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'''''Euthyphro''''' is the name of one of [[Plato]]'s early [[Socrates|Socratic]] dialogues. Together with three other of his dialogues - the [[Apology]], [[Crito]] and [[Phaedo]], it forms part of a group of Platonic dialogues on the trial and death of Socrates. In modern times, the group is often published together in a single volume of that title.
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'''''Euthyphro''''' (Greek '''''Ευθύφρων''''') is the name of one of [[Plato]]'s early [[Socrates|Socratic]] dialogues. Together with three other of his dialogues - the ''[[Apology (Plato)|Apology]]'', ''[[Crito]]'' and ''[[Phaedo]]'', it forms part of a group of Platonic dialogues on the trial and death of Socrates. In modern times, the group is often published together in a single volume with the title ''The Last Days of Socrates''.
  
 
In ''Euthyphro'', Socrates carries on a discussion on the nature of piety with Euthyphro, an acquaintance whom he meets on the steps of the courthouse as he (Socrates) arrives to answer to charges of [[impiety]] brought against him. Socrates discovers that Euthyphro is there in the capacity of a litigant bringing charges against his own father over the death of a laborer in his employ, one who had been retained because of his involvement in the death of a slave. For pressing charges against his father, Euthyphro had been reproached for being impious and it was this which led Socrates to inquiry about the nature of piety.
 
In ''Euthyphro'', Socrates carries on a discussion on the nature of piety with Euthyphro, an acquaintance whom he meets on the steps of the courthouse as he (Socrates) arrives to answer to charges of [[impiety]] brought against him. Socrates discovers that Euthyphro is there in the capacity of a litigant bringing charges against his own father over the death of a laborer in his employ, one who had been retained because of his involvement in the death of a slave. For pressing charges against his father, Euthyphro had been reproached for being impious and it was this which led Socrates to inquiry about the nature of piety.
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==Implications of the Problem==
 
==Implications of the Problem==
  
In this context, piety and holiness are interchangable with virtue or goodness.
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In this context, piety and holiness are interchangeable with virtue or goodness.
 
Socrates is asking Euthyphro whether: (a) the gods love something because it is good, or (b) whether the object is good [[Divine command theory|because the gods love it]].
 
Socrates is asking Euthyphro whether: (a) the gods love something because it is good, or (b) whether the object is good [[Divine command theory|because the gods love it]].
 
If we take (a) to be true, then the gods are unnecessary, because the object would be good regardless of their existence.
 
If we take (a) to be true, then the gods are unnecessary, because the object would be good regardless of their existence.
If we take (b) to be true, then we have two problems: that of continuity and that of arbitrariness. The problem of continuity is what happens when the gods change their minds and then declare the opposite to be immoral: an exaggerated example is if murder was declared holy and just. The problem of arbitrariness states that the gods just selected some random things, and then declared them holy for no real moral reason (as morality wouldn't exist until they did); this obviously raises the question about whether the random things they selected to be holy were really the best things for humanity.
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If we take (b) to be true, then we have two problems: that of continuity and that of arbitrariness. The problem of continuity arises when the gods change their minds and then declare a new moral law that is substantially different from, or perhaps even the opposite of, the previous moral law.  An exaggerated example would be if [[murder]] or [[genocide]] were declared holy and just or even obligatory. The problem of arbitrariness states that the gods just selected some random things and then declared them holy for no real moral reason (as morality wouldn't exist until they did); this obviously raises the question about whether the random things they selected to be holy were really the best things for humanity.
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== Atheism and the Euthypro ==
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''See also:'' [[Atheism and the Euthyphro Dilemma#Atheism and the Euthyphro Dilemna|Atheism and the Euthyphro Dilemma]]
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[[Creation Ministries International]] points out that [[atheism]] has problems related to the issues raised by the Euthypro dilemma.<ref>http://creation.com/atheism</ref> This has been called the 'Athyphro dilemma.'<ref>Matt Slick, ''[https://carm.org/athyphro-dilemma What is the Athyphro Dilemma?]'', CARM</ref> It might be said: Is something good because atheists say it is good, or do atheists say something's good because it is?
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==Solution==
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Thinkers grounded in Christianity and other branches of Monotheism hold that athesism predicated in the Euthyphro Dilemma is the practices of a [[false dichotomy]]. 
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Doug Benscoter has posited that the substance of the argument is "A. X is good because God wills it.  B. God wills X because X is good."
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:"What the Euthyphro Dilemma requires in order to work properly is the implication that B entails independence of God. A and B should really be rephrased like this:
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:A'. X, which is good, is dependent on God.
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:B'. X, which is good, is independent of God.
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: [W}hy not simply state the dilemma like this? The answer is likely that Euthyphro would have simply affirmed A'. Hence, there is no dilemma for him to consider. What Socrates and his modern counterpart have to defend is that B entails B'."
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The answer is that goodness is a necessary aspect of God's nature. It is not apart from God, but he didn't decide it.
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==References==
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<references/>
  
