Difference between revisions of "Textualism"
(Textualism is similar to "originalism", or "original meaning." These are different from purposivism. Other competing legal doctrines include Critical Legal Studies.)
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Revision as of 15:41, 23 June 2016
Textualism is an approach to the interpretation of statutes and the U.S. Constitution that focuses on the text itself and its plain meaning rather than inquiring into the purpose of those who wrote the text. Under this view the legislative history of a statute is insignificant and should not be allowed to trump the text itself.
The term "textualism" was originally coined by Justice Robert Jackson in his famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which became more influential than the Court opinion. Later, this term was used by a liberal commentator in an unsuccessful attempt to embarrass it. An older form of textualism was the "plain meaning" doctrine.
A classic description of textualism, without using the term itself, is Justice Scalia's concurrence in Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com., 777 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 15, 1985).
- INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
- William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 623 (1990) (under the doctrine of textualism, "once the Court has ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant").