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In 1947, General Albert Wedemeyer made his report on China and Korea. The Korean part was suppressed. Wedemeyer said:

In 1947, General Albert Wedemeyer made his report on China and Korea. The Korean part was suppressed. Wedemeyer said:

:"American and Soviet forces . . . are approximately equal, less than 50,000 troops each, [but] the Soviet-equipped and trained North Korean People's (Communist) Army of approximately 125,000 is vastly superior to the United States-organized constabulary of 16,000 Koreans equipped with Japanese small arms. The North Korean People's Army constitutes a potential military threat to [[South Korea]], since there is strong possibility that the Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces and thus induce our own withdrawal."<ref>Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6, 1951.</ref>

:"American and Soviet forces . . . are approximately equal, less than 50,000 troops each, [but] the Soviet-equipped and trained North Korean People's (Communist) Army of approximately 125,000 is vastly superior to the United States-organized constabulary of 16,000 Koreans equipped with Japanese small arms. The North Korean People's Army constitutes a potential military threat to [[South Korea]], since there is strong possibility that the Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces and thus induce our own withdrawal."<ref name="Foreign Relations 1951">Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6, 1951.</ref>

Wedemeyer warned that this would take place as soon as "they can be sure that the North Korean [[puppet government]] and its armed forces . . . are strong enough . . . to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops." General Lyman L. Lemnitzer said that before June 1950, when the attack occurred, no aid had been sent but a few hundred dollars worth of baling wire.<ref>Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6, 1951.</ref>

Wedemeyer warned that this would take place as soon as "they can be sure that the North Korean [[puppet government]] and its armed forces . . . are strong enough . . . to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops." General Lyman L. Lemnitzer said that before June 1950, when the attack occurred, no aid had been sent but a few hundred dollars worth of baling wire.<ref name="Foreign Relations 1951"/>

[[Comintern]] propagandist [[Owen Lattimore]] writing in the [[leftist]] ''New York Compass'' said that the U.S. should give Korea a "parting grant" of $150,000,000 and "let [[South Korea]] fall but not to let it look as though we pushed it."<ref>''New York Compass'', Jan. 17, 1949.</ref><!-- when was it accessed? --> Attempts were made by the Soviet Union and newly established North Korean regime to unite the whole of Korea under [[Communist party]] control. Initially the confusion resulting from the United States-Soviet disagreement over unification enhanced the domestic rivalries of the two contending South Korean extremist camps. The [[Left]], being an outspoken advocate of national wealth redistribution, gravitated towards the [[propaganda]] of the North Korea, and allowed itself to be utilized as a political instrument in the struggle to destroy the infant South Korean [[democracy]]. The [[Right]]ist element, incensed over the possibility that a redistribution of vested Japanese interests would constitute a precedent for the confiscation of Korean owned wealth, found itself in opposition with the left. This widening of the political chasm in South Korea was given impetus by a resort to [[terrorism]] for the Leftist agenda. The North Korean government injected a propaganda effort contrasting the alleged [[proletarian]] paradise of North Korea with what it termed the political and economic distress of the South.

[[Comintern]] propagandist [[Owen Lattimore]] writing in the [[leftist]] ''New York Compass'' said that the U.S. should give Korea a "parting grant" of $150,000,000 and "let [[South Korea]] fall but not to let it look as though we pushed it."<ref>''New York Compass'', Jan. 17, 1949.</ref><!-- when was it accessed? --> Attempts were made by the Soviet Union and newly established North Korean regime to unite the whole of Korea under [[Communist party]] control. Initially the confusion resulting from the United States-Soviet disagreement over unification enhanced the domestic rivalries of the two contending South Korean extremist camps. The [[Left]], being an outspoken advocate of national wealth redistribution, gravitated towards the [[propaganda]] of the North Korea, and allowed itself to be utilized as a political instrument in the struggle to destroy the infant South Korean [[democracy]]. The [[Right]]ist element, incensed over the possibility that a redistribution of vested Japanese interests would constitute a precedent for the confiscation of Korean owned wealth, found itself in opposition with the left. This widening of the political chasm in South Korea was given impetus by a resort to [[terrorism]] for the Leftist agenda. The North Korean government injected a propaganda effort contrasting the alleged [[proletarian]] paradise of North Korea with what it termed the political and economic distress of the South.

The Korean War was the first conflict in which jet aircraft fought each other.  (Both the [[Luftwaffe]] and the [[RAF]] had operational jets in WWII, but they never came into direct conflict.)  Most jet battles took place near the Yalu River, in the airspace over north-western North Korea known as "MiG alley."  The UN forces generally retained air superiority throughout most of the war, and air power helped compensate for the Communists' superior numbers on the ground.

The Korean War was the first conflict in which jet aircraft fought each other.  (Both the [[Luftwaffe]] and the [[RAF]] had operational jets in WWII, but they never came into direct conflict.)  Most jet battles took place near the Yalu River, in the airspace over north-western North Korea known as "MiG alley."  The UN forces generally retained air superiority throughout most of the war, and air power helped compensate for the Communists' superior numbers on the ground.

The general lack of permanent runways in Korea hindered the use of jet aircraft and bombers, forcing the Allies to use piston aircraft. The [[P-51 Mustang|F-51 Mustang]] was the most numerous Allied aircraft in the early months of the war. In November of 1950, the first of the [[MiG-15]] aircraft appeared, and was able to outperform all Allied fighters until the introduction of the [[F-86 Sabre]]. The Sabre was arguably slightly inferior to the MiG-15, but the veteran American pilots eventually produced a kill ratio of approximately 12:1 in their favour. Many of these aerial dogfights took place in the northwestern corner of Korea, a place given the name 'Mig Alley' by Allied pilots.

The general lack of permanent runways in Korea hindered the use of jet aircraft and bombers, forcing the Allies to use piston aircraft. The [[P-51 Mustang|F-51 Mustang]] was the most numerous Allied aircraft in the early months of the war. In November 1950, the first of the [[MiG-15]] aircraft appeared, and was able to outperform all Allied fighters until the introduction of the [[F-86 Sabre]]. The Sabre was arguably slightly inferior to the MiG-15, but the veteran American pilots eventually produced a kill ratio of approximately 12:1 in their favour. Many of these aerial dogfights took place in the northwestern corner of Korea, a place given the name 'Mig Alley' by Allied pilots.

Another noteworthy point during the Korean Conflict was the first significant use of [[helicopters]], for transport, reconnaissance and rescue missions.

Another noteworthy point during the Korean Conflict was the first significant use of [[helicopters]], for transport, reconnaissance and rescue missions.