Battle of Mount Kent and Top Malo House

On May 27, 1982, the 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (3 PARA) and 45 COMMANDO (45 CDO), Royal Marines left the British beachhead at San Carlos for Estancia Mountain and Bluff Cove Peak as part of the British breakout to Stanley. The 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (2 PARA) were ordered to attack the Argentinian Task Force 'Mercedes' on May 28 located on Darwin Isthmus, suffering heavy casualties during the Battle of Darwin and Goose Green, but prevailing and eliminating any future threat from the Argentinian garrison.

On May 29, Captain Peter Babbington's 'Kilo' Company from 42 COMMANDO (42 CDO) embarked in Sea King helicopters to reinforce Lieutenant-Colonel Mike Rose's 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) that was holding Mount Kent with 'D' Company (under Major Cedric Delves). Captain Babbington's rifle company along with some 105mm Light Guns from the Royal Marine Artillery Regiment was expected to land on Mount Kent on the night of May 29/30. A sudden gun-battle near the helicopter landing zone and snow blizzards meant these helicopter-borne reinforcements would only arrive on the night May 30/31, perilously close to another firefight.

On 31 May, 19 Royal Marine Commandos from the Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre (M&AWC) under Major Rod Boswell, embarked in a Wessex helicopter, with orders to eliminate the Argentinian Army Special Forces patrol that had taken refuge at Top Malo House, in order to allow the 600 Paratroopers from 3 PARA to capture Estancia Mountain and Estancia House Farm unmolested.

Key ground

Mount Kent with its surrounding hills is an area of high ground on East Falkland, approximately five miles west of Port Stanley. It rises to just under 1,100 feet and it dominated the central axis of advance from San Carlos to Stanley. Given its dominance and proximity to the capital of the Falkland Islands, the mountain was an area of special interest to both British and Argentinian Special Forces.

First contact

The first engagement during the Battles of Mount Kent and Top Malo House occurred during May 27, when 'Subteniente' Marcelo Llambías-Pravaz, Sergeant Ramón Valdez, Corporal Walter Pintos and Private Nicomedes Daniel Castillo from the 3rd Rifle Platoon of the 4th Regiment's C Company, while patrolling the western slopes under the cover of darkness and heavy rain, were overflown by a British helicopter. After radioing this information back to Regimental Headquarters, the small squad soon after detected a British SAS hide and opened fire. The next day, they closely inspected the scene but only found empty British rations that had to be dug out of the ground.

The next day, Lieutenant Guillermo Enrique Anaya from the 601st Combat Aviation Battalion visited Estancia House Farm and his Bell UH-1H helicopter landed twice on May 28. Lieutenant Anaya thought there were British commandos hiding in a cow shed, so he machine-gunned it.

In the days that followed there were a number of brief but extremely violent clashes between the Special Forces of both sides.

Argentinian commando incursion

Preparations for the Argentinian Special Forces helicopter-borne offensive began on Saturday May 29. About 40 men of 39-year-old Major Aldo Rico's 602nd Commando Company (Argentinian Army), were originally scheduled to make an assault landing in six Bell UH-1H helicopters of the 601st Combat Aviation Battalion. A follow-up force, the 65-man 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron ('Escuadrón de Fuerzas Especiales 601 de la Gendarmería Nacional' or EFE601GN) under Major José Ricardo Spadaro, would reinforce the Mount Kent position. Argentinian maps had confirmed the overland route was obstructed with minefields and booby-traps. This meant the National Gendarmerie Special Forces would have to arrive in a Puma helicopter the next day (Sunday May 30), exposed to Royal Air Force GR-3 Harriers in their morning bomb runs. There was additional delay when the Marine Special Forces from Major Guillermo Sánchez-Sabarots 1st Amphibious Commando Grouping in the lead C-130 Hercules aircraft from Comodoro Rivadavia on the Argentinian mainland, had to abort landing on Stanley Airport. A snow blizzard added to the confusion as the Argentinian Army Special Forces hurriedly prepared their backpacks and gear for the insertions.

On Mount Kent and Bluff Cove Peak, Major Cedric Delves' thinly spread out D Squadron, received no warning of Operation 'Autoimpuesta' (Self-Imposed-Initiative) and were momentarily caught off guard when they heard the sound of Argentinian Army helicopters approaching from Murrell River, in fact a Puma and four Huey helicopters bringing in 29 Argentinian Army Green Berets consisting of Captain Eduardo Villarruel's 5-man Headquarters Section and Captain Tomás Victor Fernández's 2nd and Captain Andrés Antonio Ferrero's 3rd Assault Sections, both 12-man patrols.

Mount Kent

On the night of May 29, Captain Andrés Antonio Ferrero's 3rd Assault Section from the 602nd Commando Company ran into 16 'Air' Troop from D Squadron, 22nd Special Air Service Regiment on the eastern slopes of the mountain.The British took control of the situation, but at the cost of two badly wounded SAS troopers (Carl Rhodes and Richard Palmer). Captain Andres Ferrero remembers:

“

The Malvinas War is all so long ago now that it is difficult to recall it, even more to sort out the details sufficiently to compare one's experience there with 'Comandos en Accion'. However, reading Isidoro Ruiz-Moreno's official history, again and again, to refresh my flagging memory has proved a salutary experience. Our mission briefing told us little more than we were to get on the ground, deal with any opposition as best we could and wait for the National Gendarmerie Commandos. Our task was to block the advance of 3 Commando Brigade. We'd been divided into two waves. I didn't like the idea of being split from the rest of the Commandos, but I could see why we had to do it. To fly in the turbulence between the peaks was a sure way to lose further helicopters. Bad weather had been forecast. Dark clouds on the horizon were blowing in Puerto Argentino's direction. To add to the problem, only four helicopters were available. Major Aldo Rico had agreed that the second wave should be postponed until the next day and since he and others in the company had failed to hitch a helicopter lift, to pass the time that night, he achieved his goal to learn to ride a motorbike. Rico had asked Major Mario Castagneto if he thought Mount Kent could be reached by foot but, because of the new minefields, he realized it would not be possible. In any case, it was too late to do anything by land that day. We were issued grenades, bandoliers and ammunition, and two MAG machine-guns, along with anti-tank rocket launchers and ratpacks (ration packs). We were tired after a sleepless night. First Lieutenant Horacio Fernando Lauría, a charismatic engineer-commando in his early thirties, in an attempt to take his mind of what lay ahead had been studying Mount Kent zone maps and intelligence reports ... We boarded a Unimog, which Captain Fernando De La Serna told us would be taking us to our helicopter. We were dressed in reversible white camouflage suits. The helmets came off, the berets on, and the 602nd was driven to the Soccer Field. It was around 4 in the evening and darker than usual because the sky was overcast. Journalist Eduardo Rotondo was filming us and taking pictures. This was a unique period for the Army; to be in a war zone accompanied by journalists. It was Argentinian Army Day. A day to be proud of our Army. It was even more important for Major Rico as it was his son's birthday. The helicopter we boarded - Huey AE 418 - was stripped bare inside and we sat on the floor ... At last, at about 5 in the evening came the order to go. Captains Eduardo Villarruel and Jorge Duran were coming too. The pilot lifted his helicopter into a low hover, about 3 feet off the ground. The whine of the engines was deafening. We were in the air, and this time it wasn't a training exercise. The pilot, lowered the helicopter's nose and picked up airspeed. It was a 6 or 7 minute flight - something like that. As we started to approach the noise was incredible. When we landed, I could not get off fast enough. As soon as we got off clear of the blades we began to off-load the weapons and equipment. The helicopter was loaded to the roof with spare ammunition, Instalaza missiles and medical packs. We watched the ascent of the helicopter until it disappeared. Not surprisingly, some insertions were badly scattered: Captain Eduardo Villarruel's headquarters group was so thoroughly lost that they did not rejoin the 602nd until the next day. We had landed 500 metres off course - northeast of Mount Kent. The night had fallen like ice into a glass, sharp and cold. With First Lieutenant Francisco Maqueda, an experienced mountaineer, leading, we moved higher up the mountain. It was awful terrain, with rocky outcrops all over the place. It was extremely difficult going for, while the sides of the mountain were not sheer, they were very steep and made up of boulders. One thing all of us had in common was that we were in reasonable shape. The average age in the 602nd was between 28 and 33. Otherwise my combat patrol couldn't have undertaken the six grueling patrol missions that lay ahead. The thought of bumping into a British patrol, or even worse, walking into an ambush, was uppermost in my mind. This was the Lion's den. We'd gone 500 metres when, I signaled a stop. 'I can hear water,' I said. I got edgy. I turned to Lauría who caught up with me when I stopped and he asked, 'Why not let Maqueda and me go on a reconnaissance, to see what's around?' I thought for a moment, then said, 'Okay, but that I along with Maqueda would be going, with Sergeant Arturo Oviedo.' The rest were to stay behind some boulders and wait for us to signal with the torch ... When we had gone about 50 metres all hell broke out. The rest of the patrol under Lauría, came under accurate machine-gun and mortar fire. Only one man was wounded though - First Sergeant Raimundo Maximiliano Viltes. He received a bullet through a heel. For a few seconds, pandemonium reigned. Only a few managed to get rounds off. Lauría thought they were part of Combat Team Solari that was known to have been dug in the area. When he explained to me what happened, it was obvious he was very shocked. Returning fire with his FAL rifle, Lauría managed to hit some Special Air Service Commandos ... By now it was about 7 in the evening and I heard two helicopters flying over head, returning with the 601st's 2nd Assault Section from Big Mountain, but saw nothing because of the low clouds. I had to make myself calm down. I had already experienced combat, being under fire from People's Revolutionary Army guerrillas. I had been a Commando since 1975 and had served in Tucumán Province. I tried to work out how to hit back. We crawled towards them, heard they were British and decided to take them ourselves. The problem was that we had to sprint over the top, World War One style. I had little hope that anyone could have survived that ambush. I was filled with confusion as well as desperate with anxiety. By this time mortar flares were up, illuminating portions of the area. Later I learned that at the first sound of mortar fire most had run away. It wasn't exactly the reaction Lauría had wanted. Lauría and Viltes, who were last away, had a grim withdrawal under mortar fire all the way. First Sergeant José Núñez helped Viltes. That night Lauría lay listening to the storm of fire as the Kent ridgeline blazed under the fire of 'D' Squadron of the Special Air Service Regiment. I started to pray. I put myself in God's hands and I know this is going to sound corny, but it started snowing very hard. We didn't dare wait too long. The signal we'd agreed on was one, two, then go. When finally we were calm enough, I put up one finger, then two, and we made our move. We were now scrambling downhill. It was slippery, dangerous. We slid down the mountainside on our backs and bottoms, sending small avalanches of grey stone, cascading down the mountain. During the getaway we lost Oviedo. The British Commandos did not follow up. There were about 20 of them with two machine-guns but they also fled. This is not uncommon in war. It was later learned that the British Commandos, thinking that they were on the point of being outflanked by Maqueda, Oviedo and me, decided to retire. Realizing their mistake, they returned to the Kent ridgeline just as Captain Tomás Fernandez's patrol closed on Bluff Cove Peak.

