| Line 14: |
Line 14: |
| | ===Possible Pilot Awareness of Deviation=== | | ===Possible Pilot Awareness of Deviation=== |
| | | | |
| − | The following is the agreed upon data by commentators and investigating bodies such as ICAO which concluded that the deviation was not intentional but due to a lack of situational awareness, and such as the opposite understanding that the deviation and intrusion into Soviet air space was intentional for purposes of saving on fuel by "shortcutting" , or intelligence gathering. | + | The following is the agreed upon data by commentators and investigating bodies such as ICAO which concluded that the deviation was not intentional but due to a lack of situational awareness, and such as the opposite understanding that the deviation and intrusion into Soviet air space was intentional for purposes of saving on fuel by "shortcutting", or intelligence gathering. |
| | | | |
| − | '''The Horizontal Situation Indicator:''' From Bethel and on, alert pilots could have known much—starting with the Horizonal Situation Indicator The Horizontal Situation Indicator’s needle would have alerted the pilots of their course deviation. This is because the cockpit HSI console needle, capable of showing deviation only up to eight miles, would be “pegged” all the way to the side. The pilots, thus, could have known that they were at least eight miles off course. An aircraft HSI generally has an image of a plane directly above the Horizontal Situation Indicator’s needle when the aircraft is on course. A needle pointing to the left or to the right of the image would indicate that the plane is deviated left or right of the course. KAL 007’s HSI’s needle would have been pegged all the way to the right (North). ICAO expanded on the Horizontal Situation Indicator’s capability of showing course deviation. The pilots could have known that they were off course by looking at the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) in front of each of them. Though the HSI was primarily designed to show the aircraft’s situation with regard to the horizon, the 747’s HSI contained an indicator to register deviation from plotted course. “Indications [of being on course] available to the crew would have been a reducing or zero track bar displacement with the HSI display set to INS and a similar reducing or zero cross track error on the CDUs [consoles]. There would have been a similar effect with the VOR track displacement…” (ICAO report 1993, p. 42, sect. 2.4.4.) | + | '''The Horizontal Situation Indicator:''' From Bethel and on, alert pilots could have known much—starting with the Horizonal Situation Indicator The Horizontal Situation Indicator’s needle would have alerted the pilots of their course deviation. This is because the cockpit HSI console needle, capable of showing deviation only up to eight miles, would be “pegged” all the way to the side. The pilots, thus, could have known that they were at least eight miles off course. An aircraft HSI generally has an image of a plane directly above the Horizontal Situation Indicator’s needle when the aircraft is on course. A needle pointing to the left or to the right of the image would indicate that the plane is deviated left or right of the course. KAL 007’s HSI’s needle would have been pegged all the way to the right (North). ICAO expanded on the Horizontal Situation Indicator’s capability of showing course deviation. The pilots could have known that they were off course by looking at the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) in front of each of them. Though the HSI was primarily designed to show the aircraft’s situation with regard to the horizon, the 747’s HSI contained an indicator to register deviation from plotted course. “Indications [of being on course] available to the crew would have been a reducing or zero track bar displacement with the HSI display set to INS and a similar reducing or zero cross track error on the CDUs [consoles]. There would have been a similar effect with the VOR track displacement…” <ref>ICAO report 1993, p. 42, sect. 2.4.4.</ref> |
| | | | |
| | Despite this, strangely enough, at 13:49, the pilots were reporting that they were on course! “007, Bethel at forty niner.” Fifty minutes after takeoff, military radar at King Salmon, Alaska acquired KAL 007 at more than 12.6 miles off course. It had exceeded its permissible leeway of deviation by six times! (Two nautical miles an hour error is the permissible drift from course set by INS.) | | Despite this, strangely enough, at 13:49, the pilots were reporting that they were on course! “007, Bethel at forty niner.” Fifty minutes after takeoff, military radar at King Salmon, Alaska acquired KAL 007 at more than 12.6 miles off course. It had exceeded its permissible leeway of deviation by six times! (Two nautical miles an hour error is the permissible drift from course set by INS.) |
| Line 28: |
