Difference between revisions of "Intent standard"
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(New page: The '''intent standard''' is the idea that, for a facially neutral statute which has disparate impacts, tending towards discrimination, to be illegal, the allegedly neutral statute...) |
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The '''intent standard''' is the idea that, for a [[facially neutral statute]] which has [[disparate impacts]], tending towards discrimination, to be illegal, the allegedly neutral statute must have been drafted with discriminatory intent.<ref> For racial cases, see ''Washington v. Davis,'' cf. ''Feeney'' in gender cases.</ref> Commentators have noted that this is essentially a requirement of the criminal ''[[mens rea]]'' of intent, a very high standard to meet in a civil case. | The '''intent standard''' is the idea that, for a [[facially neutral statute]] which has [[disparate impacts]], tending towards discrimination, to be illegal, the allegedly neutral statute must have been drafted with discriminatory intent.<ref> For racial cases, see ''Washington v. Davis,'' cf. ''Feeney'' in gender cases.</ref> Commentators have noted that this is essentially a requirement of the criminal ''[[mens rea]]'' of intent, a very high standard to meet in a civil case. | ||
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Revision as of 17:56, April 13, 2007
The intent standard is the idea that, for a facially neutral statute which has disparate impacts, tending towards discrimination, to be illegal, the allegedly neutral statute must have been drafted with discriminatory intent.[1] Commentators have noted that this is essentially a requirement of the criminal mens rea of intent, a very high standard to meet in a civil case.
References
- ↑ For racial cases, see Washington v. Davis, cf. Feeney in gender cases.