”

An attempt to disembark two platoon of Royal Marines from 42 COMMANDO to reinforce 'D' Squadron in the middle of the firefight was frustrated by heavy snows and machine-gun and tracer rounds, which forced the British helicopters to quickly exit the area with Marine William Macpherson recalling, "As we came in we could see glows through the snows as we came into the Landing Site and we were like thinking 'What is that?' and then there was a lot of machine-gun and tracer rounds coming at the helicopters and we banked away really hard and then the door slammed and we did not know what was happening and we ended up back in San Carlos. And when we got back, and this was probably 3 in the morning and the Sergeant-Major was there in the sheep-shed and he said 'You guys have no idea what a close call you just had tonight.'"

Lieutenant-Colonel Mike Rose was aboard in one of the helicopters and he concedes the British very nearly lost the Falklands ground campaign on this night along with a substantial part of 'Kilo' Company from 42 COMMANDO and the helicopters allocated to assist the Royal Marine Commandos and Paras take key hills west of Murrell River, "By the time we got there, the Argentinian Special Forces were almost up on the ridge from which they could have brought direct fire down on the helicopters. Then as Brigadier Julian Thompson said, it would have been 'Game over'. So it was really down to 10 minutes that we might have well lost the war."

Meanwhile, according to his Military Cross citation, Captain Timothy William Burls along with his Boat Troop from the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment's 'D' Squadron had arrived at Estancia House Farm and, whilst securing the area their position on Bluff Cove Peak had been infiltrated. After discussing with Brigadier Julian Thompson (commander of 3 Commando Brigade) of the option of regrouping at Estancia House Farm, Lieutenant-Colonel Mike Rose instructed Major Cedric Delves that it was critical to maintain Mount Kent and Bluff Cove Peak and ordered him to gather his patrols and hold both peaks until 'Kilo' Company 42 from COMMANDO arrived.

