Changes

At first most European leaders embraced the plan, but the Communists swung into opposition once Stalin signaled his opposition. However the socialist movements endorsed and supported the ERP as did business and liberal elements.  A European organization was formed, the ''' Organization for European Economic Cooperation''' ('''OEEC''') to coordinate policies, and at all times the details and operations of the program was negotiated between the U.S. and European nations.

At first most European leaders embraced the plan, but the Communists swung into opposition once Stalin signaled his opposition. However the socialist movements endorsed and supported the ERP as did business and liberal elements.  A European organization was formed, the ''' Organization for European Economic Cooperation''' ('''OEEC''') to coordinate policies, and at all times the details and operations of the program was negotiated between the U.S. and European nations.

Promotions continued after the plan began, and emphasized its success in contrast to the economic failures under Communism. As the aim of the Marshall Plan was to restore the confidence of the Europeans after the devastation of the war , the ideological and psychological aspects of the plan were as important as the economic ones. Propaganda and publicity campaigns were therefore crucial to the success of the plan and varied little from country to country, as the purpose was to spread the American way of life throughout Europe. For example, American and Danish authorities cooperated with considerable success in 1948-50 to present the Marshall Plan as a program of reciprocal benefit to both nations. Press releases, journalists' tours, and three large exhibitions presented Denmark and the United States as closely related lands with shared values of democracy and freedom. America was depicted as rich and highly developed economically and technologically, while Denmark had superior systems of agriculture and social welfare. Politics was kept in the background in building this image of shared values and interests.<ref>Marianne Rostgaard, "Kampen Om Sjaelene: Dansk Marshallplan Publicity 1948-50" [The Battle for Souls: Publicity for the Marshall Plan in Denmark, 1948-50]. ''Historie'' 2002 (2): 257-291. Issn: 0107-4725</ref>

Promotions continued after the plan began, and emphasized its success in contrast to the economic failures under Communism. As the aim of the Marshall Plan was to restore the confidence of the Europeans after the devastation of the war, the ideological and psychological aspects of the plan were as important as the economic ones. Propaganda and publicity campaigns were therefore crucial to the success of the plan and varied little from country to country, as the purpose was to spread the American way of life throughout Europe. For example, American and Danish authorities cooperated with considerable success in 1948-50 to present the Marshall Plan as a program of reciprocal benefit to both nations. Press releases, journalists' tours, and three large exhibitions presented Denmark and the United States as closely related lands with shared values of democracy and freedom. America was depicted as rich and highly developed economically and technologically, while Denmark had superior systems of agriculture and social welfare. Politics was kept in the background in building this image of shared values and interests.<ref>Marianne Rostgaard, "Kampen Om Sjaelene: Dansk Marshallplan Publicity 1948-50" [The Battle for Souls: Publicity for the Marshall Plan in Denmark, 1948-50]. ''Historie'' 2002 (2): 257-291. Issn: 0107-4725</ref>

[[Image:M-plan-1.jpg|thumb|250px|graphic from 1949 leaflet for Dutch audiences, artwork by Jo Spier (1900-1978)]]  

[[Image:M-plan-1.jpg|thumb|250px|graphic from 1949 leaflet for Dutch audiences, artwork by Jo Spier (1900-1978)]]  

===National studies===

===National studies===

====Britain====

====Britain====

[[Britain history|Britain]] received $3.2 billion dollars in ERP aid between 1948 and 1951 (in addition to several billions before the ERP began) As with other recipients, the aid was given on the condition that Britain balance its budget, control tariffs, and maintain adequate currency reserves. Marshall Plan aid involved new efforts to increase British industrial productivity. The agency that analyzed the situation, the Anglo-American Council on Productivity (1948–52), tended to compare successful American and British industrial features. American planning and production control, plant layout, management, and psychology of work were admired. Despite participation by trade unions on both sides, the analysis was variously called lop-sided in favor of employers, a misunderstanding of the American system, or a helpful industrial study leading in 1953 to the creation of a long-term program by the British Productivity Council.<ref>Anthony Carew, "The Anglo-American Council on Productivity (1948-52): the Ideological Roots of the Post-war Debate on Productivity in Britain." ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 1991 26(1): 49-69. Issn: 0022-0094 [http://www.jstor.org/pss/260630 in Jstor]</ref>