Line 28: |
| | KAL 015: "Um Um We are now having an unexpected strong tailwind How much do you get there? How much and which direction?" KAL 007: "206. Ask him how many knots?..." KAL 007: "Ah! You got so much! We still got headwind. Headwind 215 degrees, 15 knots." KAL 015: "Is it so? But according to flight plan wind direction 360, 15 knots approximately." KAL 007: "Well, it may be like this." Capt. Chun, by accepting these irreconcilables, has lost his last chance to escape. | | KAL 015: "Um Um We are now having an unexpected strong tailwind How much do you get there? How much and which direction?" KAL 007: "206. Ask him how many knots?..." KAL 007: "Ah! You got so much! We still got headwind. Headwind 215 degrees, 15 knots." KAL 015: "Is it so? But according to flight plan wind direction 360, 15 knots approximately." KAL 007: "Well, it may be like this." Capt. Chun, by accepting these irreconcilables, has lost his last chance to escape. |
| | | | |
| − | '''Weather radar: ''' There was one last navigational aid to warn the crew. With consoles at the knees of both pilot and copilot, the plane’s weather radar could have alerted them, both over Kamchatka and later over Sakhalin, to the fact that they were no longer flying over water, as they ought to have been. Weather radar has two modes—land mapping for clear weather, when it would be possible to look down and see water or land masses as well as the contours of the coast lines and the weather surveillance mode for cloudy weather, when it is necessary to “see through” clouds in order to detect dangerous thunderstorms. In land mapping mode, KAL 007 had only to make sure that the land mass of Kamchatka and the Island string of the Kurile chain would remain to the right. That night, however, KAL 007’s weather radar was probably not in land mapping mode, for the weather was inclement. The International Civil Aviation Organization’s meteorological analysis would conclude that, “there was extensive coverage of low, medium, and high level clouds over southern Kamchatka associated with an active cold front.(ICAO 1983, section 1.7.1., p. 9.)” ICAO’s analysis of KAL 007’s weather radar functioning would state, “it was concluded that the radar was not functioning properly or that the ground mapping capability was not used. (ICAO 1983, p. 45. Section 2.9.1.)” | + | '''Weather radar: ''' There was one last navigational aid to warn the crew. With consoles at the knees of both pilot and copilot, the plane’s weather radar could have alerted them, both over Kamchatka and later over Sakhalin, to the fact that they were no longer flying over water, as they ought to have been. Weather radar has two modes—land mapping for clear weather, when it would be possible to look down and see water or land masses as well as the contours of the coast lines and the weather surveillance mode for cloudy weather, when it is necessary to “see through” clouds in order to detect dangerous thunderstorms. In land mapping mode, KAL 007 had only to make sure that the land mass of Kamchatka and the Island string of the Kurile chain would remain to the right. That night, however, KAL 007’s weather radar was probably not in land mapping mode, for the weather was inclement. The International Civil Aviation Organization’s meteorological analysis would conclude that, “there was extensive coverage of low, medium, and high level clouds over southern Kamchatka associated with an active cold front.(ICAO 1983, section 1.7.1., p. 9.)” ICAO’s analysis of KAL 007’s weather radar functioning would state, “it was concluded that the radar was not functioning properly or that the ground mapping capability was not used."<ref>ICAO 1983, p. 45. Section 2.9.1.</ref> |
| | | | |
| | An indicator, according to ICAO, of lack of pilot awareness of their flight's deviation from route is the bantering and casual light conversation conducted at the times that awareness of deviation and location would have brought great tension. An example is the time (18:05 GMT) of Maj Ospovich observing KAL 007 while pulling in behind it, then locking on. KAL 007 Flight Crew: "I have heard that there is currency exchange at your airport." "In the airport currency exchange? What kind of money?" "Dollar to Korean money." "That's in the domestic building too, domestic building too." | | An indicator, according to ICAO, of lack of pilot awareness of their flight's deviation from route is the bantering and casual light conversation conducted at the times that awareness of deviation and location would have brought great tension. An example is the time (18:05 GMT) of Maj Ospovich observing KAL 007 while pulling in behind it, then locking on. KAL 007 Flight Crew: "I have heard that there is currency exchange at your airport." "In the airport currency exchange? What kind of money?" "Dollar to Korean money." "That's in the domestic building too, domestic building too." |
