Sino-Russian Entente - Revision history

RobSmith: /* Background */

2026-06-16T04:30:38Z

‎Background

RobSmith: /* Background */

2026-06-16T04:30:08Z

‎Background

RobSmith: /* Background */

2026-06-16T04:29:26Z

‎Background

RobSmith at 04:20, June 16, 2026

2026-06-16T04:20:50Z

RobSmith: /* No limits partnership */

2025-12-17T06:52:49Z

‎No limits partnership

RobSmith: /* Disagreements */

2025-05-14T03:35:55Z

‎Disagreements

RobSmith: /* Disagreements */

2025-05-14T03:33:23Z

‎Disagreements

RobSmith: /* References */

2024-07-05T22:38:55Z

‎References

RobSmith at 16:13, June 22, 2024

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 As the 21st century began, Russia had no acknowledged sphere of influence in [[Europe]], though its European neighbors (other than the newly established state of [[Ukraine]]) remained careful not to provoke it. But, as the newly globalized American sphere of influence (represented in Europe by NATO) neared its borders, Moscow became obsessed with strategic denial of neighboring countries to dominant America influence. Meanwhile, longstanding objections by China to continuing U.S. support of [[Taiwan]] (the Chinese island province to which the US-supported losing side in the Chinese civil war had retreated) intensified. China sought to remove Taiwan from the U.S. sphere of influence in [[Asia]] and to deny it status as an independent polity. Despite having no claims of its own, the United States challenged China's territorial claims in the East China Sea and [[South China Sea]].
-[[Washington, D.C.|Washington's]] labeling of both Russia and China as [[ideological]] and [[geopolitical]] adversaries and its treatment of them as such gave their partnership a common focus and helped to consolidate it. [[Escalating]] U.S. pressure pushed these two formerly estranged [[great power]]s into an increasingly open and comprehensive anti-American [[entente]], committed to coordination of policies and actions directed at reducing the menacing military presence and hostile political influence of the United States on their respective peripheries.
+[[Washington, D.C.|Washington's]] labeling of both Russia and China as [[ideological]] and [[geopolitical]] adversaries and its treatment of them as such gave their partnership a common focus and helped to consolidate it. [[Escalating]] U.S. pressure pushed these two formerly estranged [[great power]]s into an increasingly open and comprehensive anti-American entente, committed to coordination of policies and actions directed at reducing the menacing military presence and hostile political influence of the United States on their respective peripheries.
 ==No limits partnership==

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 ==Background==
-[[NATOs expansion]] and what the [[United States]] called its "pivot to Asia" produced a growing, openly hostile presence, headed by senior U.S. combatant commanders, on the peripheries of both [[Russia]] and [[China]] that aimed at [[militarily]] containing both. Not surprisingly, both pushed back. [[Moscow]] [[escalate]]d its objections to further expansion of the [[American]] [[sphere of influence]] represented by [[NATO]] and warned that it would have to react militarily if this were not halted. [[Beijing]] renewed its drive to end the division of China produced by U.S. military intervention in the [[Taiwan Strait]] to separate the combatants in the Chinese civil war that ended in 1949. Sino-American hostility grew apace.
+[[NATO expansion]] and what the [[United States]] called its "pivot to Asia" produced a growing, openly hostile presence, headed by senior U.S. combatant commanders, on the peripheries of both [[Russia]] and [[China]] that aimed at [[militarily]] containing both. Not surprisingly, both pushed back. [[Moscow]] [[escalate]]d its objections to further expansion of the [[American]] [[sphere of influence]] represented by [[NATO]] and warned that it would have to react militarily if this were not halted. [[Beijing]] renewed its drive to end the division of China produced by U.S. military intervention in the Taiwan Strait to separate the combatants in the Chinese civil war that ended in 1949. Sino-American hostility grew apace.
 As the 21st century began, Russia had no acknowledged sphere of influence in [[Europe]], though its European neighbors (other than the newly established state of [[Ukraine]]) remained careful not to provoke it. But, as the newly globalized American sphere of influence (represented in Europe by NATO) neared its borders, Moscow became obsessed with strategic denial of neighboring countries to dominant America influence. Meanwhile, longstanding objections by China to continuing U.S. support of [[Taiwan]] (the Chinese island province to which the US-supported losing side in the Chinese civil war had retreated) intensified. China sought to remove Taiwan from the U.S. sphere of influence in [[Asia]] and to deny it status as an independent polity. Despite having no claims of its own, the United States challenged China's territorial claims in the East China Sea and [[South China Sea]].