[[Britain history|Britain]] received $3.2 billion in ERP aid between 1948 and 1951 (in addition to several billions before the ERP began) As with other recipients, the aid was given on the condition that Britain balance its budget, control tariffs, and maintain adequate currency reserves. Marshall Plan aid involved new efforts to increase British industrial productivity. The agency that analyzed the situation, the Anglo-American Council on Productivity (1948–52), tended to compare successful American and British industrial features. American planning and production control, plant layout, management, and psychology of work were admired. Despite participation by trade unions on both sides, the analysis was variously called lop-sided in favor of employers, a misunderstanding of the American system, or a helpful industrial study leading in 1953 to the creation of a long-term program by the British Productivity Council.<ref>Anthony Carew, "The Anglo-American Council on Productivity (1948-52): the Ideological Roots of the Post-war Debate on Productivity in Britain." ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 1991 26(1): 49-69. Issn: 0022-0094 [http://www.jstor.org/pss/260630 in Jstor]</ref>

During this period, the British Labour government decided to introduce the National Health Service, offering universal health coverage for all citizens, funded out of tax revenues. At first, senior administrators and US leaders supported the Labour Party and its policies, believing that a popular socialist government in Britain was better able to resist Communist influence. However, by 1950, concern was expressed in America that ERP funds were being used to help finance socialist experiments in Britain at the expense of defense spending needed to counter the Soviet threat. British leaders resented what they saw as US interference in domestic politics and in 1951 declared that Britain no longer required Marshall Aid funds.<ref>Daniel M. Fox, "The Administration of the Marshall Plan and British Health Policy." ''Journal of Policy History'' 2004 16(3): 191-211. Issn: 0898-0306 in [[Project Muse]]</ref>

During this period, the British Labour government decided to introduce the National Health Service, offering universal health coverage for all citizens, funded out of tax revenues. At first, senior administrators and US leaders supported the Labour Party and its policies, believing that a popular socialist government in Britain was better able to resist Communist influence. However, by 1950, concern was expressed in America that ERP funds were being used to help finance socialist experiments in Britain at the expense of defense spending needed to counter the Soviet threat. British leaders resented what they saw as US interference in domestic politics and in 1951 declared that Britain no longer required Marshall Aid funds.<ref>Daniel M. Fox, "The Administration of the Marshall Plan and British Health Policy." ''Journal of Policy History'' 2004 16(3): 191-211. Issn: 0898-0306 in [[Project Muse]]</ref>

====Belgium====

====Belgium====

A central goal of the ERP was to promote the growth of productivity along tghe lines of American management and labor practices. Obstacles arose in [[Belgium, history|Belgium]], which clearly limited its impact. The interest among some Belgian employers in increasing rates of productivity per worker was motivated by the evolution of wage levels. But the Americans also intended to inject a new "spirit of productivity" in Belgian industries, which implied, among other measures, a reinforcement of structures of corporatist negotiation between the social partners at a local level. The ambitions of the American strategy therefore extended beyond the defined goal of introducing a [[Fordism|Fordist]] type of economic system with high wages, high productivity, and low prices to consumers. After the belated establishment of the Belgian Office for the Increase of Productivity in 1952, the political character of the program became apparent. By incorporating American management principles, while at the same time decoding them and adapting them to the national situation, Belgian employers' organizations and trade unions skillfully exploited their position as intermediaries in order to appropriate the "modernist" label that they advocated. The "policy of productivity" was successful for a certain time because it matched the contours of the evolution of social reforms in Belgium. This policy success, however, was rendered impotent by the failure of the economic dimension of the productivity campaigns. The Americans had in effect failed to recognize the structural importance of the major financial groups which dominated heavy industry in Belgium. By not adopting the American notions of productivity, and more generally by not carrying out any large-scale programs of innovation and investment in the key sectors that they controlled in the aftermath of the war, these holding companies greatly restricted the scope for American influence. Consequently, it was by other means, such as the training of managers, that the American paradigms entered into Belgian economic culture.<ref>Kenneth Bertrams, "Productivite Economique et Paix Sociale au sein du Plan Marshall: Les Limites de l'influence Americaine aupres des Industriels et Syndicats Belges, 1948-1960,"  [Economic Productivity and Social Peace Within the Marshall Plan: the Limits of American Influence on Belgian Industrialists and Trade Unionists, 1948-60]. ''Cahiers D'histoire du Temps Présent'' 2001 (9): 191-235. Issn: 0771-6435</ref>

