Terminal Railroad case - Revision history

Aschlafly at 03:42, November 5, 2022

2022-11-05T03:42:52Z

Aschlafly at 02:49, November 5, 2022

2022-11-05T02:49:29Z

Aschlafly: Created page with "In ''United States v. Terminal R. Ass'n'', 224 U.S. 383 (1912), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against an association that monopolized the Eads Bridge and associated ter..."

2022-11-05T02:48:17Z

Created page with "In ''United States v. Terminal R. Ass'n'', 224 U.S. 383 (1912), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against an association that monopolized the Eads Bridge and associated ter..."

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In ''United States v. Terminal R. Ass'n'', 224 U.S. 383 (1912), the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] ruled against an association that monopolized the [[Eads Bridge]] and associated terminal in [[St. Louis]].
<blockquote>But when, as here, the inherent conditions are such as to prohibit any other reasonable means of entering the city, the combination of every such facility under the exclusive ownership and control of less than all of the companies under compulsion to use them violates both the first and second sections of the act, in that it constitutes a contract or combination in restraint of commerce among the States and an attempt to monopolize commerce among the States which must pass through the gateway at St. Louis.

The Government has urged a dissolution of the combination between the Terminal Company, the Merchants' Bridge Terminal Company and the Wiggins Ferry Company. That remedy may be necessary unless one equally adequate can be applied.

But the illegal restraint upon commerce among the States which we here find to exist consists in the possession acquired by the proprietary companies through the means and with the object we have stated of dominating commerce among the States carried on by other railroads entering or seeking to enter the city of St. Louis and by which such railroads are compelled either to desist from carrying on interstate commerce or to do so upon the terms imposed by the proprietary companies. This control and possession constitutes such a grip upon the commerce of St. Louis and commerce which must cross the river there, whether coming from the east or west as to be both an illegal restraint and an attempt to monopolize.

The power resulting from the combination even before completed by the acquisition of the Wiggins Ferry Company and its related terminals was exhibited when the Rock Island sought an independent entrance.

Some of its abuses are shown by the imposition of the arbitrary hauling charge imposed upon the artificially limited trade districts described. It is shown also by the maintenance of the system of billing traffic destined to cross the river at St. Louis, either east or west, or to St. Louis, if from points on the east side of the river, a practice so galling and universal as to practically "eliminate St. Louis from the railroad map," to quote the graphic, if extravagant, language of counsel for the United States, as respects the great traffic subject to the regulation.

Plainly the combination which has occurred would not be an illegal restrict under the terms of the statute if it were what is claimed for it, a proper terminal association acting as the impartial agent of every line which is under compulsion to use its instrumentalities.</blockquote>
''United States v. Terminal R. Ass'n'', 224 U.S. 383, 409-10 (1912).
[[category:antitrust]]

← Older revision		Revision as of 03:42, November 5, 2022
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−	[[File:Eads Bridge.jpg\|right\|300px\|~~Thumb~~\|Eads Bridge]]In ''United States v. Terminal R. Ass'n'', 224 U.S. 383 (1912), the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] ruled against an association that monopolized the [[James Eads\|Eads Bridge]] and associated terminal in [[St. Louis]]:	+	[[File:Eads Bridge.jpg\|right\|300px\|thumb\|Eads Bridge]]In ''United States v. Terminal R. Ass'n'', 224 U.S. 383 (1912), the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] ruled against an association that monopolized the [[James Eads\|Eads Bridge]] and associated terminal in [[St. Louis]]:
	<blockquote>But when, as here, the inherent conditions are such as to prohibit any other reasonable means of entering the city, the combination of every such facility under the exclusive ownership and control of less than all of the companies under compulsion to use them violates both the first and second sections of the act, in that it constitutes a contract or combination in restraint of commerce among the States and an attempt to monopolize commerce among the States which must pass through the gateway at St. Louis.		<blockquote>But when, as here, the inherent conditions are such as to prohibit any other reasonable means of entering the city, the combination of every such facility under the exclusive ownership and control of less than all of the companies under compulsion to use them violates both the first and second sections of the act, in that it constitutes a contract or combination in restraint of commerce among the States and an attempt to monopolize commerce among the States which must pass through the gateway at St. Louis.

← Older revision		Revision as of 02:49, November 5, 2022
Line 1:		Line 1:
−	In ''United States v. Terminal R. Ass'n'', 224 U.S. 383 (1912), the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] ruled against an association that monopolized the [[Eads Bridge]] and associated terminal in [[St. Louis]].	+	[[File:Eads Bridge.jpg\|right\|300px\|Thumb\|Eads Bridge]]In ''United States v. Terminal R. Ass'n'', 224 U.S. 383 (1912), the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] ruled against an association that monopolized the [[James Eads\|Eads Bridge]] and associated terminal in [[St. Louis]]:
	<blockquote>But when, as here, the inherent conditions are such as to prohibit any other reasonable means of entering the city, the combination of every such facility under the exclusive ownership and control of less than all of the companies under compulsion to use them violates both the first and second sections of the act, in that it constitutes a contract or combination in restraint of commerce among the States and an attempt to monopolize commerce among the States which must pass through the gateway at St. Louis.		<blockquote>But when, as here, the inherent conditions are such as to prohibit any other reasonable means of entering the city, the combination of every such facility under the exclusive ownership and control of less than all of the companies under compulsion to use them violates both the first and second sections of the act, in that it constitutes a contract or combination in restraint of commerce among the States and an attempt to monopolize commerce among the States which must pass through the gateway at St. Louis.