← Older revision		Revision as of 04:29, June 16, 2026
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	==Background==		==Background==
		+	[[NATOs expansion]] and what the [[United States]] called its "pivot to Asia" produced a growing, openly hostile presence, headed by senior U.S. combatant commanders, on the peripheries of both [[Russia]] and [[China]] that aimed at [[militarily]] containing both. Not surprisingly, both pushed back. [[Moscow]] [[escalate]]d its objections to further expansion of the [[American]] [[sphere of influence]] represented by [[NATO]] and warned that it would have to react militarily if this were not halted. [[Beijing]] renewed its drive to end the division of China produced by U.S. military intervention in the [[Taiwan Strait]] to separate the combatants in the Chinese civil war that ended in 1949. Sino-American hostility grew apace.

		+	As the 21st century began, Russia had no acknowledged sphere of influence in [[Europe]], though its European neighbors (other than the newly established state of [[Ukraine]]) remained careful not to provoke it. But, as the newly globalized American sphere of influence (represented in Europe by NATO) neared its borders, Moscow became obsessed with strategic denial of neighboring countries to dominant America influence. Meanwhile, longstanding objections by China to continuing U.S. support of [[Taiwan]] (the Chinese island province to which the US-supported losing side in the Chinese civil war had retreated) intensified. China sought to remove Taiwan from the U.S. sphere of influence in [[Asia]] and to deny it status as an independent polity. Despite having no claims of its own, the United States challenged China's territorial claims in the East China Sea and [[South China Sea]].
		+
		+	[[Washington, D.C.\|Washington's]] labeling of both Russia and China as [[ideological]] and [[geopolitical]] adversaries and its treatment of them as such gave their partnership a common focus and helped to consolidate it. [[Escalating]] U.S. pressure pushed these two formerly estranged [[great power]]s into an increasingly open and comprehensive anti-American [[entente]], committed to coordination of policies and actions directed at reducing the menacing military presence and hostile political influence of the United States on their respective peripheries.