A central goal of the ERP was to promote the growth of productivity along the lines of American management and labor practices. Obstacles arose in [[Belgium, history|Belgium]], which clearly limited its impact. The interest among some Belgian employers in increasing rates of productivity per worker was motivated by the evolution of wage levels. But the Americans also intended to inject a new "spirit of productivity" in Belgian industries, which implied, among other measures, a reinforcement of structures of corporatist negotiation between the social partners at a local level. The ambitions of the American strategy therefore extended beyond the defined goal of introducing a [[Fordism|Fordist]] type of economic system with high wages, high productivity, and low prices to consumers. After the belated establishment of the Belgian Office for the Increase of Productivity in 1952, the political character of the program became apparent. By incorporating American management principles, while at the same time decoding them and adapting them to the national situation, Belgian employers' organizations and trade unions skillfully exploited their position as intermediaries in order to appropriate the "modernist" label that they advocated. The "policy of productivity" was successful for a certain time because it matched the contours of the evolution of social reforms in Belgium. This policy success, however, was rendered impotent by the failure of the economic dimension of the productivity campaigns. The Americans had in effect failed to recognize the structural importance of the major financial groups which dominated heavy industry in Belgium. By not adopting the American notions of productivity, and more generally by not carrying out any large-scale programs of innovation and investment in the key sectors that they controlled in the aftermath of the war, these holding companies greatly restricted the scope for American influence. Consequently, it was by other means, such as the training of managers, that the American paradigms entered into Belgian economic culture.<ref>Kenneth Bertrams, "Productivite Economique et Paix Sociale au sein du Plan Marshall: Les Limites de l'influence Americaine aupres des Industriels et Syndicats Belges, 1948-1960,"  [Economic Productivity and Social Peace Within the Marshall Plan: the Limits of American Influence on Belgian Industrialists and Trade Unionists, 1948-60]. ''Cahiers D'histoire du Temps Présent'' 2001 (9): 191-235. Issn: 0771-6435</ref>

====France====

====France====

Although the economic situation in France was grim in 1945, resources did exist. The US government had planned a major aid program, but President [[Harry S. Truman]] unexpectedly ended [[Lend Lease]] in late summer 1945, and additional aid was stymied by Congress in 1945-46.  France managed to regain its international status thanks to a successful production strategy, a demographic spurt, and technical and political innovations. Conditions varied from firm to firm. Some had been destroyed or damaged, nationalized or requisitioned, but the majority carried on, sometimes working harder and more efficiently than before the war. Industries were reorganized on a basis that ranged from consensual (electricity) to conflictual (machine tools), therefore producing uneven results. Despite strong American pressure through the ERP, there was little change in the organization and content of the training for French industrial managers until the late 1950s. This was mainly due to the reticence of the existing institutions and the struggle among different economic and political interest groups for control over efforts to improve the further training of practitioners.<ref>John S. Hill, "American Efforts to Aid French Reconstruction Between Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan." ''Journal of Modern History'' 1992 64(3): 500-524. Issn: 0022-2801  [http://www.jstor.org/pss/2124596 in jstor]</ref>