3 PARA in the meantime had captured Teal Inlet Settlement on May 29 but had lost one man in their march to Estancia House Farm when a Paratrooper in Captain Matthew Selfridge's D Company shot himself and was seriously wounded in a negligent discharge incident.

Bluff Cove Peak

The 602nd Commando Company's 2nd Assault Section, commanded by 'Capitán' Tomás Victor Fernández, after a brief pause, continued its advance up Bluff Cove Peak. It was here that 'Teniente 1º' Rubén Eduardo Márquez and 'Sargento 1º' Oscar Humberto Blas won posthumously the 'Medalla Al Valor En Combate' (Gallantry In Combat Medal) in a patrol clash in which they wounded two Special Air Service Commandos from 17 'Boat' Troop with hand grenades and rock fragments (Ewen Pearcy and Don Masters)."There was nothing for it but to squeeze as many as possible into caves near the top of Bluff Cove Peak," admits Captain Fernández.

That same morning, before dawn, as 'Capitán' Eduardo Marcelo Villarruel led his headquarters group back to Argentinian lines, he ran into a heavily armed British patrol on the foggy slopes of Mount Kent heading to Estancia House Farm. The Argentinian Special Forces went to ground and took up ambush positions. Sergeant Mario Antonio Cisnero, had the 7.62 millimetre belt-fed machine-gun and was ready to open fire. Villarruel, for some reason told Cisnero to hold his fire. It was a serious misjudgment and probably cost the Argentinians the battle for Mount Kent. It later transpired that the British patrol were members of 'D' Squadron, 22nd Special Air Service Regiment retreating with their two badly wounded in the Mount Kent action. Unfortunately because of the blizzard, communications were lost on both sides. But for the first time Lieutenant-Colonel Mike Rose's 22nd Special Air Service Regiment was in control of the situation after the initial SAS retreat. By 1700 local time on May 30 when 'Capitán' Tomás Fernández's radio operator, 'Sargento 1º' Vicente Alfredo Flores, at last came on air, he passed the dramatic message, "We are in trouble" and 40 minutes later, "there are English all around us...you had better hurry up."

The Argentinian helicopter-borne offensive had been checked, with the Special Air Service successfully maintaining their positions on Mount Kent and Bluff Cove Peak. Major Aldo Rico was placed in charge of all further Special Forces operations. He reluctantly cancelled the deployment of Major Mario Castagneto's 601st Commando Company and instructed Castagneto to rescue the 602nd Commando Company, who were to assemble on Estancia Mountain.

Captain Andrés Ferrero regrouped his men on Estancia Mountain and awaited reinforcements. Around 1100 local time on May 30, the Argentinian patrol commander watched in horror as two Royal Air Force Harriers (XZ963 and XZ789) made a pass over the Puma carrying reinforcements from the 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron, firing as they went. The Puma crashed in the ground and started a fire in which six Gendarmerie Commandos from Captain Jorge San Emeterio's combat patrol were killed: Lieutenant Ricardo Julio Sánchez, Second Lieutenant Guillermo Nasif, Corporals Marciano Veron, Víctor Samuel Guerrero, Carlos Ismael Pereyra and Lance-Corporal Juan Carlos Treppo. Those Gendarmerie Commandos who could jumped out, some of them braving the fire and exploding ammunition to rescue eight injured colleagues.

The Argentinian Special Forces nearby, in the form of Sergeant Mario Cisnero ―armed with a 7.62 mm machinegun― from Captain Andrés Ferrero's 3rd Assault Section, and Sergeant Luis Alberto Kovalski (also armed with a machinegun)from EFE601GN along with Private Nicomedes Daniel Castillofrom the 3rd Rifle Platoon (under 2d Lieuenant Marcelo Llambías-Pravaz) of C Company 4th Regiment however, exacted rapid revenge and one of the Royal Air Force Harriers involved, XZ-963 flown by Squadron-Leader Jerry Pook was shot down.

Royal Marine reinforcements

The job of seizing the 1,300ft mountain fell to Captain Peter Babbington's 'Kilo' Company from 42 COMMANDO, who would be flown in by helicopters. Major Cedric Delves' D Squadron was told to locate and secure a suitable landing zone below the Mount Kent summit, but the lack of helicopters, coupled with blizzard conditions and sudden firefights, meant it took five nights to airlift in the rifle company of Captain Babbington.

