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# The establishment of a commission to resolve American losses in British ship seizure and loyalist losses during the [[American Revolutionary War]].

# The establishment of a commission to resolve American losses in British ship seizure and loyalist losses during the [[American Revolutionary War]].

The terms were designed primarily by Treasury Secretary [[Alexander Hamilton]], with strong support from President [[George Washington]] and chief negotiator [[John Jay]].  Both sides achieved some of their objectives (especially averting possible war and increasing trade), but Jeffersonians thought it aligned the new nation too closely with Britain and thus threatened republican values. Jay obtained the primary American requirements, chiefly British withdrawal from the posts they occupied in the Northwest Territory of the United States, which they had promised to abandon in 1783. Wartime debts and the US-Canada boundary were sent to arbitration--one of the first major uses of arbitration in diplomatic history.  The British also granted some rights to trade with British possessions in India and the Caribbean, in exchange for American limits on the export of cotton. The treaty averted possible war but immediately became one of the central issues in domestic American politics, with [[Thomas Jefferson]] and [[James Madison]] leading the opposition.  They feared that closer economic ties with Britain would strengthen the Federalists and might undercut [[republicanism|republican values]]. The treaty encouraged trade between the two nations for a decade; but it broke down after 1803; efforts to agree on a replacement treaty failed in 1807 as tensions escalated to the [[War of 1812]].<ref> Marshall Smelser, ''The Democratic Republic: 1801-1815'' (1968) p 139, 145, 155-56</ref>

The terms were designed primarily by Treasury Secretary [[Alexander Hamilton]], with strong support from President [[George Washington]] and chief negotiator [[John Jay]].  Both sides achieved some of their objectives (especially averting possible war and increasing trade), but Jeffersonians thought it aligned the new nation too closely with Britain and thus threatened republican values. Jay obtained the primary American requirements, chiefly British withdrawal from the posts they occupied in the Northwest Territory of the United States, which they had promised to abandon in 1783. Wartime debts and the US-Canada boundary were sent to arbitration—one of the first major uses of arbitration in diplomatic history.  The British also granted some rights to trade with British possessions in India and the Caribbean, in exchange for American limits on the export of cotton. The treaty averted possible war but immediately became one of the central issues in domestic American politics, with [[Thomas Jefferson]] and [[James Madison]] leading the opposition.  They feared that closer economic ties with Britain would strengthen the Federalists and might undercut [[republicanism|republican values]]. The treaty encouraged trade between the two nations for a decade; but it broke down after 1803; efforts to agree on a replacement treaty failed in 1807 as tensions escalated to the [[War of 1812]].<ref>Marshall Smelser, ''The Democratic Republic: 1801-1815'' (1968) p 139, 145, 155-56</ref>

==Issues==

==Issues==

From the British perspective, the war with France made it imperative to improve relations with the U.S., lest that country fall into the French orbit.  From the American viewpoint, the most pressing foreign policy issues were normalizing trade relations with Britain, America's leading trading partner, and resolving issues left over from the American Revolution.  As one observer explained, the British government was "well disposed to America....They have made their arrangements upon a plan that comprehends the neutrality of the United States, and are anxious that it should be preserved."<ref>Gouverneur Morris quoted in Perkins (1955) p. 22; the British foreign minister felt, "this Country is anxious to keep the Americans in good humour." ibid. </ref>  Even more serious were the issues arising from the ongoing war between Britain and France. In 1793-1794, the British Navy captured hundreds of  American neutral ships and the British in Canada were supporting Indian tribes fighting the U.S. in Ohio (territory the British gave the U.S. in 1783). Congress voted an embargo for two months.  Hamilton and the Federalists favored Britain over France, and sought to normalize relations.  Hamilton designed the plan and Washington sent Chief Justice Jay to London to negotiate a comprehensive treaty.

