View source for German All. Ins. v. Lewis

In ''German All. Ins. Co. v. Lewis'', 233 U.S. 389 (1914), a 6-3 [[U.S. Supreme Court]] upheld a law by [[Kansas]] to regulate private fire insurance rates.

The Court held that:
{{cquote|Those regulations exhibit it to be the conception of the law-making bodies of the country without exception that the business of insurance so far affects the public welfare as to invoke and require governmental regulation. A conception so general cannot be without cause. The universal sense of a people cannot be accidental; its persistence saves it from the charge of unconsidered impulse, and its estimate of insurance certainly has substantial basis. Accidental fires are inevitable and the extent of loss very great. The effect of insurance -- indeed, it has been said to be its fundamental object -- is to distribute the loss over as wide an area as possible. In other words, the loss is spread over the country, the disaster to an individual is shared by many, the disaster to a community shared by other communities; great catastrophes are thereby lessened, and, it may be, repaired. In assimilation of insurance to a tax, the companies have been said to be the mere machinery by which the inevitable losses by fire are distributed so as to fall as lightly as possible on the public at large, the body of the insured, not the companies, paying the tax. Their efficiency, therefore, and solvency are of great concern. The other objects, direct and indirect, of insurance we need not mention. Indeed, it may be enough to say, without stating other effects of insurance, that a large part of the country's wealth, subject to uncertainty of loss through fire, is protected by insurance. This demonstrates the interest of the public in it and we need not dispute with the economists that this is the result of the "substitution of certain for uncertain loss" or the diffusion of positive loss over a large group of persons, as we have already said to be certainly one of its effects. We can see, therefore, how it has come to be considered a matter of public concern to regulate it, and, governmental insurance has its advocates and even examples. Contracts of insurance, therefore, have greater public consequence than contracts between individuals to do or not to do a particular thing whose effect stops with the individuals. We may say in passing that when the effect goes beyond that, there are many examples of regulation. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366; Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225; Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U.S. 578; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104.

Complainant feels the necessity of accounting for the regulatory state legislation and refers it to the exertion of the police power, but, while expressing the power in the broad language of the cases, seeks to restrict its application. Counsel states that this power may be exerted to "pass laws whose purpose is the health, safety, morals and the general welfare of the people." The admission is very comprehensive. What makes for the general welfare is necessarily in the first instance a matter of legislative judgment and a judicial review of such judgment is limited. "The scope of judicial inquiry in deciding the question of power is not to be confused with the scope of legislative considerations in dealing with the matter of policy. Whether the enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner, are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the earnest conflict of serious opinion does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance." Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 569.

The restrictions upon the legislative power which complainant urges we have discussed, or rather the considerations which take, it is contended, the business of insurance outside of the sphere of the power. To the contention that the business is private we have opposed the conception of the public interest. We have shown that the business of insurance has very definite characteristics, with a reach of influence and consequence beyond and different from that of the ordinary businesses of the commercial world, to pursue which a greater liberty may be asserted. The transactions of the latter are independent and individual, terminating in their effect with the instances. The contracts of insurance may be said to be interdependent. They cannot be regarded singly, or isolatedly, and the effect of their relation is to create a fund of assurance and credit, the companies becoming the depositories of the money of the insured, possessing great power thereby and changed with great responsibility. How necessary their solvency is, is manifest. On the other hand to the insured, insurance is an asset, a basis of credit. It is practically a necessity to business activity and enterprise. It is, therefore, essentially different from ordinary commercial transactions, and, as we have seen, according to the sense of the world from the earliest times -- certainly the sense of the modern world -- is of the greatest public concern. It is, therefore, within the principle we have announced.

But it is said that the reasoning of the opinion has the broad reach of subjecting to regulation every act of human endeavor and the price of every article of human use. We might, without much concern, leave our discussion to take care of itself against such misunderstanding or deductions. The principle we apply is definite and old and has, as we have pointed out, illustrating examples. And both by the expression of the principle and the citation of the examples we have tried to confine our decision to the regulation of the business of insurance, it having become "clothed with a public interest," and therefore subject "to be controlled by the public for the common good."}}
''German All. Ins. Co. v. Lewis'', 233 U.S. 389, 412-15, 34 S. Ct. 612, 619-20 (1914).
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