Difference between revisions of "U.S. v. Virginia"

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−	This page has been withdrawn from Conservapedia as part of a mass removal of content added by [[user:AmesG|Ames]] pursuant to a copyright challenge brought by the same user. The challenge rests on two grounds:	+	{{caselaw|U.S. v. Virginia|518 U.S. 515|1996}}
−	#Some content was added prior to the institution of Conservapedia's [http://www.conservapedia.com/index.php?title=Conservapedia:General_disclaimer&oldid=82832 copyright policy] on 2 April 2007, and is now removed by the user's unencumbered and uncontroverted ability to control his own content in the absence of contract or waiver to the contrary.	+	{{discrimlaw}}Otherwise known as the [[U.S. v. Virginia|VMI Case]], U.S. v. Virginia was a [[Supreme Court]] case that resulted in the opening of [[Virginia Military Institute]] to women.<ref>''U.S. v. Virginia'', 518 U.S. 515</ref>
−	#Some content, added after Conservapedia's copyright policy came into effect, is withdrawn under the below reasoning:	+
−	*If Ames supplied content gratuitously, he now revokes it.	+	VMI forbade entry to women on the grounds that most women were neither capable nor willing to undergo the "[[adversative method]]" training at VMI.  This decision may have been based on a "real difference," in that fewer women than men may wish to attend a military institution.  Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that the effect of this stereotype's persistence, and action upon it, precluded even those women who ''were'' capable from attending VMI.  Viewing this action as stereotyping, the Supreme Court ordered VMI to accept female cadets, applying its [[intermediate scrutiny]] test.<ref>''U.S. v. Virginia'', 518 U.S. 515, opinion of the Court by Justice Ginsburg.</ref>
−	*Any waiver executed by the user would have been a contract; however, the professed disclaimer asserts that it is not a contract.  Ergo, no waiver was made.	+
−	*If the waiver was a contract, it fails for lack of consideration.  No exchange was contemplated or made between the parties; detriment was suffered by user in the loss of copyrighted privileges, time, and effort put into text, but no compensation was received in turn.  If use of the site constitutes compensation, such use was already provided free of charge prior to copyright waiver, and even prior to contribution, and past consideration is no consideration.	+	The holding pioneered the idea of "[[Intermediate scrutiny]]," that the Court would inspect any classification on the basis of gender at a heightened level of review, to see that a "compelling" state interest was being served by the classification.  Such a review, in the gender cases, would involve an inquiry into whether there was a "real difference" between men and women that was implicated, or simply an imagined or stereotyped difference.  In applying the test here, Justice Ginsburg noted that the reasons for pursuing single-sex education were not sufficient to outweigh the harm posed to women by forbidding them an education at VMI.
−	*If the waiver was a contract, it was procedurally unconscionable and voidable.  User has no power under the agreement, and a simple contract of adhesion such as this one professes to be is voidable as a matter of public policy.  As voidable, it is now void.	+
−	*If the waiver was a contract, and use of the site was acceptance, the contract was breached by Conservapedia.  Conservapedia, by virtue of holding out certain guidelines and "commandments," incorporates these commandments into the the contract.  These "commandments" were breached with regard to users, as user's access to the site was terminated without cause (under the commandments) in May 2007.  Prior to May 2007, user had not violated the commandments. Having been breached, waiver is inoperative.	+	The Court noted that remedial programs, including a separate all-women parallel to VMI, were insufficient, building upon the language of [[Sweatt v. Painter]] to suggest that an educational institution is more than just a building, but a reputation that all genders & races deserve access to, and that no duplicate institution could possibly replicate.
−	*If the waiver was a contract, Conservapedia was unjustly enriched by avowadly valuable material.	+
		+	Justice Scalia dissented, noting that the benefits of single-sex education outweighed any stereotyping harm.
		+
		+	== References ==
		+	<references/>
		+	[[Category:United States Supreme Court Cases]]

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Revision as of 21:59, October 5, 2007

U.S. v. Virginia 518 U.S. 515 Decided: 1996

Part of the series on

U.S. Discrimination Law

Standards of Review

Rational basis review Intermediate scrutiny Strict scrutiny

Other Legal Theories

Substantive due process State action doctrine

Defining Moments in Law

The 14th Amendment Plessy v. Ferguson Brown v. Board of Education Loving v. Virginia U.S. v. Virginia Romer v. Evans Lawrence v. Texas

Modalities of Constitutional Law

Textual Responsive

Otherwise known as the VMI Case, U.S. v. Virginia was a Supreme Court case that resulted in the opening of Virginia Military Institute to women.^[1]

VMI forbade entry to women on the grounds that most women were neither capable nor willing to undergo the "adversative method" training at VMI. This decision may have been based on a "real difference," in that fewer women than men may wish to attend a military institution. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that the effect of this stereotype's persistence, and action upon it, precluded even those women who were capable from attending VMI. Viewing this action as stereotyping, the Supreme Court ordered VMI to accept female cadets, applying its intermediate scrutiny test.^[2]

The holding pioneered the idea of "Intermediate scrutiny," that the Court would inspect any classification on the basis of gender at a heightened level of review, to see that a "compelling" state interest was being served by the classification. Such a review, in the gender cases, would involve an inquiry into whether there was a "real difference" between men and women that was implicated, or simply an imagined or stereotyped difference. In applying the test here, Justice Ginsburg noted that the reasons for pursuing single-sex education were not sufficient to outweigh the harm posed to women by forbidding them an education at VMI.

The Court noted that remedial programs, including a separate all-women parallel to VMI, were insufficient, building upon the language of Sweatt v. Painter to suggest that an educational institution is more than just a building, but a reputation that all genders & races deserve access to, and that no duplicate institution could possibly replicate.

Justice Scalia dissented, noting that the benefits of single-sex education outweighed any stereotyping harm.

References

1. ↑ U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
2. ↑ U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, opinion of the Court by Justice Ginsburg.