Russian sanctions

Russophobia and sanctions was an improtant factor in the fraudulent Democrat/deep state Russia collusion hoax.

Russian sanctions were first imposed in 2014 after the illegal Obama-backed Maidan coup. More were imposed after the fraudulent Democrat/Deep State Russia collusion hoax, scapegoating Vladimir Putin and the Russians. Finally after the clearly provoked NATO expansion in Ukraine, more sanctions were imposed.

In the third week of February 2022, socialist leader Joe Biden said that "As a result of these unprecedented sanctions, the ruble almost is immediately reduced to rubble," and push the Russian economy from being the 11th biggest in the world to outside the top 20. The UK Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary variously said that sanctions would take "the wheels off the Russian war machine," and "hobble" its economy. EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen said "Russian industry is in tatters." The EU said that sanctions were designed to erode "sharply Russia's economic base." The sanctions, which were unprecedented in size and scope, were meant to damage the Russian economy to such an extent that Moscow would be unable to continue its intervention in the Donbas war and perhaps even lead to regime change. Many experts agreed, forecasting a catastrophic effect on the Russian economy. The Institute of Financial Studies predicted a 15% fall in GDP. A Yale study went even farther, arguing that Russia had lost foreign business presence in the country that accounted for 40% of its GDP, and that there was "no path out of economic oblivion for Russia."

Since sanctions the Russian economy has become more self-sufficient, by 2025 surpassing Germany and Japan to become the 4th largest economy on the planet.

Instead, Russian GDP declined only 2.1% in 2022, a mild recession by emerging market standards. By 2023, the IMF expected the Russian economy to return to growth, and indeed outperform the economies of Germany, Britain and France. Clearly, the sanctions failed.

The obvious reason for the failure was a fundamental misunderstanding of the size, development and importance of the Russian economy. The idea that Russia was "a gas station with nukes," had sunk into the Western received wisdom. Former President Barack Obama said that "Russia doesn't make anything," while the idea that Russia's economy was "about the size of Italy's" was commonplace, adding to the sense that Russia would be an economic pushover.

Russian GDP growth

It is true that in nominal terms Russia's economy was only a little larger than Italy's before the beginning of Russia's Special Military Operation. Nominal GDP, however, simply uses current national currency exchange rates with the dollar to compare one nation with another. It thus fails to capture real purchasing power & inflation. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) measurements of GDP seek to remedy this, and Russia's GDP PPP, not really needing much foreign currency, is far better even compared to Germany than it is to Italy's. Looking at GDP in PPP terms removes price level differences and allows a better comparison, especially of living standards, between countries. In these terms Russia overtook Germany in the summer of 2023 to become the fifth wealthiest economy in the world and the largest in Europe, worth $5.3 trillion.

Russian GDP nominally rose more than any G7 country in 2023. The average Russian household ended the year with about 18% more money in the bank than a year earlier. Sberbank, Russia’s largest state-controlled bank, posted a 5.5-fold year-on-year net profit jump to a record high of 1.5 trillion rubles (USD $16.3 billion). The defense industry employs 3.5 million people and many factories have doubled their workforce since the beginning of the SMO. The economic boom is result of defense stimulus spending, Keynesian economics, a government deficits. Compared to the United States, Russia is a piker in the debt markets. The U.S. gas $35 trillion national debt and growing), nearly a $1 trillion dollar defense budget, does not produce tanks, failed to produce a functional hypersonic missile, incapable of matching Russia’s output of artillery shells, and has become largely a service economy. The United States is no longer an industrial powerhouse.

Central Asian gains

Kyrgystan became a hub to evade the EU's Russia sanctions.

As trade ties between Russia and the EU were severed, Central Asian EU-trade increased to allow the reexport of EU goods (including dual use) to Russia. Trade with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan increased. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) became an effective mechanism for sanctions avoidance.

To give one example, German luxury car export to Kyrgyzstan increased by 31,000%. A major Russian gas deal with Uzbekistan and a $6bn coal deal with Kazakhstan, where almost 50% of foreign companies registered are now Russian, attest to an intensification of ties. Additionally, the multi-modal Middle Corridor was expected to replace the sanctioned Northern Corridor running through Russia. But the Middle Corridor still faces infrastructure bottlenecks and the Northern Corridor now transits pre-war volumes again. Central Asian migrant labor remittances increased, constituting 20% of Uzbek GDP, and higher percentages in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Ruble gains

As a result of sanctions, the Russian economy boomed as it become more self-sufficient under the weight of import substitution.

The demented Biden, whose crime family profited immensely from Ukraine corruption, claimed sanctions would reduce the ruble to rubble.

US sanctions

With sanctions, all McDonald's become domestically owned, renamed "Just Tasty", and the profits remained inside the country.

Since the start of the Special Military Operation (SMO), trade between the US and Russia has shrunk dramatically. In 2021, US exports to Russia totaled approximately $6.4 billion and US imports from Russia totaled about $29.7 billion. This resulted in a US trade deficit with Russia of about $23.3 billion for that year.

In 2024, total trade in goods between the United States and Russia declined sharply due to ongoing economic sanctions, war-related restrictions, and other political measures. US exports to Russia in 2024 were approximately $526 million, marking a decrease of over 12% compared to 2023. Major U.S. exports included medical/technical equipment, pharmaceuticals, machinery, and some food and chemical products.

