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| | [[Image:Lendleasemap.jpg|thumb|400px|right|Lend-lease routes]] | | [[Image:Lendleasemap.jpg|thumb|400px|right|Lend-lease routes]] |
| − | The '''Lend-Lease Act''' was the system by which the U.S. gave away $50 billion in military aid in 1941-45 (during [[World War II]]) so that the Allies could better fight Germany and Japan.<ref> The U.S. GDP was about $200 billion a year.</ref>. There was no repayment required. $31 billion went to Britain, $11 billion to the Soviet Union, $3 billion to France, and $1.6 billion to China. In addition, Canada operated a similar program of aid to Britain, and Britain had its own program of aid to others, especially the Soviets. | + | The '''Lend-Lease Act''' was the system by which the U.S. gave away $50 billion in military aid in 1941-45 (during [[World War II]]) so that the Allies could better fight Germany and Japan.<ref>The U.S. GDP was about $200 billion a year.</ref> There was no repayment required. $31 billion went to Britain, $11 billion to the Soviet Union, $3 billion to France, and $1.6 billion to China. In addition, Canada operated a similar program of aid to Britain, and Britain had its own program of aid to others, especially the Soviets. |
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| | It was a system of mutual and reciprocal aid which gave the U.S. about xx billions of services in return (especially rental of military bases on Allied soil). More broadly it meant the pooling of the resources, the man power, and the inventive genius of every Allied power. The original Lend Lease Act was ''An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States''<ref>http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq59-23.htm</ref> passed by Congress in March 1941 (8 months before Pearl Harbor), and though it furnished by far the largest contribution measured by monetary standards, lend-lease was a two-way affair, each nation giving to the common cause according to its resources. President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] determined that the defense of Britain against aggression was vital to the defense of the United States; Presidential confidant [[Harry Hopkins]] had general oversight on Roosevelt's behalf. | | It was a system of mutual and reciprocal aid which gave the U.S. about xx billions of services in return (especially rental of military bases on Allied soil). More broadly it meant the pooling of the resources, the man power, and the inventive genius of every Allied power. The original Lend Lease Act was ''An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States''<ref>http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq59-23.htm</ref> passed by Congress in March 1941 (8 months before Pearl Harbor), and though it furnished by far the largest contribution measured by monetary standards, lend-lease was a two-way affair, each nation giving to the common cause according to its resources. President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] determined that the defense of Britain against aggression was vital to the defense of the United States; Presidential confidant [[Harry Hopkins]] had general oversight on Roosevelt's behalf. |
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| | Gaddis Smith, A. J. P Taylor, Warren Kimball, and David Reynolds have speculated at length on Roosevelt's motives in the lend-lease matter. British historian Taylor implies that the U.S. intended from the first to use Britain's predicament to drain it of gold and dollars, weaken its overseas financial position, and undermine its capacity to compete with the United States in the | | Gaddis Smith, A. J. P Taylor, Warren Kimball, and David Reynolds have speculated at length on Roosevelt's motives in the lend-lease matter. British historian Taylor implies that the U.S. intended from the first to use Britain's predicament to drain it of gold and dollars, weaken its overseas financial position, and undermine its capacity to compete with the United States in the |
| | markets of the world. Others argue that, while Britain's replacement by the United States as the dominant economic power in the world was a result of lend-lease, it was not a cause. The president concluded that the European members of the Axis alliance were bent on world domination and that, after the fall of France, Hitler posed a direct threat to the Western Hemisphere. Quite aside from a natural sympathy for Britain and a desire to see it survive, Roosevelt, Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]], Secretary of the Treasury [[Henry Morgenthau]], Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]], and FDR advisor [[Harry Hopkins]] company saw Britain in early 1941 as America's first line of defense. These historians admit that Morgenthau forced the