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The American Civil War homefront comprises the social, economic, diplomatic and political dimensions of conflict, 1861-1865. The military history is covered in the American Civil War.

The Confederacy in 1861

Politics

The Confederacy was baffled at Washington's incomprehension. The right of revolution and self-determination had been sacred to the Founding Fathers--especially Patrick Henry, George Washington, and Thomas Jefferson--slaveholders and rebels. Southerners angrily denounced the threat represented by Yankee attacks on their time-honored, Constitutionally protected institutions. Slavery, of course, was the institution they (correctly) saw as under attack, but also the democratically elected leaders of their new nation, whom the Republicans considered illegitimate usurpers. More generally, they felt the Yankees (in the devilish persona of Lincoln) were committed to radical reforms of all sorts, and planned to use their political majorities to crush southern aspirations. Above all, Confederates felt that their honor was at stake, that they must become independent. They did not wish to fight a war, even as braggarts claimed that the cowardly, bookish Yankees would be quickly routed by the feisty, outdoorsmen of Dixie. In early 1861 the Confederacy was limited to seven cotton states, where the slave issue was of central concern. Elsewhere in the South, most people wanted to stay with the Union. Everywhere in early 1861 leaders hoped that some sort of compromise could be reached, but no formula was found. The attack on Sumter and Lincoln's call for troops decided the issue. Confederates claimed it proved their basic argument that the Yankees planned to subjugate the South, infringe its rights, and impose alien values. This argument proved decisive in the upper south, leading to the secession of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas. To answer Lincoln's 75,000, Jefferson Davis called up 59,000 militia; a far larger number volunteered. Slavery was one of the causes of secession and war, but not the only one. Relatively few soldiers marched to defend or attack slavery. They were much more highly motivated by honor and patriotism that had no direct connection to issues of race or slavery.

Strategy

Realizing that they could not conquer the North, the Confederates adopted a military strategy designed to hold their territory together, gain worldwide recognition, and inflict so much punishment on invaders that the North would grow weary of the war and negotiate a peace treaty that would recognize the independence of the CSA. The only point of seizing Washington, or invading the North (besides plunder) was to shock Yankees into realizing they could not win. The Confederacy moved its capital from a safe location in sleepy, steamy Montgomery, Alabama, to the more cosmopolitan city of Richmond, Virginia, only 100 miles from Washington. A great nation needed a great capital, and Richmond had the heritage and facilities to match Washington.

The new capital helped solidify Virginia's adherence to the new nation; Virginia gave Davis 31 of his 131 generals, and a fifth of the gray-clad soldiers. On the other hand, Richmond's exposure necessitated tying down most of the Confederate army to defend the capital. Richmond was at the end of a long, thin supply line that made defense even more problematic. (In the last year of the war, for example, Lee's cavalry had to be stationed far away where forage was available.) True nationhood required recognition by the European powers, who might provide loans, arms sales, and perhaps even naval action against the Yankee blockade. Winning battles was the best way to make the Yankees weary, and prove to a skeptical world that the Confederate States of America was a legitimate, permanent nation that controlled its own territory and deserved full diplomatic recognition. The new Confederate army had its mission: hold Richmond and win some major battles.

Advantages and disadvantages

The relative strength of the two sides was lopsided in favor of the North for a long war, but fairly even for a short one. The Confederacy had to win fast.

Confederate psychology

For a short war, the South had the advantage of a revolutionary psychology. Confederates were realizing the dream of building a new nation, and their enthusiastic patriotism led to a remarkable outpouring of spirits and material. An elite cavalry regiment that might cost a half- million dollars to outfit was no problem when the wealthiest families donated cash, fine horses, and their own sons. High status slaveowners often volunteered as privates to show their commitment to (white) equality; of course they brought a slave or two along as valet or cook. (After a year or two most of them were sent home where they could raise food.) The most talented young men joined the Confederate army; many had experience in militia and even military colleges. Half the officers of the Army of Northern Virginia had attended Virginia Military Institute (which sent to war 1700 of the 1900 students who had ever attended the school). Convinced they could whip twice their number of Yankees, the rebels marched eagerly into battle.