	==No limits partnership==		==No limits partnership==

← Older revision		Revision as of 04:20, June 16, 2026
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	Writing in 1997 former [[National Security Advisor]] to [[President Jimmy Carter]] [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]] forewarned, "A grand coalition of China and Russia united not by [[ideology]] but by complementary grievances would pose the most dangerous scenario as far as threats to United States [[hegemony]] are concerned."<ref>[https://www.sott.net/article/404941-Americas-nightmare-The-Sino-Russian-entente America's nightmare: The Sino-Russian entente], John S. Van Oudenaren, Center for National Interest, 12 Jan 2019. www.sott.net</ref><ref>[https://strategic-culture.su/news/2023/01/29/other-america-or-three-missed-chances-to-avoid-world-war-iii/ The Other America (Or the Three Missed Chances to Avoid World War III)], Matthew Ehret, January 29, 2023. strategic-culture.su</ref> China and Russia are linked by a common understanding of the threat to their [[sovereignty]] from [[US]] [[unipolar]] [[hegemony]].<ref>[https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america%E2%80%99s-nightmare-sino-russian-entente-41447 America’s Nightmare: The Sino-Russian Entente], by John S. Van Oudenaren, ''The National Interest'', January 12, 2019. nationalinterest.org</ref><ref>[https://www.indianpunchline.com/russia-china-entente-deepens-in-the-shadow-of-the-pandemic/ Russia-China entente deepens in the shadow of the pandemic], BY M. K. BHADRAKUMAR, ''Indian Punchline'', MAY 2, 2020. www.indianpunchline.com</ref> Russian Foreign Minister [[Sergey Lavrov]] made it expressed that the core of the Russia-China relationship revolves around establishing an [[economic]] and [[financial]] axis to counterpunch the [[Bretton Woods Conference\|Bretton Woods system]]. That implies doing everything to protect [[Moscow]] and [[Beijing]] from “threats of [[economic sanctions\|sanctions]] by other [[state]]s”; progressive [[de-dollarization]]; and advances in [[cryptocurrency]].<ref>[https://www.unz.com/pescobar/us-nato-vs-russia-china-in-a-hybrid-war-to-the-finish/ US-NATO vs Russia-China in a Hybrid War to the Finish], PEPE ESCOBAR, UNZ, MARCH 26, 2021. www.unz.com</ref>		Writing in 1997 former [[National Security Advisor]] to [[President Jimmy Carter]] [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]] forewarned, "A grand coalition of China and Russia united not by [[ideology]] but by complementary grievances would pose the most dangerous scenario as far as threats to United States [[hegemony]] are concerned."<ref>[https://www.sott.net/article/404941-Americas-nightmare-The-Sino-Russian-entente America's nightmare: The Sino-Russian entente], John S. Van Oudenaren, Center for National Interest, 12 Jan 2019. www.sott.net</ref><ref>[https://strategic-culture.su/news/2023/01/29/other-america-or-three-missed-chances-to-avoid-world-war-iii/ The Other America (Or the Three Missed Chances to Avoid World War III)], Matthew Ehret, January 29, 2023. strategic-culture.su</ref> China and Russia are linked by a common understanding of the threat to their [[sovereignty]] from [[US]] [[unipolar]] [[hegemony]].<ref>[https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america%E2%80%99s-nightmare-sino-russian-entente-41447 America’s Nightmare: The Sino-Russian Entente], by John S. Van Oudenaren, ''The National Interest'', January 12, 2019. nationalinterest.org</ref><ref>[https://www.indianpunchline.com/russia-china-entente-deepens-in-the-shadow-of-the-pandemic/ Russia-China entente deepens in the shadow of the pandemic], BY M. K. BHADRAKUMAR, ''Indian Punchline'', MAY 2, 2020. www.indianpunchline.com</ref> Russian Foreign Minister [[Sergey Lavrov]] made it expressed that the core of the Russia-China relationship revolves around establishing an [[economic]] and [[financial]] axis to counterpunch the [[Bretton Woods Conference\|Bretton Woods system]]. That implies doing everything to protect [[Moscow]] and [[Beijing]] from “threats of [[economic sanctions\|sanctions]] by other [[state]]s”; progressive [[de-dollarization]]; and advances in [[cryptocurrency]].<ref>[https://www.unz.com/pescobar/us-nato-vs-russia-china-in-a-hybrid-war-to-the-finish/ US-NATO vs Russia-China in a Hybrid War to the Finish], PEPE ESCOBAR, UNZ, MARCH 26, 2021. www.unz.com</ref>
		+
		+	==Background==
		+