sale of American Viscose Corporation, a subsidiary of the British textile combine, Courtalds, at approximately half its | | markets of the world. Others argue that, while Britain's replacement by the United States as the dominant economic power in the world was a result of lend-lease, it was not a cause. The president concluded that the European members of the Axis alliance were bent on world domination and that, after the fall of France, Hitler posed a direct threat to the Western Hemisphere. Quite aside from a natural sympathy for Britain and a desire to see it survive, Roosevelt, Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]], Secretary of the Treasury [[Henry Morgenthau]], Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]], and FDR advisor [[Harry Hopkins]] company saw Britain in early 1941 as America's first line of defense. These historians admit that Morgenthau forced the sale of American Viscose Corporation, a subsidiary of the British textile combine, Courtalds, at approximately half its |
| − | market value of $56 million, but point out that this was trivial compared to the reduction of British holdings the U.S. could have demanded. Morgenthau believed that Congress would never agree to the unprecedented subsidy that lend-lease involved unless the administration could neutralize widely held notions of British opulence by demonstrating that the Exchequer was out of dollars and gold. These latter scholars tend to neglect an important point, however.<ref> Woods (1990) pp 9-10.</ref> | + | market value of $56 million, but point out that this was trivial compared to the reduction of British holdings the U.S. could have demanded. Morgenthau believed that Congress would never agree to the unprecedented subsidy that lend-lease involved unless the administration could neutralize widely held notions of British opulence by demonstrating that the Exchequer was out of dollars and gold. These latter scholars tend to neglect an important point, however.<ref>Woods (1990) pp 9-10.</ref> |
| | ==External links== | | ==External links== |
| | * [http://www.theeasternfront.co.uk/Vehicles/russian/lendleasevehicles.htm Lend Lease vehicles in Russia] | | * [http://www.theeasternfront.co.uk/Vehicles/russian/lendleasevehicles.htm Lend Lease vehicles in Russia] |
| | == Bibliography == | | == Bibliography == |
| − | * Allen, R. G. D. "Mutual Aid Between the U.S. and The British Empire, 1941-45" ''Journal of the Royal Statistical Society'' Vol. 109, No. 3 (1946), pp. 243-277. detailed statistical report; [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0952-8385%281946%29109%3A3%3C243%3AMABTUA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S on JSTOR] | + | * Allen, R. G. D. "Mutual Aid Between the U.S. and The British Empire, 1941-45" ''Journal of the Royal Statistical Society'' Vol. 109, No. 3 (1946), pp. 243–277. detailed statistical report; [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0952-8385%281946%29109%3A3%3C243%3AMABTUA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S on JSTOR] |
| | * Coakley, Robert W. and Richard M. Leighton. ''Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945'' (1968), 889pp, perspective of U.S. Army* Dawson, Raymond H. ''The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics'' (1959) [http://www.questia.com/read/94830935 online edition] | | * Coakley, Robert W. and Richard M. Leighton. ''Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945'' (1968), 889pp, perspective of U.S. Army* Dawson, Raymond H. ''The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics'' (1959) [http://www.questia.com/read/94830935 online edition] |
| | * Dobson, Alan P. ''U.S. Wartime Aid to Britain, 1940-1946.'' London, 1986. | | * Dobson, Alan P. ''U.S. Wartime Aid to Britain, 1940-1946.'' London, 1986. |
| | * Hall, H. Duncan. ''North American Supply'' (1955) 559pp, official British war history that deals largely with lend-lease. | | * Hall, H. Duncan. ''North American Supply'' (1955) 559pp, official British war history that deals largely with lend-lease. |
| | * Herring Jr., George C. ''Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War'' (1973) [http://www.questia.com/read/55466120 online edition] | | * Herring Jr., George C. ''Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War'' (1973) [http://www.questia.com/read/55466120 online edition] |
| − | * Herring Jr., George C. "The United States and British Bankruptcy, 1944-1945: Responsibilities Deferred," ''Political Science Quarterly'' Vol. 86, No. 2 (Jun., 1971), pp. 260-280 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-3195%28197106%2986%3A2%3C260%3ATUSABB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J in JSTOR] | + | * Herring Jr., George C. "The United States and British Bankruptcy, 1944-1945: Responsibilities Deferred," ''Political Science Quarterly'' Vol. 86, No. 2 (Jun., 1971), pp. 260–280 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-3195%28197106%2986%3A2%3C260%3ATUSABB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J in JSTOR] |
| − | * Hill, Alexander. "British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941-June 1942," ''The Journal of Military History'' 71 #3 (July 2007) pp. 773-808. in [[Project Muse]] | + | * Hill, Alexander. "British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941-June 1942," ''The Journal of Military History'' 71 #3 (July 2007) pp. 773–808. in [[Project Muse]] |
| | * Jones, Robert Huhn. ''The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-lease to the Soviet Union'' (1969), adds little original | | * Jones, Robert Huhn. ''The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-lease to the Soviet Union'' (1969), adds little original |
| | * Kimball, Warren F. ''The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-lease, 1939-1941'' (1969) 292 pages | | * Kimball, Warren F. ''The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-lease, 1939-1941'' (1969) 292 pages |
| − | * Kimball, Warren F. "Lend-Lease and the Open Door: The Temptation of British Opulence, 1937-1942," ''Political Science Quarterly'' Vol. 86, No. 2 (Jun., 1971), pp. 232-259 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-3195%28197106%2986%3A2%3C232%3ALATODT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W in JSTOR] | + | * Kimball, Warren F. "Lend-Lease and the Open Door: The Temptation of British Opulence, 1937-1942," ''Political Science Quarterly'' Vol. 86, No. 2 (Jun., 1971), pp. 232–259 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-3195%28197106%2986%3A2%3C232%3ALATODT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W in JSTOR] |
| | * Langer, William L., and S. Everett Gleason. ''The Undeclared War, 1940-1941'' (1953) [http://www.questia.com/read/7965317 online edition] | | * Langer, William L., and S. Everett Gleason. ''The Undeclared War, 1940-1941'' (1953) [http://www.questia.com/read/7965317 online edition] |
| | * Langer, John Daniel. "The Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission and the Debate over Unconditional Aid for the Soviet Union, 1941." ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 14, no. 3 ( July 1979): 463-82. | | * Langer, John Daniel. "The Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission and the Debate over Unconditional Aid for the Soviet Union, 1941." ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 14, no. 3 ( July 1979): 463-82. |
| | * Louis, William Roger. ''Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945.'' 1977. | | * Louis, William Roger. ''Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945.'' 1977. |
| | * Martel, Leon. ''Lend-Lease, Loans and the Coming of the Cold War: A Study in the Implementation of Foreign Policy.'' 1979. | | * Martel, Leon. ''Lend-Lease, Loans and the Coming of the Cold War: A Study in the Implementation of Foreign Policy.'' 1979. |
| − | * Munting, Roger. "Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort," ''Journal of Contemporary History'' Vol. 19, No. 3 (Jul., 1984), pp. 495-510 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0094%28198407%2919%3A3%3C495%3ALATSWE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2 in JSTOR] | + | * Munting, Roger. "Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort," ''Journal of Contemporary History'' Vol. 19, No. 3 (Jul., 1984), pp. 495–510 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0094%28198407%2919%3A3%3C495%3ALATSWE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2 in JSTOR] |
| − | * Munting, Roger. "Soviet Food Supply and Allied Aid in the War, 1941-45" ''Soviet Studies'' Vol. 36, No. 4 (Oct., 1984), pp. 582-593 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0038-5859%28198410%2936%3A4%3C582%3ASFSAAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I in JSTOR] | + | * Munting, Roger. "Soviet Food Supply and Allied Aid in the War, 1941-45" ''Soviet Studies'' Vol. 36, No. 4 (Oct., 1984), pp. 582–593 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0038-5859%28198410%2936%3A4%3C582%3ASFSAAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I in JSTOR] |
| | * Patterson, James T. "Alternatives to Globalism: Robert A. Taft and American Foreign Policy, 1939-1945." ''The Historian'' 36, no. 4 ( August 1974): 670-88. | | * Patterson, James T. "Alternatives to Globalism: Robert A. Taft and American Foreign Policy, 1939-1945." ''The Historian'' 36, no. 4 ( August 1974): 670-88. |
| | * Reynolds, David. ''The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941: A Study of Competitive Cooperation.'' 1981. | | * Reynolds, David. ''The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941: A Study of Competitive Cooperation.'' 1981. |