Northern psychology

The best men in the North were not quite so ready to get involved; nine out of ten of the ambitious young men of the 1860s who later became giants of industry did not serve. Andrew Carnegie (age 26) spent a few weeks in 1861 setting up a superb telegraph system</a> for the Union army, then returned to Pennsylvania to make money. Grover Cleveland (age 26), a Democratic wannabe, refused to volunteer; when the draft called his number he purchased a substitute, as did J. P. Morgan (age 26) and Philip Armour (age 31). John D. Rockefeller (age 24), an overachiever and an abolitionist, purchased 25 substitutes while he stayed home. The vast size of the Confederacy, coupled with the superior defensive quality of rifles against infantry or cavalry attacks, meant that it would be preposterous for Lincoln's 75,000 volunteers to make a difference. A full-scale invasion would take years to prepare and over a million men.

Population

The North had a clear margin of superiority in terms of population (white adult men, 6-1; overall, 3-1), manufacturing (9-1), and railroads (3-1), not to mention telegraph lines, iron (10-1), horses [4.4:17], banks and corn (2-1). These resources were militarily valuable only if the North could figure out how to mobilize their potential. The population advantage changed year by year as the Yankees captured more territory, thus neutralizing the pro-confederate elements. A critical factor involved the South's four million slaves, the great majority of whom in 1860 were producing crops like cotton and tobacco that were of little wartime use. The challenge for the Confederacy was to use the slaves to release whites for battle. This could be done if the plantations switched to food crops, and slaves were used to construct fortifications or to work in munitions factories. When tens of thousands of slaves began escaping behind Union lines, the question was whether they would be a liability for the North in terms of guarding and feeding them, or whether they could be transformed into a military asset wearing US Army uniforms. Whenever blacks were involved, the question of their role was primarily a matter of politics and ideology, rather than optimum utilization of manpower.

The industrial superiority of the North at 9 to 1 was potentially decisive in a long war, because the factories and engineering skills could be redirected from civilian goods into munitions. It would take a year to retool for rifles, howitzers and ammunition, but only a few months for wagons, telegraph sets, uniforms, boots, blankets, tents and saddles. The South, starting practically from scratch, never had nearly enough machine tools, engineers or mechanics to operate factories. In a short war, however, the North might actually be hurt by its high level of industrialization. Many southerners argued that moneymaking and indoor activity were detriments when it came to command in battle and outdoor survival skills. Actually, the North (with its much larger population) had a larger total number of men accustomed to farming, riding, hunting and other outdoors pursuits. It had far more managers and entrepreneurs with a knack for organization and innovation. What it lacked was men with the self-confidence and personal leadership skills that ownership of slaves helped generate in the South. They needed all the leadership they could get, because Confederate enlisted men were notoriously adverse to discipline and disrespectful of authority and hierarchy. Confederate officers clearly outperformed the Yankees in 1861 and 1862, especially in elite units like the cavalry. (The Yankees, with superior engineering skills, made much better artillerymen and sailors.) The question was how fast the Yankees could learn, and how flexible their command structure would be in identifying and promoting likely talent. While most of the same elite slaveowners who assumed command of companies and regiments a the start of the war held their places for years, the army did conduct officer candidate examinations and commissioned many enlisted men who showed talent, regardless of their class background. The Yankees, less impressed with "family" did a better job in identifying and promoting talent very rapidly. By 1863 there were numerous Yankee colonels under age 25, and a few generals. A couple were too young to vote. Having too much industry was in some ways a liability for the North. Southerners reckoned that cutting off the supply of raw cotton, and its customary large purchases of food and manufactured items, might cause a depression in the North, leading to depressed prices, lower profits, high unemployment, ethnic riots. If the Yankees were indeed so profit hungry, then a profitless war would swell the peace movement. Yankee factories would take a long time to convert to munitions, but meanwhile Confederate propaganda could display them as a potential threat to the profitability of the British Empire. If London and Paris did some cost-accounting, undoubtedly they would figure out that "Cotton is King," and try to weaken the USA by assisting the CSA.

Railroads

No one gainsaid the North's clear superiority in railroad mileage and (even more important) in engineers and mechanics in the rolling mills, machine shops, factories, roundhouses and repair yards that produced and maintained rails, bridging equipage, locomotives, rolling stock, signaling gear, and telegraph equipment. In peacetime the South imported all its railroad gear from the north, or from Europe; the Union blockade completely cut off such imports. The South's 8,500 miles of relatively new line comprised enough of a railroad system to handle essential military traffic along internal lines, assuming it could be defended and maintained. As the system deteriorated because of worn out equipment, accidents and sabotage, the South was unable to construct or even repair new locomotives, cars, signals or track. No new equipment ever arrived, and the Confederacy was unable to capture Yankee railroad equipment. Realizing their enemy's dilemma, Yankee cavalry raids routinely burned and destroyed rails, machine shops, roundhouses, bridges, and telegraph wires. By the end of the war, the southern railroad system was totally ruined--used up, worn out, burned out, irreparable. Destroying the lines the Yankees were using to support their invasions became a high priority rebel target. Their cavalry and guerrillas would burn trestles, cut wires, and sabotage tracks. A railroad through hostile territory was a fragile lifeline--it took a whole army to guard it, because each foot of track had to be secure.

Rivers

The South possessed one of the world's longest systems of natural waterways, river ports, wharves, docks, coastal inlets and ocean ports. Riverboats and ocean-going steamers might help equalize transportation resources. The South, however, had scarcely any seafaring tradition, few salt-water sailors, and no warships. The two thousand paddle-boats on western rivers were chiefly owned, captained and piloted by northerners. If Lincoln's seamen and soldiers could seize the waterways, he would have superb invasion routes pointed to the heart of Dixie as the Mississippi, Cumberland and Tennessee rivers.

Civilian leadership

Jefferson Davis and his advisers

Warfare between two of the largest and richest nations on the globe demanded a high order of political and managerial skills. The North clearly surpassed the South, beginning at the top. Jefferson Davis was probably the strongest president the Confederacy could have raised up. As a former Army officer, Senator, and Secretary of War, he possessed the stature and experience to be president, but certain character defects undercut his performance. He played favorites, was imperious, frosty, and quarrelsome. By dispensing with parties, he lost the chance to build a grass roots network that would provide critically needed support in dark hours. Instead, he took the brunt of the blame for all difficulties and disasters. Davis was animated by a profound vision of a powerful, opulent new American nation, the Confederate States of America, premised on the right of its (white) citizens to self government. However, in dramatic contrast to Lincoln, he was never able to articulate that vision or provide a coherent strategy to fight the war. He neglected the civilian needs of the Confederacy while spending too much time meddling in military details. Davis's meddling in military strategy proved counterproductive. His explicit orders that Vicksburg be held no matter what led sabotaged the only feasible defense and led directly to the fall of the city in 1863.

Lincoln

Lincoln, an ugly and ungainly giant, did not look the part of a president, but he performed the role brilliantly. His first priority was military victory, and he eventually became a master strategist. Working closely with state and local politicians he rallied public opinion and (at Gettysburg) articulated a national mission that has defined America ever since. His charm and willingness to cooperate with political and personal enemies made Washington work much more smoothly than Richmond. His wit smoothed many rough edges (Davis, he quipped was "that tother fellow.") Lincoln's cabinet proved much stronger and more efficient than Davis's, as Lincoln channeled personal rivalries into a competition for excellence rather than mutual destruction. With William Seward at State, Salmon P. Chase at the Treasury, and (from 1862) Edwin Stanton at the War Department, Lincoln had a powerful cabinet of determined men; except for monitoring major appointments, Lincoln gave them full reign to destroy the Confederacy. The federal bureaucracy performed exceptionally well, in contrast to all but a handful of Confederates. In the South, honor demanded a military uniform at the head of the parade; in the North, achievement accepted subordinate roles in a complex system.

Bibliography

Surveys and reference books

• Beringer, Richard E., Archer Jones, and Herman Hattaway, Why the South Lost the Civil War (1986) influential analysis of factors; The Elements of Confederate Defeat: Nationalism, War Aims, and Religion (1988), abridged version
• Donald, David et al. The Civil War and Reconstruction (latest edition 2001); 700 page survey
• Fellman, Michael et al. This Terrible War: The Civil War and its Aftermath (2nd ed. 2007), 544 page survey
• Ford, Lacy K., ed. A Companion to the Civil War and Reconstruction. Blackwell, 2005. 518 pp. 23 essays by scholars excerpt and text search
• Goldin, Claudia D., and Frank D. Lewis, "The Economic Cost of the American Civil War: Estimates and Implications," Journal of Economic History 35#2 (June 1975), pp. 299-326 in JSTOR
• Heidler, David Stephen, ed. Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History (2002), 1600 entries in 2700 pages in 5 vol or 1-vol editions; very good basic reference
• McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (1988), 900 page survey; Pulitzer prize
• Nevins, Allan. Ordeal of the Union, an 8-volume set (1947-1971). the most detailed political, economic and military narrative; by Pulitzer Prize winner
  • 1. Fruits of Manifest Destiny, 1847-1852; 2. A House Dividing, 1852-1857; 3. Douglas, Buchanan, and Party Chaos, 1857-1859; 4. Prologue to Civil War, 1859-1861; 5. The Improvised War, 1861-1862; 6. War Becomes Revolution, 1862-1863; 7. The Organized War, 1863-1864; 8. The Organized War to Victory, 1864-1865
• Ransom, Roger L. "The Economics of the Civil War," EH.Net Encyclopedia, ed. Robert Whaples (Aug. 25, 2001), online edition
• Rhodes, James Ford. History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 (1920 and numerous editions) his 5-volume history of the war vol 1-7 online at Google.books.com
• Rhodes, James Ford. History of the Civil War, 1861-1865 (1918), Pulitzer Prize; a short version of his 5-volume history