	==No limits partnership==		==No limits partnership==

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 The [[NATO war in Ukraine]] brought [[Moscow]] and [[Beijing]] closer together for the first time since the days of [[Mao]] and [[Stalin]].<ref>[https://truthout.org/articles/war-in-ukraine-needs-to-be-understood-in-context-of-new-russia-china-alliance/ War in Ukraine Needs to Be Understood in Context of New Russia-China Alliance], By Alfred W. McCoy , ''TOM DISPATCH'', March 10, 2022. truthout.org. First published in TomDispatch https://tomdispatch.com/the-geopolitics-of-the-ukraine-war/</ref> [[Biden]] and those who come after him are unlikely to be able to make a division, as [[Nixon]] did in 1972.<ref>[https://archive.is/ioghJ#selection-437.0-605.14 This Is the Russia-China Friendship That Nixon Feared], By Farah Stockman, ''[[New York Times]]'', Feb. 20, 2022. </ref><ref>[https://archive.is/70KJw Fifty Years After Nixon’s Visit, China Tilts Back Toward Russia], James T. Areddy, ''[[Wall Street Journal]]'', Feb. 26, 2022.</ref> Former Presidential briefer [[Ray McGovern]] chronicled how
-:''"as [[Biden]] took office in 2021, his advisers assured him that he could play on [[Russia]]'s fear (sic) of [[China]] – and drive a wedge between them. This represents the ‘mother of all errors’ of judgement, because it brings about the circumstances in which the [[New World Order|western ‘Order’]] may dissolve”. “This [presumption of Russian weakness] became embarrassingly clear when Biden said to [[Putin]] during their [[Geneva]] summit in June 2021 … let me ask a rhetorical question: ‘You got a multi-thousand-mile border with China. China is seeking to be the most powerful [[economy]] in the world and the largest and the most powerful [[military]] in the world’.” McGovern observes that this meeting gave Putin clear confirmation that Biden and his advisers were stuck in a woefully outdated appraisal of Russia-China relations. Here is the bizarre way Biden described his approach to Putin on China: At the airport after the summit, Biden’s aides did their best to whisk him onto the plane but failed to stop him from sharing more ‘wisdom’ on China: “Russia is in a very, very difficult spot right now. They are being squeezed by China”. ‘Yes’: More of the same! Biden was trying, on the advice of his experts, to insert the ubiquitous [[Western alliance|western ‘wedge’]] between Russia and a ‘BIG’ China.''<ref>[https://consortiumnews.com/2024/05/17/ray-mcgovern-russia-china-two-against-one/ RAY McGOVERN: Russia & China — Two Against One], Ray McGovern, ''Consortium News]], May 17, 2024. consortiumnews.com</ref>
+:''"as [[Biden]] took office in 2021, his advisers assured him that he could play on [[Russia]]'s fear (sic) of [[China]] – and drive a wedge between them. This represents the ‘mother of all errors’ of judgement, because it brings about the circumstances in which the [[New World Order|western ‘Order’]] may dissolve”. “This [presumption of Russian weakness] became embarrassingly clear when Biden said to [[Putin]] during their [[Geneva]] summit in June 2021 … let me ask a rhetorical question: ‘You got a multi-thousand-mile border with China. China is seeking to be the most powerful [[economy]] in the world and the largest and the most powerful [[military]] in the world’.” McGovern observes that this meeting gave Putin clear confirmation that Biden and his advisers were stuck in a woefully outdated appraisal of Russia-China relations. Here is the bizarre way Biden described his approach to Putin on China: At the airport after the summit, Biden’s aides did their best to whisk him onto the plane but failed to stop him from sharing more ‘wisdom’ on China: “Russia is in a very, very difficult spot right now. They are being squeezed by China”. ‘Yes’: More of the same! Biden was trying, on the advice of his experts, to insert the ubiquitous [[Western alliance|western ‘wedge’]] between Russia and a ‘BIG’ China.''<ref>[https://consortiumnews.com/2024/05/17/ray-mcgovern-russia-china-two-against-one/ RAY McGOVERN: Russia & China — Two Against One], Ray McGovern, ''[[Consortium News]]'', May 17, 2024. consortiumnews.com</ref>
 After these remarks, Putin and [[Xi]] spent the rest of 2021 trying to disabuse Biden of the “China squeeze” [[meme]]: This mutual effort culminated in the Xi-Putin ‘no limits’ friendship summit in early February 2022. If the advisers had been paying attention however, they would have threaded a long history of Russo-Chinese [[rapprochement]]. But no, they were [[ideological]]ly frozen in the view that the two were destined to be eternal enemies.

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 ==Disagreements==
-{{See also|Belligerents in NATO imperial wars#India-Pakistan}}
+{{See also|Belligerents in NATO imperial wars#India-Pakistan front}}
 While China and Russia's strategic ties are closer than ever before, they still disagree on [[Kashmir]] and the [[South China Sea]] issues since Russia fully supports [[India]] and [[Vietnam]]'s respective positions. The two prioritize their corresponding national interests which largely overlap, in which cases they cooperate to pursue their shared goals, but they sometimes diverge. Nevertheless, Russia and China manage these disagreements for the greater good of [[multipolarity]].