| Line 195: |
Line 195: |
| | | | |
| | [[Image:Chart8.jpg|left|thumb|450px]][[Image:Time magazine.jpg|Fallacious common media depiction contradicted by deciphering of Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder|right|thumb|200px]] | | [[Image:Chart8.jpg|left|thumb|450px]][[Image:Time magazine.jpg|Fallacious common media depiction contradicted by deciphering of Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder|right|thumb|200px]] |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| Line 242: |
Line 234: |
| | The first missile was radar-controlled and proximity-fused, designed to detonate 50 meters from an aircraft. It exploded at exactly 18:26:02—exactly five hours, 26 minutes and 18 seconds after KAL 007 began its taxi to takeoff from Anchorage, Alaska. Sending fragments forward, this missile either severed or unraveled the crossover cable from the left inboard elevator to the right elevator. This with damage to one of the four Hydraulic systems (3 of the 4 systems were damaged or out), caused KAL 007 to ascend from 35,000 ft. to 38,250 ft. at which point Capt. Chun, disengaging the auto-pilot and taking manual control, was able to bring it down. | | The first missile was radar-controlled and proximity-fused, designed to detonate 50 meters from an aircraft. It exploded at exactly 18:26:02—exactly five hours, 26 minutes and 18 seconds after KAL 007 began its taxi to takeoff from Anchorage, Alaska. Sending fragments forward, this missile either severed or unraveled the crossover cable from the left inboard elevator to the right elevator. This with damage to one of the four Hydraulic systems (3 of the 4 systems were damaged or out), caused KAL 007 to ascend from 35,000 ft. to 38,250 ft. at which point Capt. Chun, disengaging the auto-pilot and taking manual control, was able to bring it down. |
| | | | |
| − | '''The fragments also caused punctures to the pressurized passenger cabin. All the punctures together amounted to a total of 1 3/4 sq. feet, too small, even together, for anyone to be sucked out by decompression. This was determined by the 11 seconds it took for the air to begin rushing out of the cabin before the alarm was set off picked up by the Cockpit Voice Recorder (ICAO '93, Information Paper''' 1., pg. 93). | + | '''The fragments also caused punctures to the pressurized passenger cabin. All the punctures together amounted to a total of 1 3/4 sq. feet, too small, even together, for anyone to be sucked out by decompression. This was determined by the 11 seconds it took for the air to begin rushing out of the cabin before the alarm was set off picked up by the Cockpit Voice Recorder.<ref>ICAO '93, Information Paper''' 1., pg. 93</ref> |
| | | | |
| | ====Inside the Cabin==== | | ====Inside the Cabin==== |
| | Congressman [[Larry McDonald]], seated in an aisle seat of the first class section was most likely unharmed though there may well have been wounded or dead in the rear section struck by missile fragments. There was a sufficient supply of oxygen for comfortable breathing. Aviation Specialist Dr. Malcolm Brenner explains: '''“Crew members and passengers would have about one minute of expected useful consciousness unless they successfully began receiving oxygen from an oxygen mask'''.” Well within that critical “one minute of expected useful consciousness,” the oxygen masks had already deployed and, because of the upward pitch of the aircraft’s nose for most of its ascent leg of the 1 minute and 13 second arc upward, the masks were drifting back toward or behind the heads of the passengers, within easy reach (If airline regulations had been followed, adults would have donned their masks first before putting them on their children). | | Congressman [[Larry McDonald]], seated in an aisle seat of the first class section was most likely unharmed though there may well have been wounded or dead in the rear section struck by missile fragments. There was a sufficient supply of oxygen for comfortable breathing. Aviation Specialist Dr. Malcolm Brenner explains: '''“Crew members and passengers would have about one minute of expected useful consciousness unless they successfully began receiving oxygen from an oxygen mask'''.” Well within that critical “one minute of expected useful consciousness,” the oxygen masks had already deployed and, because of the upward pitch of the aircraft’s nose for most of its ascent leg of the 1 minute and 13 second arc upward, the masks were drifting back toward or behind the heads of the passengers, within easy reach (If airline regulations had been followed, adults would have donned their masks first before putting them on their children). |
| | | | |