From the British perspective, the war with France made it imperative to improve relations with the U.S., lest that country fall into the French orbit.  From the American viewpoint, the most pressing foreign policy issues were normalizing trade relations with Britain, America's leading trading partner, and resolving issues left over from the American Revolution.  As one observer explained, the British government was "well disposed to America....They have made their arrangements upon a plan that comprehends the neutrality of the United States, and are anxious that it should be preserved."<ref>Gouverneur Morris quoted in Perkins (1955) p. 22; the British foreign minister felt, "this Country is anxious to keep the Americans in good humour." ibid.</ref>  Even more serious were the issues arising from the ongoing war between Britain and France. In 1793-1794, the British Navy captured hundreds of  American neutral ships and the British in Canada were supporting Indian tribes fighting the U.S. in Ohio (territory the British gave the U.S. in 1783). Congress voted an embargo for two months.  Hamilton and the Federalists favored Britain over France, and sought to normalize relations.  Hamilton designed the plan and Washington sent Chief Justice Jay to London to negotiate a comprehensive treaty.

The American government had a number of issues it wanted dealt with:

The American government had a number of issues it wanted dealt with:

==Treaty terms==

==Treaty terms==

Both sides achieved many objectives.  The British agreed to vacate the six western forts by June 1796 (which was done), and to compensate American ship owners (the British paid $10,345,200 by 1802).<ref>Wayne S. Cole, ''An Interpretive History of American Foreign Relations,'' (1974) P. 55. </ref>  In return, the Americans gave "most favored nation" trading status to the British, and acquiesced in British anti-French maritime policies.  The United States guaranteed the payment of private prewar debts owed by Americans to British merchants that could not be collected in U.S. courts (the U.S. paid £600,000 in 1802). Two joint boundary commissions were set up to establish correctly the boundary line in the northeast (it agreed on the Saint Croix River) and in the northwest (this one never met).  Jay, a strong opponent of slavery, dropped the issue of compensation for slaves, which angered Southern slaveowners.  Jay was unsuccessful in negotiating an end to the  [[impressment]] of American sailors into the Royal Navy, which later became one of the key issues that led to the [[War of 1812]].  Article III declared the right of Indians to trade and travel between the United States and British Canada.

Both sides achieved many objectives.  The British agreed to vacate the six western forts by June 1796 (which was done), and to compensate American ship owners (the British paid $10,345,200 by 1802).<ref>Wayne S. Cole, ''An Interpretive History of American Foreign Relations,'' (1974) P. 55.</ref>  In return, the Americans gave "most favored nation" trading status to the British, and acquiesced in British anti-French maritime policies.  The United States guaranteed the payment of private prewar debts owed by Americans to British merchants that could not be collected in U.S. courts (the U.S. paid £600,000 in 1802). Two joint boundary commissions were set up to establish correctly the boundary line in the northeast (it agreed on the Saint Croix River) and in the northwest (this one never met).  Jay, a strong opponent of slavery, dropped the issue of compensation for slaves, which angered Southern slaveowners.  Jay was unsuccessful in negotiating an end to the  [[impressment]] of American sailors into the Royal Navy, which later became one of the key issues that led to the [[War of 1812]].  Article III declared the right of Indians to trade and travel between the United States and British Canada.

==Approval and dissent==

==Approval and dissent==

Washington submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification in June  1795.  The treaty was unpopular at first, and gave the Jeffersonians a platform to rally new supporters. As Varg (1963) explains, "The Jay Treaty was a reasonable give-and-take compromise of the issues between the two countries. What rendered it so assailable was not the compromise spelled out between the two nations but the fact that it was not a compromise between the two political parties at home. Embodying the views of the Federalists, the treaty repudiated the foreign policy of the opposing party."<ref> Varg, 1963 p. 95</ref>  The Jeffersonians feared that close economic ties to Britain would strengthen monarchism in the U.S.; they strongly supported France in the war between Britain and France that began in 1794, and arguing the treaty with France from 1778 was still in effect. They looked at Britain as the center of aristocracy and the main threat to America's republican values. Therefore they denounced Hamilton and Jay (and even Washington) as monarchists who betrayed American values. They organized public protests against Jay and his treaty; one of their rallying cries went: ''Damn John Jay! Damn everyone that won't damn John Jay! Damn every one that won't put lights in his window and sit up all night damning John Jay!'' <ref> William Weeks, ''Building the Continental Empire'', p. 23 </ref>

Washington submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification in June  1795.  The treaty was unpopular at first, and gave the Jeffersonians a platform to rally new supporters. As Varg (1963) explains, "The Jay Treaty was a reasonable give-and-take compromise of the issues between the two countries. What rendered it so assailable was not the compromise spelled out between the two nations but the fact that it was not a compromise between the two political parties at home. Embodying the views of the Federalists, the treaty repudiated the foreign policy of the opposing party."<ref>Varg, 1963 p. 95</ref>  The Jeffersonians feared that close economic ties to Britain would strengthen monarchism in the U.S.; they strongly supported France in the war between Britain and France that began in 1794, and arguing the treaty with France from 1778 was still in effect. They looked at Britain as the center of aristocracy and the main threat to America's republican values. Therefore they denounced Hamilton and Jay (and even Washington) as monarchists who betrayed American values. They organized public protests against Jay and his treaty; one of their rallying cries went: ''Damn John Jay! Damn everyone that won't damn John Jay! Damn every one that won't put lights in his window and sit up all night damning John Jay!'' <ref>William Weeks, ''Building the Continental Empire'', p. 23</ref>

Jefferson and Madison strongly opposed the Treaty--they favored France--thus setting up foreign policy as a major dispute between the recently established Federalist party and the new Republican party.  Furthermore they had a counterproposal designed to establish "a direct system of commercial hostility with Great Britain," even at the risk of war. The Jeffersonians raised public opinion to fever pitch by accusing the British of promoting Indian atrocities on the frontier.<ref>Elkins and McKitrick, p. 405</ref> The fierce debates over the Treaty in 1794-95, according to one historian, "transformed the Republican movement into a Republican party." To fight the treaty the Jeffersonians "established coordination in activity between leaders at the capital, and leaders, actives and popular followings in the states, counties and towns."<ref> William Nisbet Chambers. ''Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, 1776-1809'' (1963), p. 80</ref>  Jay's failure to obtain compensation for "lost" slaves galvanized the South into opposition.<ref>Sean Wilentz, ''The Rise of American Democracy'' (2006) 67-68</ref>

Jefferson and Madison strongly opposed the Treaty—they favored France—thus setting up foreign policy as a major dispute between the recently established Federalist party and the new Republican party.  Furthermore they had a counterproposal designed to establish "a direct system of commercial hostility with Great Britain," even at the risk of war. The Jeffersonians raised public opinion to fever pitch by accusing the British of promoting Indian atrocities on the frontier.<ref>Elkins and McKitrick, p. 405</ref> The fierce debates over the Treaty in 1794-95, according to one historian, "transformed the Republican movement into a Republican party." To fight the treaty the Jeffersonians "established coordination in activity between leaders at the capital, and leaders, actives and popular followings in the states, counties and towns."<ref>William Nisbet Chambers. ''Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, 1776-1809'' (1963), p. 80</ref>  Jay's failure to obtain compensation for "lost" slaves galvanized the South into opposition.<ref>Sean Wilentz, ''The Rise of American Democracy'' (2006) 67-68</ref>

The Federalists fought back and Congress rejected the Jefferson-Madison counterproposals. Washington threw his enormous prestige behind the treaty, and Federalists rallied public opinion more effectively than the opponents.<ref>Estes 2001</ref>  Hamilton convinced President Washington it was the best treaty that could be expected. Washington, who insisted the U.S. must remain neutral in the European wars then raging, signed it and his prestige carried the day in Congress.  The Federalists made a strong, systematic appeal to public opinion which rallied their own supporters and shifted the debate.  Washington and Hamilton outmaneuvered Madison as opposition leader.<ref>Estes pp 398-99</ref>  Hamilton, now out of the government, was the dominant figure who helped secure its approval in the Senate by the needed 2/3 vote.  In mid-August, the Senate ratified the treaty 20-10.  President Washington signed it in late August. The Treaty was proclaimed in effect on February 29, 1796 and in the series of close votes after another bitter fight the House funded the Treaty in April 1796.  

The Federalists fought back and Congress rejected the Jefferson-Madison counterproposals. Washington threw his enormous prestige behind the treaty, and Federalists rallied public opinion more effectively than the opponents.<ref>Estes 2001</ref>  Hamilton convinced President Washington it was the best treaty that could be expected. Washington, who insisted the U.S. must remain neutral in the European wars then raging, signed it and his prestige carried the day in Congress.  The Federalists made a strong, systematic appeal to public opinion which rallied their own supporters and shifted the debate.  Washington and Hamilton outmaneuvered Madison as opposition leader.<ref>Estes pp 398-99</ref>  Hamilton, now out of the government, was the dominant figure who helped secure its approval in the Senate by the needed 2/3 vote.  In mid-August, the Senate ratified the treaty 20-10.  President Washington signed it in late August. The Treaty was proclaimed in effect on February 29, 1796 and in the series of close votes after another bitter fight the House funded the Treaty in April 1796.  

Historian Marshall Smelser argues that the treaty effectively postponed war with Britain for ten years and more (war finally did break out in 1812).<ref>Marshall Smelser, ''The Democratic Republic, 1801-1815'' (1968)</ref>   

Historian Marshall Smelser argues that the treaty effectively postponed war with Britain for ten years and more (war finally did break out in 1812).<ref>Marshall Smelser, ''The Democratic Republic, 1801-1815'' (1968)</ref>   

Bradford Perkins argued in 1955 that the treaty was the first establishment of a special relationship between Britain and America, with a second installment under Lord Salisbury. In his view, the treaty worked for ten years to secure peace between Britain and America: "The decade may he characterized as the period of "The First Rapprochement." As Perkins concludes, "For about ten years there was peace on the frontier, joint recognition of the value of commercial intercourse, and even, by comparison with both preceding and succeeding epochs, a muting of strife over ship seizures and impressment. Two controversies with France... pushed the English-speaking powers even more closely together."<ref> Perkins (1955) p. vii</ref> Starting at swords' point in 1794 the Jay treaty reversed the tensions, Perkins concludes: "Through a decade of world war and peace, successive governments on both sides of the Atlantic were able to bring about and preserve a cordiality which often approached genuine friendship."<ref>Perkins (1955) p 1</ref>  

Bradford Perkins argued in 1955 that the treaty was the first establishment of a special relationship between Britain and America, with a second installment under Lord Salisbury. In his view, the treaty worked for ten years to secure peace between Britain and America: "The decade may he characterized as the period of "The First Rapprochement." As Perkins concludes, "For about ten years there was peace on the frontier, joint recognition of the value of commercial intercourse, and even, by comparison with both preceding and succeeding epochs, a muting of strife over ship seizures and impressment. Two controversies with France... pushed the English-speaking powers even more closely together."<ref>Perkins (1955) p. vii</ref> Starting at swords' point in 1794 the Jay treaty reversed the tensions, Perkins concludes: "Through a decade of world war and peace, successive governments on both sides of the Atlantic were able to bring about and preserve a cordiality which often approached genuine friendship."<ref>Perkins (1955) p 1</ref>  

Perkins gives more weight than other historians to valuable concessions regarding trade in India and the concession on the West Indies trade.  In addition, reports Perkins, the Royal Navy treated American commerce with "relative leniency" during the wars, and many impressed seamen were returned to America. Furthermore, Spain, seeing an informal British-American alliance shaping up, became more favorable regarding American usage of the Mississippi River and signed [[Pinckney's Treaty]] which the Americans wanted. When Jefferson took office he gained renewal of the commercial articles that had greatly benefitted American shipping.<ref>Perkins, ''Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations I: The Creation of a Republican Empire''. (1995) p. 99, 100, 124</ref>   

