Henry Kissinger

Henry Kissinger (1923- ) , American statesman and exponent of "realism" in foreign policy; he dominated foreign policy in the the administrations of presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, holding both positions for a time. He won the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize for reaching a peace that ended the Vietnam War. In close collaboration with Nixon, he created a détente policy that called for an end to the Cold War and for friendly relations with both the Soviet Union and China. His position on détente was rejected by Ronald Reagan in the 1976 campaign for the presidential nomination. But Reagan lost the election to Ford, and in turn Ford was defeated by Democrat Jimmy Carter, as Kissinger retired to write his highly revealing memoirs ansd consult for businesses worldwide.

Life

Kissinger was born in Fürth, Germany, on May 27, 1923 to a middle class Jewish family. They fled Nazi persecution, and arrived in New York in 1938, where he changed his first name from Heinz to Henry and rapidly Americanized in everything except his thick accent. He attended public schools and City University before being drafted at age 19. He returned to Europe during World War II with the U.S. Army; he was in the infantry then intelligence and was discharged as a sergeant in 1946, then spent a year as an civilian instructor in denazification at an Army school in Germany. He had power and responsibility far beyond his years because of his intelligence and his energy and his commitment to oppsing the Nazis. In the army, Kissinger was informally tutored in depth by Fritz Kraemer, a fellow refugee with two PhD's. In 1950 Kissinger earned his B.A. summa cum laude at Harvard with a 377 page essay on "The Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee and Kant." He finished his Ph.D. in 1956 at Harvard, with a dissertation on "A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22," a study praising how the conservative diplomats of the era built a stable and peaceful international system after the Napoleonic wars.

He married Ann Fleischer in 1949 and was divorced in 1964. There were two children, Elizabeth and David. In 1974 he married Nancy Maginnes.

Harvard professor

Kissinger became a full professor in Harvard's Department of Government in 1962. As the director of Harvard's University Summer International Seminar, 1952-69, he brought in nearly 700 young European and Asian scholars, many of whom became high officials in their own country. Kissinger met practically every intellectual in international relations at home and abroad.

Kissinger was eager to serve on national commissions. He served as Study Director, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, for the Council of Foreign Relations from 1955 to 1956; Director of the Special Studies Project for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund from 1956 to 1958; and Director of the Harvard Defense Studies Program from 1958 to 1971. He resigned from Harvard in January 1971 when his two-year leave of absence expired.

In 1957 Kissinger published Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, which proposed a flexible defense posture, including provision for "limited warfare" and the strategic employment of nuclear weapons as an alternative to the doctrine of "massive retaliation" against direct foreign aggression, which dominated military thinking during the mid-1950s. The book brought Kissinger to national attention, and he became an mid-level advisor on security questions under presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson; he was foreign policy advisor in Nelson Rockefeller's 1968 quest for the Republican party nomination, but Nixon won the nomination and Kissinger switched to the winner.

Kissinger was consultant to the Department of State (1965-68), United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1961-68), Rand Corporation (1961-68), National Security Council (1961-62), Weapons Systems Evaluation Group of the joint Chiefs of Staff (1959-60), Operations Coordinating Board (1955), Director of the Psychological Strategy Board (1952), Operations Research Office (1951), and Chairman of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (1983-84). In 2001 he was not appointed to head the commission studying the 9-11 Attack because he was too controversial.

National Security Advisor

In 1969 Nixon appointed him his top advisor on foreign affairs as "Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs" )or "National Security Advisor") in charge of the National Security Council staff, which he made his base of power. He and Nixon largely ignored the State Department in setting the main lines of foreign policy. In 1973, Kissinger gained the additional role as secretary of state. He was the only person ever to hold the two top national security roles at the same time, and in 1975 he was replaced as head of the NSC.