Although the economic situation in France was grim in 1945, resources did exist. The US government had planned a major aid program, but President [[Harry S. Truman]] unexpectedly ended [[Lend Lease]] in late summer 1945, and additional aid was stymied by Congress in 1945-46.  France managed to regain its international status thanks to a successful production strategy, a demographic spurt, and technical and political innovations. Conditions varied from firm to firm. Some had been destroyed or damaged, nationalized or requisitioned, but the majority carried on, sometimes working harder and more efficiently than before the war. Industries were reorganized on a basis that ranged from consensual (electricity) to conflictual (machine tools), therefore producing uneven results. Despite strong American pressure through the ERP, there was little change in the organization and content of the training for French industrial managers until the late 1950s. This was mainly due to the reticence of the existing institutions and the struggle among different economic and political interest groups for control over efforts to improve the further training of practitioners.<ref>John S. Hill, "American Efforts to Aid French Reconstruction Between Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan." ''Journal of Modern History'' 1992 64(3): 500-524. Issn: 0022-2801  [http://www.jstor.org/pss/2124596 in jstor]</ref>

Given the business background of ECA leaders such as Paul Hoffman, the Americans' readiness to work with the Norwegian Labor government's ERP Council disappointed the conservative Norwegian business community, represented by the major business organizations, the Norges Industriforbund and the Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening. While reluctant to work with the government, Norwegian business leaders also recognized the dangers of appearing to obstruct the implementation of the Marshall Plan. The Americans' acceptance of a role for government in economic planning reflected their New Deal orientation. The opportunities for mediation between conservative Norwegian business interests and the government that arose in the course of administering the Marshall Plan helped establish a base for the emergence of Norwegian corporatism in the 1950s.<ref>Kai R. Pedersen, "Norwegian Business and the Marshall Plan, 1947-1952."  ''Scandinavian Journal of History'' 1996 21(4): 285-301. Issn: 0346-8755</ref>

Given the business background of ECA leaders such as Paul Hoffman, the Americans' readiness to work with the Norwegian Labor government's ERP Council disappointed the conservative Norwegian business community, represented by the major business organizations, the Norges Industriforbund and the Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening. While reluctant to work with the government, Norwegian business leaders also recognized the dangers of appearing to obstruct the implementation of the Marshall Plan. The Americans' acceptance of a role for government in economic planning reflected their New Deal orientation. The opportunities for mediation between conservative Norwegian business interests and the government that arose in the course of administering the Marshall Plan helped establish a base for the emergence of Norwegian corporatism in the 1950s.<ref>Kai R. Pedersen, "Norwegian Business and the Marshall Plan, 1947-1952."  ''Scandinavian Journal of History'' 1996 21(4): 285-301. Issn: 0346-8755</ref>

====Germany====

====Germany====

The West German "Wirtschaftswunder," the miraculous economic recovery after 1945, was due to the explosive growth of intra-European trade. After an interlude of Allied administration, the Marshall Plan heralded the reintegration of West Germany into the Western European economy. The emerging postwar settlement facilitated the continuation of the boom in the 1950's. Economic development created additional impetus for further European integration by the end of the decade.  France, once fearful of German industrial domination, combined with West Germany to form the European Coal and Steel Community in which they supplied steel for German automobiles. Competition played a role in modernizing the steel industry in both countries.<ref>Till Geiger, "Like a Phoenix from the Ashes!? West Germany's Return to the European Market, 1945-58." ''Contemporary European History'' 1994 3(3): 337-353. Issn: 0960-7773</ref>