Diplomacy

• Hubbard, Charles M. The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy (1998)
• Jones, Howard. Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom: the Union and slavery in the diplomacy of the Civil War, (1999) onlin e edition
• Mahin, Dean B. One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War (1999) excerpt and text serch
• Monaghan, Jay. Diplomat In Carpet Slippers - Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Affairs (2007) excerpt and text search
• Owsley, Frank Lawrence. King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign relations of the Confederate States of America (1931)

Union homefront

• Donald, David Herbert. Lincoln (1999) the ebest biography; excerpt and text search
• Gienapp. William E. Abraham Lincoln and Civil War America: A Biography (2002), good short online edition
• Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (2005) excerpts and text search
• Green, Michael S. Freedom, Union, and Power: Lincoln and His Party during the Civil War. (2004). 400 pp.
• Nevins, Allan. Ordeal of the Union (1970), vol 5. The Improvised War, 1861-1862; vo 6. War Becomes Revolution, 1862-1863; vol 7. The Organized War, 1863-1864; vol 8. The Organized War to Victory, 1864-1865
• Paludan, Philip S. The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln (1994), thorough treatment of Lincoln's administration
• Resch, John P. et al., Americans at War: Society, Culture and the Homefront vol 2: 1816-1900 (2005)
• Richardson, Heather Cox. The Greatest Nation of the Earth: Republican Economic Policies during the Civil War (1997) online edition
• Thornton, Mark and Ekelund, Robert B., Jr. Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation: The Economics of the Civil War. (2004). 124 pp.
• Weber, Jennifer L. Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln's Opponents in the North (2006) excerpt and text search
• Wilson, Mark R. The Business of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861-1865. (2006). 306 pp. excerpt and text search

Confederate homefront

• Current, Richard N., et al eds. Encyclopedia of the Confederacy (1993) (4 Volume set; also 1 vol abridged version)
• Boritt, Gabor S., et al, Why the Confederacy Lost, (1992).
• Coulter, E. Merton. The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865 (1950), highly detailed overview; strong Southern accent
• Davis, William C. Look Away! A History of the Confederate States of America (2003)
• Davis, William C. and Robertson, James I., Jr., eds. Virginia at War, 1861. (2007). 241 pp.
• Eaton, Clement. A History of the Southern Confederacy (1954).
• Roland, Charles P. The Confederacy, 1960. brief survey
• Rable, George C., The Confederate Republic: A Revolution against Politics, (1994). online edition
• Rubin, Anne Sarah. A Shattered Nation: The Rise and Fall of the Confederacy, 1861-1868. (2005). 319 pp.
• Thomas, Emory M. Confederate Nation: 1861-1865 (1979). Standard political-economic-social history
• Thomas, Emory M. The Confederacy as a Revolutionary Experience, (1992) short interpretive essay

Blacks and women

• McPherson, James M. Marching Toward Freedom: The Negro's Civil War (1982); first edition was The Negro's Civil War: How American Negroes Felt and Acted During the War for the Union (1965),
• Quarles, Benjamin. The Negro in the Civil War (1953), standard history excerpt and text search
• Wiley, Bell Irvin. Southern Negroes: 1861-1865 (1938)
• Clinton, Catherine & Nina Silber, eds. Divided Houses: Gender and the Civil War (1992), provocative essays online edition
• Faust, Drew. This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (2008), Pulitzer prize excerpt and text search
• Faust, Drew. Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War (2004) excerpt and text search
• Harper, Judith E. Women during the Civil War: An Encyclopedia. (2004). 472 pp.
• Marten, James. Children for the Union: The War Spirit on the Northern Home Front. (2004). 209 pp.
• Massey, Mary. Bonnet Brigades: American Women and the Civil War (1966), excellent overview; reissued as Women in the Civil War (1994)
• Rable, George C. Civil Wars: Women and the Crisis of Southern Nationalism (1989), excellent

Notes