Rogers v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.
Rogers v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co, 167 F.3d 933 (1999), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that a defendant waives a challenge based on improper venue if he fails to appear.
Glynn W. Rodgers filed a complaint in a district court after the Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company denied him long term disability benefits. Receiving no response, Rogers requested that the district court file an entry of default, which it did. The court awarded Rogers expenses for disability benefits, medical benefits, prejudgment interest, and attorney's fees. Over a month later, Hartford and the Plan became aware of the default judgment, and promptly moved for relief. Hartford and the Plan motioned the district court to set aside the default judgment in its entirety, or, in the alternative, to set aside that portion of the judgment relating to medical benefits. The district court denied their motions to set aside the default judgment in its entirety. It decided, however, that Rogers could not recover expenses for medical treatment, and ordered the default judgment adjusted accordingly. Hartford and the Plan timely appealed; Rogers cross-appealed.
Hartford and the Plan contended that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the entire default judgment. Hartford argued that it appeared in the action by waiving service of process, and therefore, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) it was entitled to three days notice prior to the entry of a default judgment, which it did not receive. The Plan argued that Rogers improperly served it with process, and therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the default judgment. It also argued that the court should set aside the default judgment because venue was improper under ERISA. Finally, the Plan argued that its failure to respond timely to Rogers' complaint constituted excusable neglect.
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court, Rogers argued that the district court erroneously set aside that portion of the default judgment compensating him for medical expenses. According to Rogers, the award of medical expenses was necessary to restore him to the position he occupied prior to the wrongful denial of his long-term disability benefits. Rogers contended that ERISA provided for the recovery of this type of relief, and asked the court to reinstate the award of medical expenses.
In response to Hartford's challenge to the venue, the court ruled, "The Supreme Court has made clear that if a party defaults by failing to appear or file a timely responsive pleading, the party waives defects in venue. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343, 80 S. Ct. 1084, 1089, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1254,(1960) ("A defendant, properly served with process by a court having subject matter jurisdiction, waives venue by failing seasonably to assert it, or even simply by making default.")"
The Circuit Court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding, "We conclude that Mertens controls our resolution of Rogers' cross-appeal. Rogers may not recover medical expenses under ERISA. Accordingly, the district court properly vacated this portion of the default judgment."
