GUR - Revision history

RobSmith at 10:41, December 23, 2025

2025-12-23T10:41:06Z

RobSmith at 00:12, December 1, 2025

2025-12-01T00:12:17Z

RobSmith at 00:06, December 1, 2025

2025-12-01T00:06:09Z

RobSmith: /* Nuclear war threats */

2025-08-21T14:47:08Z

Nuclear war threats

RobSmith: /* Nuclear war threats */

2025-08-21T14:46:05Z

Nuclear war threats

RobSmith: /* CIA proxy */

2025-08-21T14:45:18Z

CIA proxy

RobSmith at 14:44, August 21, 2025

2025-08-21T14:44:09Z

RobSmith at 14:43, August 21, 2025

2025-08-21T14:43:11Z

RobSmith: Redirected page to Central Intelligence Agency#Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine

2024-02-01T21:42:02Z

Redirected page to Central Intelligence Agency#Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine

New page

#REDIRECT [[Central_Intelligence_Agency#Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine]]

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 [[File:NATO terror attack in Moscow.jpg|right|300px|thumb|[[Crocus terror attack]], March 22, 2024.]]
-The '''Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine''' ('''GUR''') is the [[Maidan regime]]'s [[military]] [[intelligence agency]]. The organization carries out [[covert] activities such as assassinations, sabotage, and [[terrorist attack]]s in addition to just information or 'intelligence' gathering.
+The '''Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine''' ('''GUR''') is the [[Maidan regime]]'s [[military]] [[intelligence agency]]. The organization carries out [[covert]] activities such as assassinations, [[sabotage]], and [[terrorist attack]]s in addition to just information or 'intelligence' gathering.
 After the [[Obama]]-backed [[Maidan coup]] in 2014, the [[CIA]] embarked on an extensive transformation of the GUR. With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the [[SBU]] and had a narrower focus on [[espionage]] and [[active measures]] against [[Russia]]. It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from [[Soviet]] times, while the SBU was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence. Some of the GUR’s new recruits were transfers from the SBU. Among them was Vasyl Burba, who had managed SBU Fifth Directorate operations before joining the GUR and serving as agency director from 2016 to 2020. Burba became such a close ally of the CIA that the CIA provided him an armored vehicle.

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 [[File:NATO terror attack in Moscow.jpg|right|300px|thumb|[[Crocus terror attack]], March 22, 2024.]]
-The '''Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine''' ('''GUR''') is the [[Maidan regime]]'s [[military]] [[intelligence agency]]. The organization carries out [[covert] activities such as assassinations, sabotage, and [[terrorist attack]]s in addition to intelligence gathering.
+The '''Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine''' ('''GUR''') is the [[Maidan regime]]'s [[military]] [[intelligence agency]]. The organization carries out [[covert] activities such as assassinations, sabotage, and [[terrorist attack]]s in addition to just information or 'intelligence' gathering.
 After the [[Obama]]-backed [[Maidan coup]] in 2014, the [[CIA]] embarked on an extensive transformation of the GUR. With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the [[SBU]] and had a narrower focus on [[espionage]] and [[active measures]] against [[Russia]]. It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from [[Soviet]] times, while the SBU was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence. Some of the GUR’s new recruits were transfers from the SBU. Among them was Vasyl Burba, who had managed SBU Fifth Directorate operations before joining the GUR and serving as agency director from 2016 to 2020. Burba became such a close ally of the CIA that the CIA provided him an armored vehicle.

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:06, December 1, 2025
Line 1:		Line 1:
		+	[[File:NATO terror attack in Moscow.jpg\|right\|300px\|thumb\|[[Crocus terror attack]], March 22, 2024.]]
		+	The '''Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine''' ('''GUR''') is the [[Maidan regime]]'s [[military]] [[intelligence agency]]. The organization carries out [[covert] activities such as assassinations, sabotage, and [[terrorist attack]]s in addition to intelligence gathering.

