Difference between revisions of "Talk:John Birch Society"

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(New page: What do we mean by "front groups" here?)
 
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What do we mean by "front groups" here?
 
What do we mean by "front groups" here?
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:Here's some information we may be able to use, however it's not worked upto a full fledged organization yet.
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::'''Fronts and cutouts'''
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::A front organization in espionage functions within a system of "cutouts". A "cutout" is intended to shield or isolate a higher level infiltrator who has "penetrated" the target organization (government bureau, for example). Once the Department penetration has been made, the higher level infiltrator may have any of three jobs: (1) to bring within the government agency, and to protect, lower level appointees who are also infiltrators; (2) to provide information from within the penetrated target organization to an outside intelligence organization; or (3) a combination of both.
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::A "ring" within a penetrated bureau consists of several collectors of information from different areas within the penetrated bureau. The most valuable source must be protected; so often the least "productive" infiltrator, i.e. the person lowest on the totem pole within the penetrated target, whose knowledge and ability to collect information is second or third hand, functions as the head of the group. He carries the information from higher level gatherers to outside persons, so as to "cutout" contact between a high level infiltrator and a foreign intelligence organization.
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::So the most valuable and productive members of the ring are isolated from contact with foreign Agent case officers, which is safest for both. One member gathers all the collected material from all infiltrators, then will pass the information to another cutout outside the government. That second cutout likewise is usually a natural citizen, though not employed by the target government, but who then can transmit the information directly to the foreign intelligence service.
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::The extensive use of cutouts, so long as they are trusted and reliable persons, can become a long chain of individuals. This performs another purpose, similiar to the extensive use of "front organizations"; by their sheer number, it becomes a shell game with counterintelligence investigators, who have finite and limited resources. When suspicion arises, the large number of persons and organizations connected to the conspiracy can devour endless hours and cost, which has the effect of slowing down the process of exposing an espionage

Revision as of 15:01, 20 March 2007

What do we mean by "front groups" here?

Here's some information we may be able to use, however it's not worked upto a full fledged organization yet.
Fronts and cutouts
A front organization in espionage functions within a system of "cutouts". A "cutout" is intended to shield or isolate a higher level infiltrator who has "penetrated" the target organization (government bureau, for example). Once the Department penetration has been made, the higher level infiltrator may have any of three jobs: (1) to bring within the government agency, and to protect, lower level appointees who are also infiltrators; (2) to provide information from within the penetrated target organization to an outside intelligence organization; or (3) a combination of both.
A "ring" within a penetrated bureau consists of several collectors of information from different areas within the penetrated bureau. The most valuable source must be protected; so often the least "productive" infiltrator, i.e. the person lowest on the totem pole within the penetrated target, whose knowledge and ability to collect information is second or third hand, functions as the head of the group. He carries the information from higher level gatherers to outside persons, so as to "cutout" contact between a high level infiltrator and a foreign intelligence organization.
So the most valuable and productive members of the ring are isolated from contact with foreign Agent case officers, which is safest for both. One member gathers all the collected material from all infiltrators, then will pass the information to another cutout outside the government. That second cutout likewise is usually a natural citizen, though not employed by the target government, but who then can transmit the information directly to the foreign intelligence service.
The extensive use of cutouts, so long as they are trusted and reliable persons, can become a long chain of individuals. This performs another purpose, similiar to the extensive use of "front organizations"; by their sheer number, it becomes a shell game with counterintelligence investigators, who have finite and limited resources. When suspicion arises, the large number of persons and organizations connected to the conspiracy can devour endless hours and cost, which has the effect of slowing down the process of exposing an espionage