Kissinger's approach to foreign policy was shaped by his vision of world peace achieved through a global balance of power; and accordingly Kissinger believed that effective U.S. diplomacy needed to be backed by force and guided by the pragmatism of Realpolitik rather than by high ideals and abstract causes. In practice his diplomacy, which mixed a highly visible, personal style with secret, behind-the-scenes maneuverings, was marked by bold, often controversial, initiatives and by frequent travel between world capitals in what came to be known as "shuttle diplomacy".

Nuclear strategy

On taling office Nixon and Kissinger were briefed on the US nuclear war plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Appalled by the catastrophic scale of the SIOP, Nixon and Kissinger sought military options that were more credible than massive nuclear strikes. Participants in the Air Force Nuclear Options project also supported more flexible nuclear war plans. Although Kissinger repeatedly asked Defense Department officials to construct limited options, they were skeptical that it would be possible to control nuclear escalation or to introduce greater flexibility without weakening the SIOP. Interagency studies presented a mixed verdict about the desirability of limited options; nevertheless, continued White House pressure encouraged Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to sponsor a major review of nuclear targeting. In 1972 the John Foster panel developed concepts of limited, selective, and regional nuclear options that were responsive to Kissinger's interest in credible nuclear threats. The Foster panel's report led to the controversial "Schlesinger Doctrine" and further efforts to revise the SIOP, but serious questions endured about the whole concept of controlled nuclear warfare.

Détente with Soviet Union and China

Kissinger's first priority in office was the achievement of détente with the Soviet Union and China, and playing them off against each other . Recognizing and accepting the Soviet Union as a superpower, Kissinger sought both to maintain U.S. military strength and to inaugurate peaceful economic, cultural, and scientific exchanges to engage the Soviet Union in the international system. This policy flourished under Kissinger's direction and led in 1972 to the signing of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I). At the same time Kissinger successfully engineered a rapprochement with Communist China, leading to the astonishing news in 1971 that Nixon would visit China, which he and Kissinger did in 1972.

Aware that China and the Soviet Union were at sword's point, with rival claims to be the true Communists, Kissinger used the "Soviet card" to win over China by playing up the Soviet threat to the Chinese as a way of promoting closer relations with China. He even hinted at a US-China alliance to oppose the Soviets, and, with Nixon's trips to Moscow, hinted that China had better come to terms lest the US form an alliance with Moscow. The tactics worked, resulting in a friendly relationship with both Beijing and Moscow. As part of the détente, both powers reduced or ended their aid to North Vietnam, thus allowing a settlement of the Vietnam War.

Vietnam

Kissinger worked to achieve a disengagement of U.S. forces fighting in Vietnam. He promoted Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization," aimed at turning the burden of actual combat over to the South Vietnamese, with repeated shows of U.S. air strength, notably in the bombings of Cambodia and North Vietnam. Kissinger met secretly with North Vietnamese leaders in Paris from 1969 on, finally concluding a cease-fire in January 1973, for which he and chief North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho were awarded the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize. Later rumors to the effect that Kissinger knew the South Vietnamese government was too weak to survive long were wrong; Kissinger and Nixon had built South Vietnam into one of the strongest militaries in Asia--much stronger than the North Vietnamese--and they had stripped away much of Hanoi's support from Moscow and Beijing. The problem was that Saigon put all its future on the continuation of Nixon in office and his promises to intervene militarily if necessary. Nixon collapsed unexpectedly (because of Watergate) and his personal promises were gone. Saigon despaired and scarecely fought back when Hanoi did invade in 1975, after Nixon was gone and Congress forbad further American intervention.

Middle East

One challenge to détente under Kissinger came with the outbreak of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Faced with a threat of Soviet intervention, Kissinger successfully urged that U.S. forces be placed on worldwide alert. He then employed shuttle diplomacy to secure cease-fires between Israel and the Arab states and to restore U.S. Egyptian diplomatic ties, broken since 1967.