← Older revision		Revision as of 03:33, May 14, 2025
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	==Disagreements==		==Disagreements==
		+	{{See also\|Belligerents in NATO imperial wars#India-Pakistan}}
	While China and Russia's strategic ties are closer than ever before, they still disagree on [[Kashmir]] and the [[South China Sea]] issues since Russia fully supports [[India]] and [[Vietnam]]'s respective positions. The two prioritize their corresponding national interests which largely overlap, in which cases they cooperate to pursue their shared goals, but they sometimes diverge. Nevertheless, Russia and China manage these disagreements for the greater good of [[multipolarity]].		While China and Russia's strategic ties are closer than ever before, they still disagree on [[Kashmir]] and the [[South China Sea]] issues since Russia fully supports [[India]] and [[Vietnam]]'s respective positions. The two prioritize their corresponding national interests which largely overlap, in which cases they cooperate to pursue their shared goals, but they sometimes diverge. Nevertheless, Russia and China manage these disagreements for the greater good of [[multipolarity]].

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:38, July 5, 2024
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	{{reflist\|2}}		{{reflist\|2}}

−	[[Category:~~Diplomacy~~]]	+	[[Category:International Relations]]

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−	[[File:Lavrov March 19 2022.jpeg\|right\|300px\|thumb\|Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov comment during Q & A at the Leaders of Russia Management Competition, Moscow, March 19, 2022.<ref>https://thesaker.is/foreign-minister-sergey-lavrov-leaders-of-russia-management-competition-moscow-march-19-2022/</ref> ''[[NYT]]'' journalist Tom Friedman joked, ''"Grandma always said never fight Russia and China at the same time."''<ref>[https://archive.ph/YHRPS We Are Suddenly Taking On China and Russia at the Same Time], [[Thomas Friedman]], ''[[New York Times]]'' Op-ed, Oct. 12, 2022. </ref>]]	+	[[File:Lavrov March 19 2022.jpeg\|right\|300px\|thumb\|Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov comment during Q & A at the Leaders of Russia Management Competition, Moscow, March 19, 2022.<ref>[https://archive.is/U6Hpy Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov: Leaders of Russia management competition], Moscow, March 19, 2022. Original https://thesaker.is/foreign-minister-sergey-lavrov-leaders-of-russia-management-competition-moscow-march-19-2022/</ref> ''[[NYT]]'' journalist Tom Friedman joked, ''"Grandma always said never fight Russia and China at the same time."''<ref>[https://archive.ph/YHRPS We Are Suddenly Taking On China and Russia at the Same Time], [[Thomas Friedman]], ''[[New York Times]]'' Op-ed, Oct. 12, 2022. </ref>]]
	The '''Sino-Russo Entente''' refers to a series of [[diplomatic]], [[economic]] and [[military]] ties between the [[Peoples Republic of China]] and the [[Russian Federation]] in the early 21st century.		The '''Sino-Russo Entente''' refers to a series of [[diplomatic]], [[economic]] and [[military]] ties between the [[Peoples Republic of China]] and the [[Russian Federation]] in the early 21st century.

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:08, June 22, 2024
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−	[[File:Lavrov March 19 2022.jpeg\|right\|300px\|thumb\|Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov comment during Q & A at the Leaders of Russia Management Competition, Moscow, March 19, 2022.<ref>https://thesaker.is/foreign-minister-sergey-lavrov-leaders-of-russia-management-competition-moscow-march-19-2022/</ref> ''[[NYT]]'' journalist Tom Friedman joked, ''"Grandma always said never fight Russia and China at the same time."''<ref>https://archive.ph/YHRPS</ref>]]	+	[[File:Lavrov March 19 2022.jpeg\|right\|300px\|thumb\|Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov comment during Q & A at the Leaders of Russia Management Competition, Moscow, March 19, 2022.<ref>https://thesaker.is/foreign-minister-sergey-lavrov-leaders-of-russia-management-competition-moscow-march-19-2022/</ref> ''[[NYT]]'' journalist Tom Friedman joked, ''"Grandma always said never fight Russia and China at the same time."''<ref>[https://archive.ph/YHRPS We Are Suddenly Taking On China and Russia at the Same Time], [[Thomas Friedman]], ''[[New York Times]]'' Op-ed, Oct. 12, 2022. </ref>]]
	The '''Sino-Russo Entente''' refers to a series of [[diplomatic]], [[economic]] and [[military]] ties between the [[Peoples Republic of China]] and the [[Russian Federation]] in the early 21st century.		The '''Sino-Russo Entente''' refers to a series of [[diplomatic]], [[economic]] and [[military]] ties between the [[Peoples Republic of China]] and the [[Russian Federation]] in the early 21st century.