy to France, 1797, 1798." American Historical Review 1897 2(2): 294-306. Issn: 0002-8762 Fulltext: in JSTOR

Notes