−	~~[[File:NATO terror attack in Moscow.jpg\|right\|300px\|thumb\|[[Crocus terror attack]], March 22, 2024.]]~~	+	After the [[Obama]]-backed [[Maidan coup]] in 2014, the [[CIA]] embarked on an extensive transformation of the GUR. With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the [[SBU]] and had a narrower focus on [[espionage]] and [[active measures]] against [[Russia]]. It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from [[Soviet]] times, while the SBU was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence. Some of the GUR’s new recruits were transfers from the SBU. Among them was Vasyl Burba, who had managed SBU Fifth Directorate operations before joining the GUR and serving as agency director from 2016 to 2020. Burba became such a close ally of the CIA that the CIA provided him an armored vehicle.
−	~~The '''Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine''' ('''GUR''') is the [[Maidan regime]]'s [[military]] [[intelligence agency]].~~ After the [[Obama]]-backed [[Maidan coup]] in 2014, the [[CIA]] embarked on an extensive transformation of the GUR. With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the [[SBU]] and had a narrower focus on [[espionage]] and [[active measures]] against [[Russia]]. It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from [[Soviet]] times, while the SBU was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence. Some of the GUR’s new recruits were transfers from the SBU. Among them was Vasyl Burba, who had managed SBU Fifth Directorate operations before joining the GUR and serving as agency director from 2016 to 2020. Burba became such a close ally of the CIA that the CIA provided him an armored vehicle.

	==CIA proxy==		==CIA proxy==

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:47, August 21, 2025
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	==Nuclear war threats==		==Nuclear war threats==
		+	[[File:Suwalski Gap.jpg\|right\|300px\|thumb\|Suwalski Gap]]
	On July 18, 2025 the commander of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe and NATO Land Forces, General Christopher Donahue, for the first time publicly confirmed the existence of a plan to suppress Russian defenses in the [[Kaliningrad]] region. "Kaliningrad is 47 miles of territory surrounded by [[NATO]] countries. There is no reason why we can’t suppress the A2/AD zone<ref>Anti-Access/Area Denial</ref> from land, and we have already developed a plan of action," Donahue stated at a conference in [[Wiesbaden]]. NATO is developing a "[[Deterrence]] Line on the Eastern Flank" strategy. This is not merely a [[policy]] but a [[technical]] and operational plan that includes shared [[weapon]]s systems, compatible launch systems, unified digital coordination, and integration of all NATO countries.<ref>https://t.me/ukraine_watch/44477</ref>		On July 18, 2025 the commander of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe and NATO Land Forces, General Christopher Donahue, for the first time publicly confirmed the existence of a plan to suppress Russian defenses in the [[Kaliningrad]] region. "Kaliningrad is 47 miles of territory surrounded by [[NATO]] countries. There is no reason why we can’t suppress the A2/AD zone<ref>Anti-Access/Area Denial</ref> from land, and we have already developed a plan of action," Donahue stated at a conference in [[Wiesbaden]]. NATO is developing a "[[Deterrence]] Line on the Eastern Flank" strategy. This is not merely a [[policy]] but a [[technical]] and operational plan that includes shared [[weapon]]s systems, compatible launch systems, unified digital coordination, and integration of all NATO countries.<ref>https://t.me/ukraine_watch/44477</ref>

@@ Line 18: / Line 18: @@
 ==Nuclear war threats==
-On July 18, 2025 the commander of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe and NATO Land Forces, General Christopher Donahue, for the first time publicly confirmed the existence of a plan to suppress Russian defenses in the Kaliningrad region. "Kaliningrad is 47 miles of territory surrounded by [[NATO]] countries. There is no reason why we can’t suppress the A2/AD zone<ref>Anti-Access/Area Denial</ref> from land, and we have already developed a plan of action," Donahue stated at a conference in [[Wiesbaden]]. NATO is developing a "[[Deterrence]] Line on the Eastern Flank" strategy. This is not merely a [[policy]] but a [[technical]] and operational plan that includes shared [[weapon]]s systems, compatible launch systems, unified digital coordination, and integration of all NATO countries.<ref>https://t.me/ukraine_watch/44477</ref>
+On July 18, 2025 the commander of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe and NATO Land Forces, General Christopher Donahue, for the first time publicly confirmed the existence of a plan to suppress Russian defenses in the [[Kaliningrad]] region. "Kaliningrad is 47 miles of territory surrounded by [[NATO]] countries. There is no reason why we can’t suppress the A2/AD zone<ref>Anti-Access/Area Denial</ref> from land, and we have already developed a plan of action," Donahue stated at a conference in [[Wiesbaden]]. NATO is developing a "[[Deterrence]] Line on the Eastern Flank" strategy. This is not merely a [[policy]] but a [[technical]] and operational plan that includes shared [[weapon]]s systems, compatible launch systems, unified digital coordination, and integration of all NATO countries.<ref>https://t.me/ukraine_watch/44477</ref>
 Donahue's statement was not intended to suggest that NATO had imminent plans to launch a first strike; rather it was a warning to Russia about the alliance's readiness. Commentators and officials interpret these remarks as reassurance to NATO partners and a signal to [[Moscow]] that any attack on NATO would prompt a decisive and rapid response. Regardless of Donahue's intent, ex-[[CIA]] analyst [[Larry Johnson]] observed that this is a reckless, dangerous statement in light of his position as the head of the US European Command. While it may have boosted morale in the [[Baltic states]], the Russians viewed it as a serious threat and a provocation.