| − | At 6:26:34, thirty-two seconds after missile detonation, the following consecutive messages were broadcast over the public address system in English, Korean, and Japanese: '''“Attention, Emergency Descent. Put out your cigarette. This is an Emergency Descent. Put the mask on your nose and mouth and adjust the headbands.”''' When one of the flight crew radioed Tokyo Airport, one minute and two seconds after missile detonation, his breathing was already "accentuated" as he was then speaking through the mike located in his oxygen mask,''' '' "Korean Air 007 ah… We are… Rapid compressions. Descend to 10,000.” ''''' Two expert witnesses testified at a Court of Appeals trial on the issue of pre-death pain and suffering. Captain James McIntyre, an experienced Boeing 747 pilot and aircraft accident investigator, testified that Flight 007's tail was struck by shrapnel from a proximity missile. This shrapnel probably caused a hole smaller than two feet in diameter, resulting in decompression but leaving the passengers sufficient time to don oxygen masks. McIntyre testified that, based upon his estimate of the extent of damage the aircraft sustained, all passengers survived the initial impact of the shrapnel from the missile explosion. In McIntyre's expert opinion, at least twelve minutes elapsed between the impact of the shrapnel and the crash of the plane, and the passengers remained conscious throughout.(UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Nos. 907, 1057 August Term, 1994 {Argued: April 5, 1995 Decided: July 12, 1995, Docket Nos. 94-7208,94-7218}) | + | At 6:26:34, thirty-two seconds after missile detonation, the following consecutive messages were broadcast over the public address system in English, Korean, and Japanese: '''“Attention, Emergency Descent. Put out your cigarette. This is an Emergency Descent. Put the mask on your nose and mouth and adjust the headbands.”''' When one of the flight crew radioed Tokyo Airport, one minute and two seconds after missile detonation, his breathing was already "accentuated" as he was then speaking through the mike located in his oxygen mask,''' '' "Korean Air 007 ah… We are… Rapid compressions. Descend to 10,000.” ''''' Two expert witnesses testified at a Court of Appeals trial on the issue of pre-death pain and suffering. Captain James McIntyre, an experienced Boeing 747 pilot and aircraft accident investigator, testified that Flight 007's tail was struck by shrapnel from a proximity missile. This shrapnel probably caused a hole smaller than two feet in diameter, resulting in decompression but leaving the passengers sufficient time to don oxygen masks. McIntyre testified that, based upon his estimate of the extent of damage the aircraft sustained, all passengers survived the initial impact of the shrapnel from the missile explosion. In McIntyre's expert opinion, at least twelve minutes elapsed between the impact of the shrapnel and the crash of the plane, and the passengers remained conscious throughout.<ref>UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Nos. 907, 1057 August Term, 1994 {Argued: April 5, 1995 Decided: July 12, 1995, Docket Nos. 94-7208,94-7218}</ref> |
| | | | |
| | ===Capabilities and Damage to Hydraulics=== | | ===Capabilities and Damage to Hydraulics=== |
| Line 547: |
Line 539: |
| | | | |
| | <blockquote> | | <blockquote> |
| − | "the U.S.S.R.has refused to permit search and rescue units from other countries to enter Soviet territorial waters to search for the remains of KAL 007. Moreover, the Soviet Union has blocked access to the likely crash site and has refused to cooperate with other interested parties, to ensure prompt recovery of all technical equipment, wreckage and other material." (Congressional Record, Sept. 20, 1983,pgs S12462-S12464). | + | "the U.S.S.R. has refused to permit search and rescue units from other countries to enter Soviet territorial waters to search for the remains of KAL 007. Moreover, the Soviet Union has blocked access to the likely crash site and has refused to cooperate with other interested parties, to ensure prompt recovery of all technical equipment, wreckage and other material."<ref>Congressional Record, Sept. 20, 1983,pgs S12462-S12464.</ref> |
| | </blockquote> | | </blockquote> |
| | [[Image:After Action Report Map.jpg|After Action Report Map|right|thumb|300px]] | | [[Image:After Action Report Map.jpg|After Action Report Map|right|thumb|300px]] |
| Line 628: |
Line 620: |
| | | | |
| | <blockquote> | | <blockquote> |
| − | “It is still a mystery what happened to the bodies of the crew and passengers on the plane. According to one theory, right after the rocket’s detonation, the nose and tail section of the jumbo fell off and the mid fuselage became a sort of wind tunnel so the people were swept through it and scattered over the surface of the ocean. Yet in this case, some of the bodies were to have been found during the search operations in the area. The question of what actually happened to the people has not been given a distinct answer.”[http://www.rescue007.org/kaminski.htm] | + | “It is still a mystery what happened to the bodies of the crew and passengers on the plane. According to one theory, right after the rocket’s detonation, the nose and tail section of the jumbo fell off and the mid fuselage became a sort of wind tunnel so the people were swept through it and scattered over the surface of the ocean. Yet in this case, some of the bodies were to have been found during the search operations in the area. The question of what actually happened to the people has not been given a distinct answer.”<ref>http://www.rescue007.org/kaminski.htm</ref> |