Perkins gives more weight than other historians to valuable concessions regarding trade in India and the concession on the West Indies trade.  In addition, reports Perkins, the Royal Navy treated American commerce with "relative leniency" during the wars, and many impressed seamen were returned to America. Furthermore, Spain, seeing an informal British-American alliance shaping up, became more favorable regarding American usage of the Mississippi River and signed [[Pinckney's Treaty]] which the Americans wanted. When Jefferson took office he gained renewal of the commercial articles that had greatly benefitted American shipping.<ref>Perkins, ''Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations I: The Creation of a Republican Empire''. (1995) p. 99, 100, 124</ref>   

==Bibliography==

==Bibliography==

* Bemis, Samuel Flagg. ''Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy'' (1923) remains the standard narrative of how treaty was written

* Bemis, Samuel Flagg. ''Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy'' (1923) remains the standard narrative of how treaty was written

* Charles, Joseph. "The Jay Treaty: The Origins of the American Party System," in ''William and Mary Quarterly'', 3rd Ser., Vol. 12, No. 4. (Oct., 1955), pp. 581-630. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-5597%28195510%293%3A12%3A4%3C581%3ATJTTOO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C online at JSTOR]

* Charles, Joseph. "The Jay Treaty: The Origins of the American Party System," in ''William and Mary Quarterly'', 3rd Ser., Vol. 12, No. 4. (Oct., 1955), pp.&nbsp;581–630. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-5597%28195510%293%3A12%3A4%3C581%3ATJTTOO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C online at JSTOR]

* Combs, Jerald. A. ''The Jay Treaty: Political Background of Founding Fathers'' (1970) (ISBN 0-520-01573-8) Focusing on the domestic and ideological aspects, Combs dislikes Hamilton's quest for national power and a "heroic state" dominating the Western Hemisphere, but concludes the Federalists "followed the proper policy" because the treaty preserved peace with Britain

* Combs, Jerald. A. ''The Jay Treaty: Political Background of Founding Fathers'' (1970) (ISBN 0-520-01573-8) Focusing on the domestic and ideological aspects, Combs dislikes Hamilton's quest for national power and a "heroic state" dominating the Western Hemisphere, but concludes the Federalists "followed the proper policy" because the treaty preserved peace with Britain

*Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, ''The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800.'' (1994), ch. 9

*Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, ''The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800.'' (1994), ch. 9

* Fewster, Joseph M. "The Jay Treaty and British Ship Seizures: the Martinique Cases." ''William and Mary Quarterly'' 1988 45(3): 426-452. ISSN 0043-5597 22:09, [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-5597%28198807%293%3A45%3A3%3C426%3ATJTABS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4 online at JSTOR]

* Fewster, Joseph M. "The Jay Treaty and British Ship Seizures: the Martinique Cases." ''William and Mary Quarterly'' 1988 45(3): 426-452. ISSN 0043-5597 22:09, [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-5597%28198807%293%3A45%3A3%3C426%3ATJTABS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4 online at JSTOR]

* Perkins, Bradford. ''The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805'' 1955.  

* Perkins, Bradford. ''The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805'' 1955.  

* Perkins, Bradford. "Lord Hawkesbury and the Jay-Grenville Negotiations," ''The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,'' Vol. 40, No. 2. (Sep., 1953), pp. 291-304. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0161-391X%28195309%2940%3A2%3C291%3ALHATJN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0 JSTOR]

* Perkins, Bradford. "Lord Hawkesbury and the Jay-Grenville Negotiations," ''The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,'' Vol. 40, No. 2. (Sep., 1953), pp.&nbsp;291–304. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0161-391X%28195309%2940%3A2%3C291%3ALHATJN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0 JSTOR]

*  Varg, Paul A;  ''Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers.'' 1963.  

*  Varg, Paul A;  ''Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers.'' 1963.  

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[[category:Early National U.S.]]

[[Category:Early National U.S.]]

[[category:diplomacy]]

[[Category:Diplomacy]]

[[category:British History]]

[[Category:British History]]