Latin American policies

The Nixon administration sought to protect the economic and commercial interests of the United States during a period of heightened Latin American nationalism and expropriations, 1969-74. Though the administration initially adopted a flexible policy toward Latin American governments that nationalized American corporations' assets, the influence of Nixon's economic ideology, domestic political pressures, and the advice of Secretary of the Treasury John Connally, led to a more confrontational stance toward Latin American countries. As the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and Kissinger had warned, however, Latin American countries took an even more anti-US stance and expropriated even more assets. Nixon's "get tough" stance, therefore, had a negative effect on American credibility and influence in the hemisphere.

Kissinger and Nixon permitted covert operations by the CIA and military]] designed to destabilize the anti-American Allende regime in Chile. Allende was overthrown by the Chilean military with no help from the U.S., but hatred of Kissinger on the left escalated another notch as their favorite regime collapsed.

South Asia

During the South Asian crisis in 1971, the White House, stood firmly behind Pakistani president Yahya Khan and demonstrated a disdain for India and particularly its leader, Indira Gandhi because of India's tilt or favoritism toward the Soviet Union. Kissinger had disdain for India and was using Pakistan as a tool to reach China, which he considered much more important to the U.S.

Losing power

Despite his real accomplishments, however, Kissinger's tenure was marked by much controversy. Revelations of his knowledge of Nixon's secret bombings in Cambodia in 1969 and the U.S. ground invasion of Cambodia in 1970 stirred particularly strong hatreds on the left, as did later discoveries that he had authorized wiretaps aimed at stopping leaks of classified information.

Much more serious, however, was the attack from the right by Ronald Rreagan, who rejected détente with the Soviets as a viable strategy, warning that the Soviets would see it as a sign of American weaknesses and mobilize its Third World allies to subvert pro-Americans governments wherever it could and expand Soviet influence. Reagan's analysis proved correct and Ford was forced to reduce Kissinger's role, taking away in 1975 Kissinger's double role as National Security Advisor.

In 1976 Ford was challenged by Ronald Reagan for the GOP nomination. Ford won a very long, close and intensely fought battle. Attacks on détente policy was the focus of Reagan's campaign as the GOP moved to the right on foreign policy. President Jimmy Carter, however, did not recognize the failure of détente until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 destroyed that policy and reopened the Cold War at a more intense level.

Kissinger remained on as secretary of state until the end of the Ford term in January 1977.

Retirement

Out of office Kissinger became a highly visible corporate consultant on world affairs, and wrote his highly detailed and insightful memoirs. In 1979, Kissinger and David Rockefeller reportedly convinced Carter to admit the Shah of Iran into the United States; the Shah, in desperate need of cancer therapy, was a long-time friend of the U.S. who had been overthrown by Islamic militants in Iran. Carter's decision prompted angry Shiite Muslims in Iran to capture the American embassy there and hold dozens of Americans hostage for nearly a year. The national crisis contributed to the defeat of President Jimmy Carter in the 1980 election.

Image and reputation

Kissinger was loathed by some liberals who viewed him as a war criminal and criticized by hardliners for detente. Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973 for pulling the United States out of Vietnam.

Kissinger was a Machiavellian figure, skilled at manipulating people around him and currying favor in the media. At one point he admitted allowing secret wiretapping of his own aides' conversations. When he testified before Congress, he would benefit from extraordinary exclusion of the press so that the American public would not hear his thick German accent. The aura of Kissinger's influence was due partly to a cultivated image of high intelligence, including a PhD degree from Harvard University.

Evaluation

A smooth-talking, charming bon vivant, Kissinger was an international celebrity in high society, with the opposite personality of Nixon, yet they made a remarkably effective team with surprisingly little friction. They thought alike, and both could conceptualize and make plans for the complex interactions of international affairs. Neither was interested in economics, and only Nixon mastered the nitty gritty of politics and elections, while only Kissinger understood nuclear strategy.

Kissinger and Nixon were "realists" who deemphasized idealistic goals like anti-communism or promotion of democracy worldwide, because those goals were too expensive in terms of America's economic capabilities. Instead of a Cold War they wanted peace, trade and cultural exchanges. They realized that Americans were no longer willing to tax themselves for idealistic foreign policy goals, especially for containment policies that never seemed to produce positive results. Instead Nixon and Kissinger sought to downsize America's global commitments in proportion to its reduced economic, moral and political power. They rejected "idealism" as impractical and too expensive; neither man showed much sensitivity to the plight of people living under Communism. Kissinger's realism fell out of fashion as idealism returned to American foreign policy with Carter's moralism emphasizing human rights, and Reagan's rollback strategy aimed at destroying Communism.