The West German "Wirtschaftswunder," the miraculous economic recovery after 1945, was due to the explosive growth of intra-European trade. After an interlude of Allied administration, the Marshall Plan heralded the reintegration of West Germany into the Western European economy. The emerging postwar settlement facilitated the continuation of the boom in the 1950s. Economic development created additional impetus for further European integration by the end of the decade.  France, once fearful of German industrial domination, combined with West Germany to form the European Coal and Steel Community in which they supplied steel for German automobiles. Competition played a role in modernizing the steel industry in both countries.<ref>Till Geiger, "Like a Phoenix from the Ashes!? West Germany's Return to the European Market, 1945-58." ''Contemporary European History'' 1994 3(3): 337-353. Issn: 0960-7773</ref>

    

    

==Comparisons==

==Comparisons==

Western Europe recovered much faster after World War II than after World War I, despite far greater physical and economic damage in 1945 than in 1918. Output grew at 7.5% annually from 1945 to 1950, more than double the 3.5% of 1919-24. Indeed, the rapid recovery in the late 1940s took economists by surprise. One explanation was the large output gap (that is, economic output in 1945 was further below the level of 1938 than that of 1919 to 1914) and a greater capacity to fill that gap (increased industrial capacity as a result of expanded wartime production). Another reason for the improved economic performance in the late 1940's was a general change in domestic political attitudes. After 1918 there were conscious hopes and efforts to revive prewar economic and political structures; no such reactionary calls for a return to the prewar [[Great Depression]] existed after 1945. Instead there was a clear desire for change. One measure of a commitment to change was the far slower decontrol of wages, prices, and rents after 1945 to ensure economic stability. Another difference between 1919 and 1946, from a macroeconomic standpoint, was that post-1918 politicians committed themselves to an immediate return to the gold standard with little clear understanding of how national economies worked or were interconnected. In contrast, after 1945 most countries pursued expansionary economic policies with little regard for hard currency stability. A final reason for the difference in the success of postwar reconstruction was a marked change in the nature of international politics, with far more effort being made toward international cooperation after World War II, especially by the 1950's, compared to what happened in the 1920's. This sense of cooperation was complemented by a radically new attitude of the United States toward world affairs: a willingness to participate in the UN; modest reparations demands on Germany; no demand for repayment of war debts; and an active American aid program abroad, in particular the Marshall Plan.<ref>Andrea Boltho, "Reconstruction after Two World Wars: Why the Differences?" ''Journal of European Economic History'' 2001 30(2): 429-456. Issn: 0391-5115</ref>

Western Europe recovered much faster after World War II than after World War I, despite far greater physical and economic damage in 1945 than in 1918. Output grew at 7.5% annually from 1945 to 1950, more than double the 3.5% of 1919-24. Indeed, the rapid recovery in the late 1940s took economists by surprise. One explanation was the large output gap (that is, economic output in 1945 was further below the level of 1938 than that of 1919 to 1914) and a greater capacity to fill that gap (increased industrial capacity as a result of expanded wartime production). Another reason for the improved economic performance in the late 1940s was a general change in domestic political attitudes. After 1918 there were conscious hopes and efforts to revive prewar economic and political structures; no such reactionary calls for a return to the prewar [[Great Depression]] existed after 1945. Instead there was a clear desire for change. One measure of a commitment to change was the far slower decontrol of wages, prices, and rents after 1945 to ensure economic stability. Another difference between 1919 and 1946, from a macroeconomic standpoint, was that post-1918 politicians committed themselves to an immediate return to the gold standard with little clear understanding of how national economies worked or were interconnected. In contrast, after 1945 most countries pursued expansionary economic policies with little regard for hard currency stability. A final reason for the difference in the success of postwar reconstruction was a marked change in the nature of international politics, with far more effort being made toward international cooperation after World War II, especially by the 1950s, compared to what happened in the 1920s. This sense of cooperation was complemented by a radically new attitude of the United States toward world affairs: a willingness to participate in the UN; modest reparations demands on Germany; no demand for repayment of war debts; and an active American aid program abroad, in particular the Marshall Plan.<ref>Andrea Boltho, "Reconstruction after Two World Wars: Why the Differences?" ''Journal of European Economic History'' 2001 30(2): 429-456. Issn: 0391-5115</ref>

==Memory==

==Memory==