View source for Father's right to object to abortion

'''Father's right to object to abortion''' is recognized in some countries, particularly in [[Latin America]], while not in others. States could establish this right by court order or by statute in the [[United States]]. Since ''[[Dobbs]]'', there is no constitutional right to an [[abortion]] by a woman (or a man pressuring a woman) in the United States.  Fathers typically do have rights in frozen embryos, and a similar right should exist for implanted embryos.  

The Court’s decision in Dobbs overturned the key judgment in Casey but did not specifically address the issue of undue burden or paternal notification. Parental rights were not an issue during the Dobbs arguments. Since ''Dobbs'' allows states to make their own abortion laws, these legal rights are evolving.

An article on this topic by FindLaw concludes:
{{cquote|Even though fathers are not physically involved in the pregnancy, they still may have rights when it comes to their unborn child. If you have questions about your rights as a prospective father, contact a family law attorney.<refname="FL">https://www.findlaw.com/family/paternity/fathers-rights-and-abortion.html#:~:text=Biological%20fathers%20do%20not%20have,decision%20to%20terminate%20a%20pregnancy.</ref>}}

== Relevant cases and issues ==
*''Planned Parenthood v. Danforth'' (1976) (implicitly overruled by ''Dobbs''): a Supreme Court decision rejecting a constitutional (but not a statutory) right of a father to veto an abortion. The flawed reasoning was that the mother bears the primary physical burden of pregnancy.  Moreover, the primary issues in ''Danforth'' were vagueness and overbreadth.
*''Casey'': "The Court’s decision in Dobbs overturned the key judgment in Casey but did not specifically address the issue of undue burden or paternal notification. Parental rights were not an issue during the Dobbs arguments. Since Dobbs allows states to make their own abortion laws, these legal rights are evolving." Melissa Bender, Esq., and FindLaw Staff, "Fathers’ Rights and Abortion" (July 22, 2023).<refname="FL"/>
*''Right to Privacy'' (abrogated by ''Dobbs''): a woman has sometimes had a right to privacy in making healthcare decisions, which in some states includes a right to have an abortion.
*private agreements
*civil liability

== Missouri ==
{{cquote|In this case, the trial court's judgment found the frozen pre-embryos are marital property of a special character, awarded the frozen pre-embryos to Gadberry and McQueen jointly, and ordered that "no transfer, release, or use of the frozen [pre-]embryos shall occur without the signed authorization of both [Gadberry] and [McQueen]." As the main part of this ruling pertains to the parties' decision-making authority over the frozen pre-embryos created subsequent to their marriage, including but not limited to when they can exercise rights to use them, it is consistent with the broad definitions of "marital property" and "property" set out above. See Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 771, 776 and Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175, 179, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. 1998) (indicating that the issue in cases involving the disposition of frozen pre-embryos is determining the parties' decision-making authority over them); In re Marriage of Dahl and Angle, 222 Ore. App. 572, 194 P.3d 834, 838 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (finding a similar definition of "property" to be "broad" and encompass rights relating to the disposition of frozen pre-embryos). And to the extent the trial court's judgment denominates the frozen pre-embryos as marital property of a "special character" and essentially provides the frozen pre-embryos are to remain in their status quo of being cryogenically preserved and stored until the parties both agree in writing as to another disposition, the judgment is consistent with the principle that frozen pre-embryos are entitled to a special respect. Therefore, we hold the trial court did not err in classifying the frozen pre-embryos as marital property of a special character.}}
''McQueen v. Gadberry'', 507 S.W.3d 127, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016)
== Ohio ==

Prior to ''[[Dobbs]]''' overruling ''[[Roe v. Wade]]'', Ohio held that a unmarried father did not have a right in a decision about [[abortion]]:
{{cquote|We will address first Hacker's argument that it is unconstitutional for the decision about abortion and adoption to belong only to the mother of the child.

We turn first to the issue of "choice". Hacker does not contest that, during the early stages of pregnancy, a woman has a right to decide whether to obtain an abortion. See, generally, Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania (1992), 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L.   Ed. 2d 674 (right to obtain abortion); Maher v. Roe (1977), 432 U.S. 464, 472, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 53 L. Ed. 2d 484 (right to carry fetus to term). He argues, however, that this "right to choose" should belong equally to the pregnant woman and to that woman's sexual partner.

The decision of whether to carry a fetus to term can never be an equal one when the parties disagree. It is a simple biological fact that, in this circumstance, the wishes of only one party must prevail. "Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two [the woman and the man], the balance weighs in her favor." Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth (1976), 428 U.S. 52, 71, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2842, 49 L. Ed. 2d 788.

In Danforth, supra, the Supreme Court addressed and disposed of Hacker's "equal choice" argument, holding that the spouse of a pregnant woman can not compel or forbid his wife to terminate her pregnancy. The Court reasoned that the state cannot delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself is prohibited from exercising.

Since the highest court of the land has refused to recognize that the husband of a pregnant woman has the right to compel or forbid abortion, we most assuredly do not find that a nonmarital partner has this right. See People ex rel. S.P.B. (Colo.1982), 651 P.2d 1213.}}
''Bryant v. Hacker'', 116 Ohio App. 3d 860, 863-64, 689 N.E.2d 609, 611 (1996) (footnotes omitted).

Many of the above decisions have been implicitly overruled by ''Dobbs''.

But Ohio has also established that fathers do have rights in frozen embryos, in ''Kotkowski-Paul v. Paul'', 2022-Ohio-4567, 204 N.E.3d 66 (Ct. App.). "[T]he trial court did not err in concluding the subject embryos are marital property subject to allocation as part of the division of such property." ''Id.'' at  76.

== Tennessee ==
Tennessee recognizes a right of procreational autonomy in a father, which may depend on an agreement with the mother concerning an embryo:
{{cquote|In summary, we hold that disputes involving the disposition of preembryos produced by in vitro fertilization should be resolved, first, by looking to the preferences of the progenitors. If their wishes cannot be ascertained, or if there is dispute, then their prior agreement concerning disposition should be carried out. If no prior agreement exists, then the relative interests of the parties in using or not using the preembryos must be weighed. Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than use of the preembryos in question. If no other reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered. However, if the party seeking control of the preembryos intends merely to donate them to another couple, the objecting party obviously has the greater interest and should prevail.

But the rule does not contemplate the creation of an automatic veto, and in affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, we would not wish to be interpreted as so holding.}}
''Davis v. Davis'', 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992)
{{cquote|Tennessee paternity actions do not abridge a putative father's right to procreational autonomy, because such actions do not interfere with the determination of whether to father a child. Any private wrong or other such unfair treatment that previously interfered with a man's procreational autonomy "does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation." 449 N.E.2d at 716. Accordingly, we hold that Tennessee's paternity statutes do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's right to privacy.}}
''Sorrel v. Henson'', Appeal No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 852, at *11 (Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998).

== Greece ==

"One of abortion's many victims is the father of the child." The article explains further that:
{{cquote| [Greece] L 1609/86 does not specify men's rights in abortion. Post-abortion counseling services are dealing with an increasing number of men coming forward, grieving their aborted children. A more careful approach is required and a possible review of the law on abortion may be useful. ... Clarity of thinking, sympathy and understanding are prerequisites in order for a solution respecting the personality of both the woman and her male partner to be reached.<ref>https://www.researchgate.net/publication/223993903_Do_men_have_rights_in_abortion_The_Greek_view</ref>}}

== Latin America ==
[[category:abortion]]