| | </blockquote> | | </blockquote> |
| | | | |
| Line 691: |
Line 683: |
| | | | |
| | <blockquote> | | <blockquote> |
| − | '''Diver Viyacheslav Popov''': "As we learned then, before us the trawlers had done some ‘work’ in the designated quadrant. It is hard to understand what sense the military saw in the trawling operation. First drag everything haphazardly around the bottom by the trawls, and then send in the submersibles?...It is clear that things should have been done in the reverse order.”[http://www.rescue007.org/docs/TheGreatRussianRuse.pdf]- pgs 10,11. | + | '''Diver Viyacheslav Popov''': "As we learned then, before us the trawlers had done some ‘work’ in the designated quadrant. It is hard to understand what sense the military saw in the trawling operation. First drag everything haphazardly around the bottom by the trawls, and then send in the submersibles?...It is clear that things should have been done in the reverse order.”<ref>http://www.rescue007.org/docs/TheGreatRussianRuse.pdf]- pgs 10,11.</ref> |
| | </blockquote> | | </blockquote> |
| | | | |
| − | These were some of the reports conveyed to Senator Jessie Helms of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and which prompted him, according to Helms' chief of Staff Admiral Bud Nance, to write to Boris Yeltsin concerning KAL 007 [http://www.rescue007.org/nance_letter.htm]. | + | These were some of the reports conveyed to Senator Jessie Helms of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and which prompted him, according to Helms' chief of Staff Admiral Bud Nance, to write to Boris Yeltsin concerning KAL 007.<ref>http://www.rescue007.org/nance_letter.htm</ref> |
| | | | |
| | ====The Top Secret Soviet Memos==== | | ====The Top Secret Soviet Memos==== |
| Line 954: |
Line 946: |
| | (At the bottom of third column to the left is Cong. Larry McDonald. The last four photos of the third column to the right are of the Grenfell family - Neil (36), Noelle Ann (5), Stacey Marie (3), and Carol Ann (33)) | | (At the bottom of third column to the left is Cong. Larry McDonald. The last four photos of the third column to the right are of the Grenfell family - Neil (36), Noelle Ann (5), Stacey Marie (3), and Carol Ann (33)) |
| | [[Image:Pass all.jpg|955px]] | | [[Image:Pass all.jpg|955px]] |
| − | <br /><br /><br /><br />
| + | <br /> |
| − | <br /><br /><br /><br />
| + | ==Further reading== |
| − | <br /><br /><br /><br />
| |
| − | ==References== | |
| | *Solovev, Vladimir, and Klepikove, Elena. ''Behind the High Kremlin Walls'', Dodd Mead, New York (1986). ISBN-10: 0396087108 [http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0396087108/gemotrack11-20/ref=nosim] | | *Solovev, Vladimir, and Klepikove, Elena. ''Behind the High Kremlin Walls'', Dodd Mead, New York (1986). ISBN-10: 0396087108 [http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0396087108/gemotrack11-20/ref=nosim] |
| | *Dallin, Alexander. ''Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers'', University of California Press, Berkeley, CA (1985) | | *Dallin, Alexander. ''Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers'', University of California Press, Berkeley, CA (1985) |
| Line 1,010: |
Line 1,000: |
| | *[[Avraham Shifrin: KAL 007 Researcher/ An Essay]] | | *[[Avraham Shifrin: KAL 007 Researcher/ An Essay]] |
| | *[[Korean Air]] | | *[[Korean Air]] |
| − | | + | ==References== |
| | + | <references/> |
| | ==External Links== | | ==External Links== |
| | *[http://bertschlossberg.blogspot.com/2012/11/lawrence-patton-mcdonald-b_15.html A Forgotten Man: Congressman Larry McDonald] | | *[http://bertschlossberg.blogspot.com/2012/11/lawrence-patton-mcdonald-b_15.html A Forgotten Man: Congressman Larry McDonald] |
| Line 1,041: |
Line 1,032: |
| | *[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YglShO6ChW0&feature=related KAL 007 Search and Recovery Operations USS Sterett CG 31 1983] | | *[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YglShO6ChW0&feature=related KAL 007 Search and Recovery Operations USS Sterett CG 31 1983] |
| | | | |
| − | ==References==
| |
| − | <references/>
| |
| | [[Category:KAL007]] | | [[Category:KAL007]] |
| | [[Category: Aviation]] | | [[Category: Aviation]] |
| | [[Category:Cold War]] | | [[Category:Cold War]] |
| | [[Category:Featured articles]] | | [[Category:Featured articles]] |