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:45, August 21, 2025
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	Also in 2016, the CIA has helped Ukraine set up a dozen forward operating bases along the border with Russia, from which Ukrainian officers have collected intelligence, monitored Russian communications and sometimes carried out covert operations.		Also in 2016, the CIA has helped Ukraine set up a dozen forward operating bases along the border with Russia, from which Ukrainian officers have collected intelligence, monitored Russian communications and sometimes carried out covert operations.
		+
		+	==Nuclear war threats==
		+	On July 18, 2025 the commander of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe and NATO Land Forces, General Christopher Donahue, for the first time publicly confirmed the existence of a plan to suppress Russian defenses in the Kaliningrad region. "Kaliningrad is 47 miles of territory surrounded by [[NATO]] countries. There is no reason why we can’t suppress the A2/AD zone<ref>Anti-Access/Area Denial</ref> from land, and we have already developed a plan of action," Donahue stated at a conference in [[Wiesbaden]]. NATO is developing a "[[Deterrence]] Line on the Eastern Flank" strategy. This is not merely a [[policy]] but a [[technical]] and operational plan that includes shared [[weapon]]s systems, compatible launch systems, unified digital coordination, and integration of all NATO countries.<ref>https://t.me/ukraine_watch/44477</ref>
		+
		+	Donahue's statement was not intended to suggest that NATO had imminent plans to launch a first strike; rather it was a warning to Russia about the alliance's readiness. Commentators and officials interpret these remarks as reassurance to NATO partners and a signal to [[Moscow]] that any attack on NATO would prompt a decisive and rapid response. Regardless of Donahue's intent, ex-[[CIA]] analyst [[Larry Johnson]] observed that this is a reckless, dangerous statement in light of his position as the head of the US European Command. While it may have boosted morale in the [[Baltic states]], the Russians viewed it as a serious threat and a provocation.
		+
		+	Russian authorities responded that any military assault on Kaliningrad would be treated unequivocally as an attack on the [[Russian Federation]] itself. [[Leonid Slutsky]], chair of the Russian parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee (a senior figure who often reflects Foreign Ministry thinking), explicitly stated:
		+	{{quotebox-float\|An attack on the Kaliningrad Region will mean an attack on Russia, with all due retaliatory measures stipulated, among other things, by its [[Russian nuclear doctrine\|nuclear doctrine]]…. The American general should consider this before making such declarations.}}
		+	A [[parliamentary]] defense committee member called the threats "essentially a [[declaration of war]]." Donahue’s remarks, beyond being incredibly [[stupid]], displayed the arrogance and contempt that [[US]] [[political]] and [[military]] leaders have for Russia.<ref>[https://larrycjohnson.substack.com/p/more-unnecessary-bellicosity-from More Unnecessary Bellicosity from a Senior US General Raises Tensions with Russia], [[Larry Johnson]], 22 July 2025. </ref> Former [[chief-of-staff]] for [[Secretary of State]] [[Colin Powell]] later stated Donahue's source was the [[Ukrainian]] [[military]] [[intelligence agency]], the [[GUR]].<ref>https://youtu.be/nwfprr7kV54?t=2195</ref>

