War of attrition

NATO war in Ukraine: a 21st century war of attrition.

A war of attrition is a war in which the competing sides seek to win by exhausting the enemy's resources, rather than by a decisive battlefield victory. Such wars tend to be long-lasting, with relatively static battlefronts. Probably the best modern example of a war of attrition was the conflict on the Western Front in the First World War (1914-1918); another is the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Wars often start out as maneuver warfare, but some turn into wars of attrition.

No war is by intention a war of attrition; rather, the aggressor almost invariably expects a swift victory (Germany invading Belgium and France in 1914, Germany invading the USSR in 1941, the Allies invading Italy in 1943, Iraq invading Iran in 1980, terrorists attacking the United States in 2001), and it is only once such hopes are disappointed that a war takes on an attritional character.

In a war of attrition, countries ramp up their production of arms. In addition, countries often bomb the opposition's war production facilities in order to stop the enemy from resupplying (Unless it's a nuclear power.). In some cases, such as WWII, key components of a country's war machine capabilities such as oil production are restricted. Furthermore, various means are used to harm an enemy's economy such as economic sanctions.

Alex Vershinin of the UK's Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a globalist and military industrial complex think tank, says attritional wars "require their own 'Art of War' and are fought with a 'force-centric' approach, unlike wars of manoeuvre which are 'terrain-focused'. They are rooted in massive industrial capacity to enable the replacement of losses, geographical depth to absorb a series of defeats, and technological conditions that prevent rapid ground movement. In attritional wars, military operations are shaped by a state's ability to replace losses and generate new formations, not tactical and operational manoeuvres. The side that accepts the attritional nature of war and focuses on destroying enemy forces rather than gaining terrain is most likely to win." Vershinin adds, "The West is not prepared for this kind of war."

Commenting on the global situation in 2024, "Vershinin noted: "Unfortunately, many in the West have a very cavalier attitude that future conflicts will be short and decisive. This is not true for the very reasons outlined above. Even middling global powers have both the geography and the population and industrial resources needed to conduct an attritional war. The thought that any major power would back down in the case of an initial military defeat is wishful thinking at its best. Any conflict between great powers would be viewed by adversary elites as existential and pursued with the full resources available to the state. The resulting war will become attritional and will favour the state which has the economy, doctrine and military structure that is better suited towards this form of conflict. If the West is serious about a possible great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its industrial capacity, mobilisation doctrine and means of waging a protracted war, rather than conducting wargames covering a single month of conflict and hoping that the war will end afterwards. As the Iraq War taught us, hope is not a method."^[1]

Although wars of attrition can be won eventually often it is at great cost to the victors. A pyrrhic victory is a victory that comes at such a high cost that it's questionable if it was worth it.

"What is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations." - Sun Tzu

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