Bibliography

• Bundy, William P. A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (1998) excerpt and text search
• Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (2007) excerpt and text search, dual biography by leading scholar
• Garthoff, Raymond L. Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (2nd ed. 1994) excerpt and text search, favorable analysis by proponent of detente
• Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From "Red Menace" to "Tacit Ally." (2005). 299 pp.
• Goh, Evelyn. "Nixon, Kissinger, and the 'Soviet Card' in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971-1974." Diplomatic History 2005 29(3): 475-502. Issn: 0145-2096 Fulltext: Ebsco
• Hanhimäki, Jussi M. "'Dr. Kissinger' or 'Mr. Henry'? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting." Diplomatic History 2003 27(5): 637-676 full text at EBSCO
• Hanhimäki, Jussi M. "Ironies and Turning Points: Détente in Perspective," in Odd Arne Westad, ed. Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (2000), pp 326-42; excerpt and text search
• Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger (1992); a major biography excerpt and text search
• Kuklick, Bruce. Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger. (2006). 241 pp. says nearly everyone with substantial academic credentials in the early Cold War decades was wrong nearly all the time.
• Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976 (1986)
• Macmillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (2008)
• Mann, James. About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (1999).
• Nelson, Keith L. The Making of Détente: Soviet-American Relations in the Shadow of Vietnam (1995)
• Qureshi, Lubna Zakia. ""Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile (2009)
• Ross, Robert S. Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-1989, Stanford University Press, 1995 online edition
• Schulzinger, Robert D. Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy. (1989).
• Serewicz, Lawrence W. America at the Brink of Empire: Rusk, Kissinger, And the Vietnam War (2007), stresses commitment to republicanism excerpt and text search; online review
• Suri, Jeremi. Henry Kissinger and the American Century (2007), intellectual biography focused on pre-1969
• Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. "Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China." Journal of American History 2005 92(1): 109-135. in History Cooperative
• Warner, Geoffrey. "Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China, 1969-1972." International Affairs 2007 83(4): 763-781. Issn: 0020-5850 Fulltext: Ebsco
• Willbanks, James H. Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War (2004) excerpt and text search

Primary Sources

• Kissinger, Henry. White House Years (1979). Nov. 1968-Jan. 1973; Years of Upheaval (1982). Jan. 1973 to Aug. 1974; Years of Renewal (1999), Aug. 1974 to Jan. 1977 excerpt and text search vol 3
• Kissinger, Henry. "The Conservative Dilemma: Reflections on the Political Thought of Metternich" The American Political Science Review, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec., 1954), pp. 1017-1030 in JSTOR
• Kissinger, Henry. "The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal," World Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Jan., 1956), pp. 264-280 in JSTOR
• Kissinger, Henry. A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22. (1957), his revised PhD dissertation.
• Kissinger, Henry. "Acceptance Speech" for The Nobel Peace Prize 1973 online edition
• Kissinger, Henry. "Address to the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly," International Organization, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Summer, 1974), pp. 573-583 in JSTOR
• Kissinger, Henry. American Foreign Policy (3rd ed. 1977), his speeches
• Kissinger, Henry. "The Kissinger Commission on Population and Development in Central America," Population and Development Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Jun., 1984), pp. 381-389 in JSTOR
• Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy (1994) an interpretive history since 1815
• Kissinger, Henry. Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America's Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (2003) excerpt and text search
• Haldeman, H. R. The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (1994)
• Nixon, Richard. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (1981) excerpt and text search

Online sources

• William Burr, ed. "Nixon's Trip to China Records now Completely Declassified, Including Kissinger Intelligence Briefing and Assurances on Taiwan" The National Security Archive (2003)

References

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