Talk:Euthyphro

2017-10-16T21:55:43Z

Matthew The Courier: /* I need help adding a reference to an addition to the page. */ new section

In Plato's early dialogues, Socrates typically argues by cross-examining someone's claims in order to draw out a contradiction among them. For example, in the Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro to provide a definition of piety. Euthyphro replies that the pious is that which is loved by the gods. But, Socrates also has Euthyphro agreeing that the gods are quarrelsome and their quarrels, like human quarrels, concern objects of love or hatred. Therefore, Socrates reasons, at least one thing exists that certain gods love but other gods hate. Again, Euthyphro agrees. Socrates concludes that if Euthyphro's definition of piety is acceptable, then there must exist at least one thing that is both pious and impious (as it is both loved and hated by the gods)—which, Euthyphro admits, is absurd. Thus, Euthyphro is brought to a realization by this dialectical method that his definition of piety cannot be correct. This particular example has become known as the Euthyphro dilemma: is something good because it is willed by God (or the gods), or is it willed by God because it is good? It shows that, underneath what appears as a simple contradiction due to prejudice and ignorance, issues much deeper and more difficult to resolve involving the nature of ultimate reality remain.

:I think I've got a solution. The Bible says, ''"In the beginning, the Word was with God and the Word '''was''' God."'' In other words, moral law doesn't control God, and God doesn't control moral law, God is moral law, and therefore defines it. Does this seem like a viable solution? [[User:DavidBG|David]] [[User talk:DavidBG|Talk]] 16:20, 2 November 2010 (EDT)

::Good question, but I think it's a false dilemma. [[Unificationism]] defines good and evil in terms of benifits (or harm) to other people. It's good to benefit another person, and especially noble to do so self-sacrificially: "Greater love hath no man than to lay down his life for ..." While evil would be to exploit another person for one's own benefit.

::Moreover, God has willed us (human beings) to lead a good life, as conceived by Him for our benefit and his delight (see Gen. 1:28). --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 17:16, 2 November 2010 (EDT)

:::So should this be put on the page? [[User:DavidBG|David]] [[User talk:DavidBG|Talk]] 17:59, 2 November 2010 (EDT)

::Oh, sorry, you were waiting for some kind of editorial direction? :-) Go ahead. --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 18:02, 3 November 2010 (EDT)

== I need help adding a reference to an addition to the page. ==

How do I add this to the reference list? - http://dougbenscoter.blogspot.com/2011/10/euthyphro-dilemma.html Thanks

Euthyphro

2017-10-16T21:51:53Z

Matthew The Courier: Benscoter's logic was added to the "Solution" section. An external reference needs to be added

'''''Euthyphro''''' (Greek '''''Ευθύφρων''''') is the name of one of [[Plato]]'s early [[Socrates|Socratic]] dialogues. Together with three other of his dialogues - the ''[[Apology (Plato)|Apology]]'', ''[[Crito]]'' and ''[[Phaedo]]'', it forms part of a group of Platonic dialogues on the trial and death of Socrates. In modern times, the group is often published together in a single volume with the title ''The Last Days of Socrates''.

In ''Euthyphro'', Socrates carries on a discussion on the nature of piety with Euthyphro, an acquaintance whom he meets on the steps of the courthouse as he (Socrates) arrives to answer to charges of [[impiety]] brought against him. Socrates discovers that Euthyphro is there in the capacity of a litigant bringing charges against his own father over the death of a laborer in his employ, one who had been retained because of his involvement in the death of a slave. For pressing charges against his father, Euthyphro had been reproached for being impious and it was this which led Socrates to inquiry about the nature of piety.

==The problem of Euthyphro==

In one of the more famous passages in this dialogue, Socrates asks:

:"The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved by the gods."

==Implications of the Problem==

In this context, piety and holiness are interchangeable with virtue or goodness.
Socrates is asking Euthyphro whether: (a) the gods love something because it is good, or (b) whether the object is good [[Divine command theory|because the gods love it]].
If we take (a) to be true, then the gods are unnecessary, because the object would be good regardless of their existence.
If we take (b) to be true, then we have two problems: that of continuity and that of arbitrariness. The problem of continuity arises when the gods change their minds and then declare a new moral law that is substantially different from, or perhaps even the opposite of, the previous moral law. An exaggerated example would be if [[murder]] or [[genocide]] were declared holy and just or even obligatory. The problem of arbitrariness states that the gods just selected some random things and then declared them holy for no real moral reason (as morality wouldn't exist until they did); this obviously raises the question about whether the random things they selected to be holy were really the best things for humanity.

== Atheism and the Euthypro ==

''See also:'' [[Atheism and the Euthyphro Dilemma#Atheism and the Euthyphro Dilemna|Atheism and the Euthyphro Dilemma]]

[[Creation Ministries International]] points out that [[atheism]] has problems related to the issues raised by the Euthypro dilemma.<ref>http://creation.com/atheism</ref> This has been called the 'Athyphro dilemma.'<ref>Matt Slick, ''[https://carm.org/athyphro-dilemma What is the Athyphro Dilemma?]'', CARM</ref> It might be said: Is something good because atheists say it is good, or do atheists say something's good because it is?

==Solution==
Thinkers grounded in Christianity and other branches of Monotheism hold that athesism predicated in the Euthyphro Dilemma is the practices of a [[false dichotomy]].

Doug Benscoter has posited that the substance of the argument is "A. X is good because God wills it. B. God wills X because X is good."

:"What the Euthyphro Dilemma requires in order to work properly is the implication that B entails independence of God. A and B should really be rephrased like this:

:A'. X, which is good, is dependent on God.

:B'. X, which is good, is independent of God.

: [W}hy not simply state the dilemma like this? The answer is likely that Euthyphro would have simply affirmed A'. Hence, there is no dilemma for him to consider. What Socrates and his modern counterpart have to defend is that B entails B'."

The answer is that goodness is a necessary aspect of God's nature. It is not apart from God, but he didn't decide it.

==References==
<references/>

==External links==

* [http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html ''Euthyphro''] Internet Classics Archive on-line version translated by Benjamin Jowett
* [http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/euthyphro/ SparkNotes philosophy study guide on ''Euthyphro'']
* [http://www.theandros.com/euthyphro.html Absurd Wisdom: an Apology for ''Euthyphro'', by John C. Medaille]
== Notes ==
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[[Category:Ancient Greece]]
[[Category:Philosophical Works]]

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