The British High Command 8,000 miles away in Northwood, impatient for victories, questioned the need to use up valuable time on reconnaissance. Fortunately the British commander in the Falklands ignored their orders, because when the Royal Marines did land on the lower slopes of Mount Kent they discovered that strong enemy special forces patrols were still trying to penetrate the British lines.

Brigadier Julian Thompson, who commanded 3 Commando Brigade, wrote later that without the SAS presence on Mount Kent, the Argentinian Special Forces patrols "would have had a turkey shoot on the vulnerable helicopters and the troops as they jumped out, temporarily disorientated in the darkness; the operation would have been a disaster."

When the 42 CDO spearhead flew in on the night of May 30/31 they witnessed the SAS in the form of 'Mountain Troop' engage Captain Tomás Fernández's 2nd Assault Section near the landing site. Fortunately for the Royal Marine reinforcements, though, the Argentinian patrol withdrew after having earlier lost two killed on Bluff Cove Peak in the clash with the SAS patrol under the command of Captain Timothy Burls.

Also heavily involved in this action was the Task Force’s only surviving Chinook helicopter, 'Bravo November'. Flight-Lieutenant Andy Lawless, co-pilot of the Chinook took part in the mission to deliver artillery guns and ammunition to the SAS and describes the crash of the helicopter (possibly as a result of small-arms or mortar fire cutting electrical cables) soon after:

“

We knew the SAS were outgunned. Our job was to land 105-mm howitzers of 29 Regiment Royal Artillery. Rose (Loadmaster) told me the landing site was flat and secure. The mission was to be flown all at night with night-vision goggles. We had three 105—mm guns inside and ammunition pallets under-slung. Then the fog of war intervened. The ground was not flat and covered in boulders. We could not find anywhere to land and we spent time manoeuvering to drop off the under-slung loads. We had to put them exactly where the gunners wanted because they could not roll the guns very far across the terrible terrain. I can distinctly remember troops moving under the rotor disking firing their guns – this was not part of the plan. There were incoming artillery rounds. Once we dropped off the guns we went straight back to San Carlos to bring in more guns and ammo. Then we hit water. We were lucky because if we had hit solid ground we would have been dead. We hit at 100 knots. The bow wave came over the cockpit window as we settled and the engines partially flamed out. I knew we had ditched but I was not sure if we had been hit. Dick (Pilot) said he thought we had been hit by ground fire. As the helicopter settled the bow wave reduced. We had the collective still up and the engine wound up as we came out of the water like a cork out of a bottle. We were climbing.

”

Top Malo House

On May 27, a four-man patrol of the Mountain & Arctic Warfare Cadre (M&AWC) under Sergeant Chris Stone were manning an Observation Post (OP) on Bull Hill. They heard two UH-1 Huey helicopters approach their position and fearing that they would be attacked radioed that this might be their last transmission and that they would try to fight their way out. Fortunately after circling their position the Hueys set off towards Mount Simon (which was covered in mist) and deposited on the lower slopes what the British Mountain Commandos estimated to be a 17-man Special Forces patrol. This was worrying news for the British as the strong enemy patrol flanked 3 Commando Brigade Headquarters at Teal Inlet and the British helicopters supplying 42 COMMANDO's 'Kilo' Company on Mount Kent.

The Argentinian remote outpost was reported to Captain Rod Boswell, the M&AWC commander at San Carlos. Top Malo House was beyond the range of British Artillery and no Royal Air Force Harriers were available for an air strike, so Brigadier Julian Thompson agreed that Boswell's unit should eliminate the Argentinian patrol. Captain Boswell gathered together nineteen Mountain Commandos and were flown forward by a Sea King helicopter piloted by Lieutenant John Miller the next morning.

Having surrounded Top Malo House, Captain Rod Boswell ordered his 12-man assault group patrol to fix bayonets and fire a green flare, the signal for the 7-man fire support group (under Lieutenant Callum Murray) on a nearby hillock to unleash a volley of six anti-tank rockets at the remote farmhouse.

Senior Lieutenant Ernesto Emilio Espinosa on sentry duty on the top stairs window raised the alarm and was shot and killed by Corporal Steve Groves armed with a sniper rifle, but not before shooting and injuring Sergeant Mac Mclean in the hand (bad bone bruising) as he was preparing to fire an anti-tank rocket as part of thee support group.