	==References==		==References==

@@ Line 2: / Line 2: @@
 [[File:NATO terror attack in Moscow.jpg|right|300px|thumb|[[Crocus terror attack]], March 22, 2024.]]
 The '''Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine''' ('''GUR''') is the [[Maidan regime]]'s [[military]] [[intelligence agency]]. After the [[Obama]]-backed [[Maidan coup]] in 2014, the [[CIA]] embarked on an extensive transformation of the GUR. With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the [[SBU]] and had a narrower focus on [[espionage]] and [[active measures]] against [[Russia]]. It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from [[Soviet]] times, while the SBU was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence. Some of the GUR’s new recruits were transfers from the SBU. Among them was Vasyl Burba, who had managed SBU Fifth Directorate operations before joining the GUR and serving as agency director from 2016 to 2020. Burba became such a close ally of the CIA that the CIA provided him an armored vehicle.
 The CIA helped the GUR acquire state-of-the-art surveillance and electronic eavesdropping systems, including mobile equipment that could be placed along Russian-controlled lines in eastern Ukraine, but also software tools used to exploit the [[cellphone]]s of [[Kremlin]] officials visiting outside of Moscow. Ukrainian officers operated the systems but everything gleaned was shared with the Americans.

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:43, August 21, 2025
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−	~~#REDIRECT~~ [[~~Central_Intelligence_Agency#~~Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine]]	+
		+	[[File:NATO terror attack in Moscow.jpg\|right\|300px\|thumb\|[[Crocus terror attack]], March 22, 2024.]]
		+	The '''Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine''' ('''GUR''') is the [[Maidan regime]]'s [[military]] [[intelligence agency]]. After the [[Obama]]-backed [[Maidan coup]] in 2014, the [[CIA]] embarked on an extensive transformation of the GUR. With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the [[SBU]] and had a narrower focus on [[espionage]] and [[active measures]] against [[Russia]]. It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from [[Soviet]] times, while the SBU was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence. Some of the GUR’s new recruits were transfers from the SBU. Among them was Vasyl Burba, who had managed SBU Fifth Directorate operations before joining the GUR and serving as agency director from 2016 to 2020. Burba became such a close ally of the CIA that the CIA provided him an armored vehicle.
		+
		+	The CIA helped the GUR acquire state-of-the-art surveillance and electronic eavesdropping systems, including mobile equipment that could be placed along Russian-controlled lines in eastern Ukraine, but also software tools used to exploit the [[cellphone]]s of [[Kremlin]] officials visiting outside of Moscow. Ukrainian officers operated the systems but everything gleaned was shared with the Americans.
		+
		+	Concerned that the GUR’s aging facilities were likely compromised by Russian intelligence, the CIA paid for new headquarters buildings for the GUR’s “spetsnaz” paramilitary division and a separate directorate responsible for electronic espionage. Troves of data were relayed through the new CIA-built facility back to Washington, where they were scrutinized by CIA and [[NSA]] analysts.
		+
		+	The GUR had also developed networks of sources in Russia’s security apparatus. The CIA was permitted to have direct contact with agents recruited and run by Ukrainian intelligence.
		+
		+	The GUR was being prepared by the CIA to fight Russia as a small [[proxy]] army. The operation to train GUR personnel by the CIA was called "Goldfish".<ref>https://abcnews.go.com/International/cia-helped-rebuild-ukraine-intelligence-russia-invasion/story?id=116909361</ref>
		+
		+	In 2016, a certain unit called 2245, trained in the [[US]], was sent to [[Crimea]] to [[sabotage]] one of the [[helicopter]] bases. However, "the mission went catastrophically wrong": a shootout with Russian special forces began, as a result of which several of the unit's fighters could have died. One of those who was trained in Unit 2245 was the current head of the GUR, [[Kirill Budanov]].
		+
		+	Also in 2016, the CIA has helped Ukraine set up a dozen forward operating bases along the border with Russia, from which Ukrainian officers have collected intelligence, monitored Russian communications and sometimes carried out covert operations.
		+
		+	==References==
		+	{{reflist}}
		+
		+	[[Category:Russia-Ukraine War]]