 
==External links==
 
==External links==
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* [http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/euthyphro/ SparkNotes philosophy study guide on ''Euthyphro'']
 
* [http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/euthyphro/ SparkNotes philosophy study guide on ''Euthyphro'']
 
* [http://www.theandros.com/euthyphro.html Absurd Wisdom: an Apology for ''Euthyphro'', by John C. Medaille]
 
* [http://www.theandros.com/euthyphro.html Absurd Wisdom: an Apology for ''Euthyphro'', by John C. Medaille]
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== Notes ==
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{{reflist|2}}
  
 
[[Category:Ancient Greece]]
 
[[Category:Ancient Greece]]
[[Category:Philosophical works]]
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[[Category:Philosophical Works]]

Revision as of 21:51, October 16, 2017

Euthyphro (Greek Ευθύφρων) is the name of one of Plato's early Socratic dialogues. Together with three other of his dialogues - the Apology, Crito and Phaedo, it forms part of a group of Platonic dialogues on the trial and death of Socrates. In modern times, the group is often published together in a single volume with the title The Last Days of Socrates.

In Euthyphro, Socrates carries on a discussion on the nature of piety with Euthyphro, an acquaintance whom he meets on the steps of the courthouse as he (Socrates) arrives to answer to charges of impiety brought against him. Socrates discovers that Euthyphro is there in the capacity of a litigant bringing charges against his own father over the death of a laborer in his employ, one who had been retained because of his involvement in the death of a slave. For pressing charges against his father, Euthyphro had been reproached for being impious and it was this which led Socrates to inquiry about the nature of piety.

The problem of Euthyphro

In one of the more famous passages in this dialogue, Socrates asks:

"The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved by the gods."

Implications of the Problem

In this context, piety and holiness are interchangeable with virtue or goodness. Socrates is asking Euthyphro whether: (a) the gods love something because it is good, or (b) whether the object is good because the gods love it. If we take (a) to be true, then the gods are unnecessary, because the object would be good regardless of their existence. If we take (b) to be true, then we have two problems: that of continuity and that of arbitrariness. The problem of continuity arises when the gods change their minds and then declare a new moral law that is substantially different from, or perhaps even the opposite of, the previous moral law. An exaggerated example would be if murder or genocide were declared holy and just or even obligatory. The problem of arbitrariness states that the gods just selected some random things and then declared them holy for no real moral reason (as morality wouldn't exist until they did); this obviously raises the question about whether the random things they selected to be holy were really the best things for humanity.

Atheism and the Euthypro

See also: Atheism and the Euthyphro Dilemma

Creation Ministries International points out that atheism has problems related to the issues raised by the Euthypro dilemma.[1] This has been called the 'Athyphro dilemma.'[2] It might be said: Is something good because atheists say it is good, or do atheists say something's good because it is?

Solution

Thinkers grounded in Christianity and other branches of Monotheism hold that athesism predicated in the Euthyphro Dilemma is the practices of a false dichotomy.

Doug Benscoter has posited that the substance of the argument is "A. X is good because God wills it. B. God wills X because X is good."

"What the Euthyphro Dilemma requires in order to work properly is the implication that B entails independence of God. A and B should really be rephrased like this:
A'. X, which is good, is dependent on God.
B'. X, which is good, is independent of God.
[W}hy not simply state the dilemma like this? The answer is likely that Euthyphro would have simply affirmed A'. Hence, there is no dilemma for him to consider. What Socrates and his modern counterpart have to defend is that B entails B'."

The answer is that goodness is a necessary aspect of God's nature. It is not apart from God, but he didn't decide it.

References

  1. http://creation.com/atheism
  2. Matt Slick, What is the Athyphro Dilemma?, CARM

External links

Notes