U.S. imports from Russia in 2024 were about $3.0–$3.27 billion, down more than 34% compared to 2023 and down over 75% from pre-war levels in 2021–2022. Key Russian exports to the U.S. were fertilizers (about $1.3 billion), precious metals (about $878 million), and inorganic chemicals (about $683 million). Energy imports have almost entirely ceased.

Seizure of Russian assets

Three years into the NATO war in Ukraine the Belgium company Euroclear still held €258 billion ($300 billion USD) in frozen or immobilised Russian assets. Some of these assets belong to institutions not sanctioned by the European Union. Frozen assets amount to €65 billion, with an additional €193 billion in immobilised transactions, primarily from the Central Bank of Russia.

The EU has been confiscating the interest, not the principal, of that money to distribute it to Ukraine. That step is likely already illegal and Russia will use the courts to get it back. There has been talk of investing the Russian assets in junk bonds with aim of achieving a higher yield:

Euroclear chief executive Valérie Urbain told the Financial Times that European Union plans to raise additional revenue from frozen Russian assets by investing them in higher-risk securities would amount to "expropriation." Urbain also warned that such a move could prompt "Russian retaliation in all sorts of forms," as well as damage Euroclear's reputation...The EU was reportedly discussing the possibility of transferring the assets to a special EU-administered fund that would make higher-risk investments. The goal is to generate greater returns to support Ukraine.

The 19th Russia sanctions package in October 2025 banned the import of Russian-manufactured flush toilets. President Vladimir Putin responded, "The fact that they have canceled the purchase of our toilets, that will cost them dearly. In general, it seems to me they would actually need them in today's situation if they continue to pursue the same policy toward the Russian Federation."

The move was blocked as no one was ready to accept the potential liability for it. Not only Belgium, but also Germany and other fiscal conservative states, have warned that such a move would endanger their own assets. Russia has announced that it will retaliate against any confiscation of its money. It threatens to confiscate whatever European companies own or hold in Russia. Those companies would then have to sue their own governments for cover of their losses.

"In the future, investors are unlikely to place their assets in Euroclear, knowing they could be so easily liquidated without trial or due process, just as Russian assets are being liquidated.," said Georgy Ostapkovich, academic supervisor at the Center for Market Studies at the Higher School of Economics.

The authority of Western countries and Western finance houses will be undermined. "The likely consequence of such action by EU member states will be Russian confiscation of all assets of these countries, their companies and their citizens in the Russian Federation," according to international relations and Russian affairs analyst Gilbert Doctorow. "That may create a political storm when the companies seek legal redress against their governments."

Euroclear has expressed concerns over its future and the future of the euro currency if the Russian sovereign assets are seized by the EU. Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever has asked other EU leaders for guarantees they will share the risks. Former head of the German Blackrock office Fuhrer Friedrich Merz had a new idea. In a Financial Times op-ed Merz claimed:

Germany has been, and remains, cautious on the issue of confiscating the Russian central bank's assets that are frozen in Europe, and with good reason. There are not only questions of international law to consider, but also fundamental issues concerning the euro's role as a global reserve currency. But this must not hold us back: we must consider how, by circumventing these problems, we can make these funds available for the defence of Ukraine. In my view a viable solution should now be developed whereby — without intervening in property rights — we can make available to Ukraine an interest-free loan of almost €140 billion in total. That loan would only be repaid once Russia has compensated Ukraine for the damage it has caused during this war. Until then, the Russian assets will remain frozen, as decided by the European Council. Such extensive assistance will require budgetary guarantees from member states. Those bilateral guarantees should, as soon as the next Multiannual Financial Framework is in place in 2028, be replaced by collateralisation under the EU's long-term budget."

What sounds like AI slop is not Merz' own idea but a plan that had been proffered earlier by the EU Commission.

Frustration has been building in EU capitals around the lack of details surrounding the so-called reparations loan, which Commission President Ursula von der Leyen first pitched in her State of the European Union speech Sept. 10 [2025]. The bulk of the Russian assets are held by the Brussels-based financial firm Euroclear and are invested in Western government bonds that have matured into cash. The cash is sitting in a deposit account with the European Central Bank. The idea is for the EU to redirect the cash to Ukraine and "enter into a tailored debt contract with Euroclear at 0 percent interest," according to the note. Euroclear holds €185 billion in cash balances linked to the Russian assets, a part of which will pay back a preexisting G7 loan to Ukraine. The remaining €140 billion will be paid out to Ukraine in tranches and used for "defense cooperation" as well as supporting Kyiv's ordinary budget needs.

Reuters reported more details:

To avoid seizing the Russian assets, the idea is to transfer the cash from Euroclear to a newly created Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) owned by EU governments, or G7 governments as well. In exchange, the European Commission would issue Euroclear with zero-coupon bonds guaranteed by the owners of the SPV. The EU bonds would cover Euroclear's risk against Russian litigation while the cash in the SPV could be invested more profitably than overnight deposits in the ECB and thus generate a higher return for Ukraine.</ref>https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/explainer-how-will-the-west-use-russia-s-frozen-assets/ar-AA1NdSz7

Why would this scheme, as Merz say, 'require budgetary guarantees from member states'? That mean that the taxpayers of the EU will have to pay when Russia wins its litigation in court. It is, in the end, the people of Russia's money. Any attempt to seize is outright thievery.

The European Central Bank has also voiced concerns over any asset seizure. At a virtual meeting of deputy finance ministers on September 30, 2025 it urged the European Commission to prove the move would not undermine the euro’s credibility.

See also

• Magnitsky Act of 2012
• Russiagate
• Great Reset
• SWIFT network

External link

• Russian Boomerang