Changes

Slave Power derived from a combination of factors. The "three-fifths clause," (counting 100 slaves as 60 people for seats in the House and thus for electoral votes) gave the South additional representation at the national level.<ref> Garry Wills, ''"Negro President": Jefferson and the Slave Power,'' (2005) </ref> Parity in the Senate was critical, whereby a new slave state was admitted in tandem with a new free state. Regional unity across party lines was essential on key votes.  In the Democratic party, the a presidential candidate had to carry the national convention by a two-thirds vote to get nominated.  It was also essential for  some northerners--"Doughfaces"<ref>Most Doughfaces were [[Jacksonian Democracy|Jacksonian Democrats]] like [[Franklin Pierce]] and [[James Buchanan]]; few were Whigs.</ref>--to collaborate with the South proved crucial, as in the debates surrounding the three-fifths clause itself in 1787, the Missouri Compromise of 1820, the gag rule in the House (1836-1844), and the wider subject of the [[Wilmot Proviso]] and slavery expansion in the Southwest after the Mexican war of 1846-48.<ref>  Richards (2000) </ref>  However, the North was adding population--and House seats--much faster than the South, so the handwriting was on the wall. With the implacable Republicans gaining every year, the secession option became more and more attractive to the South.  Secession was suicidal, as some leaders realized--and as [[John Quincy Adams]] had long prophesied.  Secession,  argued  James Henry Hammond of South Carolina, reminded him of "the Japanese who when insulted rip open their own bowels." And yet when secession came in 1860 Hammond followed. Richards concludes, "It was men like Hammond who finally destroyed the Slave Power. Thanks to their leading the South out of the Union, seventy-two years of slaveholder domination came to an end." <ref> Richards (2000) pp. 214-15. </ref>  

Slave Power derived from a combination of factors. The "three-fifths clause," (counting 100 slaves as 60 people for seats in the House and thus for electoral votes) gave the South additional representation at the national level.<ref> Garry Wills, ''"Negro President": Jefferson and the Slave Power,'' (2005) </ref> Parity in the Senate was critical, whereby a new slave state was admitted in tandem with a new free state. Regional unity across party lines was essential on key votes.  In the Democratic party, the a presidential candidate had to carry the national convention by a two-thirds vote to get nominated.  It was also essential for  some northerners--"Doughfaces"<ref>Most Doughfaces were [[Jacksonian Democracy|Jacksonian Democrats]] like [[Franklin Pierce]] and [[James Buchanan]]; few were Whigs.</ref>--to collaborate with the South proved crucial, as in the debates surrounding the three-fifths clause itself in 1787, the Missouri Compromise of 1820, the gag rule in the House (1836-1844), and the wider subject of the [[Wilmot Proviso]] and slavery expansion in the Southwest after the Mexican war of 1846-48.<ref>  Richards (2000) </ref>  However, the North was adding population--and House seats--much faster than the South, so the handwriting was on the wall. With the implacable Republicans gaining every year, the secession option became more and more attractive to the South.  Secession was suicidal, as some leaders realized--and as [[John Quincy Adams]] had long prophesied.  Secession,  argued  James Henry Hammond of South Carolina, reminded him of "the Japanese who when insulted rip open their own bowels." And yet when secession came in 1860 Hammond followed. Richards concludes, "It was men like Hammond who finally destroyed the Slave Power. Thanks to their leading the South out of the Union, seventy-two years of slaveholder domination came to an end." <ref> Richards (2000) pp. 214-15. </ref>  

==Threat to republicanism==

==bAllLsACK==

The problem posed by slavery, it was argued by opponents of the Slave Power was not so much the mistreatment of slaves (a theme that abolitionists emphasized), but rather the political threat to American [[Republicanism]], and more generally to American standards of liberty.  The [[Free Soil Party]] first raised this warning in 1848, arguing that the annexation of Texas as a slave state was a terrible mistake.  Their strong rhetoric became a central theme in the new anti-slavery [[U.S. Republican Party, history|Republican party]], especially in the election of 1856.  

The problem posed by slavery, it was argued by opponents of the Slave Power was not so much the mistreatment of slaves (a theme that abolitionists emphasized), but rather the political threat to American [[Republicanism]], and more generally to American standards of liberty.  The [[Free Soil Party]] first raised this warning in 1848, arguing that the annexation of Texas as a slave state was a terrible mistake.  Their strong rhetoric became a central theme in the new anti-slavery [[U.S. Republican Party, history|Republican party]], especially in the election of 1856.