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Essay: One person's view of the Ontological Argument

No change in size, 14:44, 23 November 2011
In the Thomist view, the nature of God is the being the existence of which is the same as its essence: there are no bumps. The contrary to the Thomist view, namely that omnipotence includes the power to cause itself to cease to exist, implicitly allows that the idea of 'existence' is a thing in itself. I call the idea that ‘existence is a thing in itself’ ‘meta-existence’. So, for anyone who thinks that existence is a thing in itself, I say that ‘they think that meta-existence exists.’
They say that existence is not a 'property' and, thus, that it cannot add anything to the greatness of something. I think this is why they find the [[Ontological Argumentargument]] an empty attempt at defining greatness. What I just said about 'meta-existence' is my attempt to communicate what I see as the error of abstracting 'existence' in such a way as to hold that it is a non-thing. I think that only if there is no thing which 'exists necessarily' can 'existence' add nothing to greatness. In other words, if nothing, including 'existence', is inherently mutual to anything, then I see no way for anything to be deduced from anything.
I would say that the way in which existence is deduced as a property of perfection is different from the way in which a future (pending) puddle on pavement is deduced from present rain, in that, unless something exists as a property of itself, then nothing exists. I would say that non-existence is not, I repeat, not a property either of anything that does exist or of anything that does not exist; while existence is a property of anything that does exist; and, only some things may exist necessarily; and, perfection of the ultimate concept (God) includes necessary existence. How the concept of 'necessity' can be divorced from the concept of 'existence' is beyond me, but there it is.
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