As Boswell and his assault group charged forward, two more 66mm rockets smashed into the house and the Argentinian Army Special Forces who had taken cover there overnight fled to Mullow Stream 200 metres away. The ammunition stacked in the farmhouse exploded as the British Mountain Commandos ran forward, forcing them to fall back in the confusion, while smoke from the burning building shielded them from the Argentinian Green Berets lying in the stream firing at them.

In the fierce firefight, Senior Sergeant Mateo Domingo Sbert was killed while covering along with Captain José Arnobio Vercesi and Senior Lieutenant Juan José Gatti, the Argentinian retreat to the stream and the Argentinian second-in-command, Senior Lieutenant Horacio Losito, had an enemy Mountain Commando fixed in his sights when he all of a sudden lost consciousness through loss of blood before Senior Sergeants Miguel Ángel Castillo and Omar Medina reluctantly threw down their weapons and surrendered with the remainder of the patrol. In the confusion of surrender, a number of British Commandos kept firing and Medina was badly wounded in the left leg and Corporal Raúl Valdivieso was also shot.

The battle of Top Malo House had lasted forty-fiveminutes and cost the lives of two members of Captain José Arnobio Vercesi's 1st Assault Section of the 602nd Commando Company. The 10 Argentinian survivors, six of them wounded, were taken prisoner. The six Argentinian wounded were: Teniente 1º Humberto Daniel Martinez, Teniente 1º Horacio Losito, Teniente 1º Luis Alberto Brun, Sargento 1º Juan Carlos Helguero, Sargento 1º Humberto Omar Medina and Cabo 1º Raúl Roberto Valdivieso.

Four Royal Marine Commandos (Sergeants Taff Doyle, Steve Groves, Mac McLean and Corporal Chris Stone) were wounded or injuredin the protracted gun-battle, a testament to the bravery and skill of the Argentinian Commandos that had managed to reach Mullow Stream some 200 metres away.

Unknown to the M&AWC the entire assault had been watched by civilian volunteers from the 'Red de Observadores del Aire' (R.O.A.) of the Argentinian Air Force observation positions on Malo Hill and elsewhere. Fourteen R.O.A. voluneeters from these positions surrendered to 3 PARA the next day.

Aftermath

The Battle of Mount Kent and Top Malo House in late May 1982 cost the lives of eleven members of Argentina's Special Forces, including a Blue Beret (Senior Lieutenant Luis Darío José Castagnari) from the Argentinian Air Force's Special Operations Group ('Grupo de Operaciones Especiales' or GOE) at Stanley Airbase that was killed and another four Blue Berets wounded when hit by a Seaslug missile that the British light cruiser HMS 'Glamorgan' fired in the surface-to-surface role while the Argentinian Air Force Commandos were protecting the Skyguard fire-control radars from the 601st Air Defence Artillery Regiment and preparing to take part in the helicopter-borne offensive and seize Smoko Mount. Ten British Commandos and Paratroopers (4 M&AWC, 4 SAS, 1 Paratrooper from 3 PARAand 1 gunner from the Royal Marine Artillery Regiment (Van Rooyen) were wounded or injured securing the British advance to Mount Kent and Estancia House, but one SBS Commando (Sergeant Ian 'Kiwi' Hunt) was soon killed as a result of Friendly fire in the Mount Kent zone when mistaken to be part of an Argentinian Special Forces patrol and another four Royal Marine Commandos (Sergeant Robert Leeming, Corporal Andrew Uren, Corporal Peter Fitton and Marine Keith Phillips) lost their lives when caught between two British patrols operating in no-man's-land and two Argentinian Special Forces patrols armed with machine-guns waiting to ambush them opposite Murrell River.

Unknown to the Argentinian Army Special Forces, the Battle of Mount Kent and Top Malo House had tied down a significant part of the available SAS and M&AWC Commandos, leaving only a handful of Captain Rod Boswell's men on Mount Smoko to keep watch of the Argentinian outpost guarding the bridge connecting Bluff Cove and Fitzroy Settlements while the rest recovered and the SAS got ready to deploy on West Falkland.As a result of the British delay to clear both settlements, Senior Lieutenant Darío Horacio Blanco and his platoon of engineers from the 601st Combat Engineer Battalion were able to blow up a significant part of the bridge unmolested on June 2, resulting in 50 British killed and 200 wounded or injuredduring the Bluff Cove/Fitzroy Air Attacks on 8 June when the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards and attached units aboard the troopships 'Sir Galahad' and 'Sir Tristram' arrived overnight only to discover their advance route by land severed and forcing them to remain aboard ships the following day.