Changes

Wilson and his closest advisors, House and Secretary of State [[Robert Lansing]] increasingly realized that Germany threatened both the idealistic and materialistic interests of the nation. By 1917 they viewed Germany as the incarnation of militarism and believed Prussian autocracy needed to be eliminated to make democracy and peace possible. They also viewed Germany as a threat to American commerce on the high seas and to America's internal security through its propaganda and espionage activities in Mexico.  

Wilson and his closest advisors, House and Secretary of State [[Robert Lansing]] increasingly realized that Germany threatened both the idealistic and materialistic interests of the nation. By 1917 they viewed Germany as the incarnation of militarism and believed Prussian autocracy needed to be eliminated to make democracy and peace possible. They also viewed Germany as a threat to American commerce on the high seas and to America's internal security through its propaganda and espionage activities in Mexico.  

Wilson had House assemble the "Inquiry" &mdash; a team of academic experts to devise efficient postwar solutions to all the world's problems and told House to prepare a charter for a [[League of Nations]].  In October 1918, when Germany petitioned for peace based on the [[Fourteen Points]], Wilson charged House with working out details of an armistice with the Allies. Nelson (1969) contends that House inadvertently compromised Wilson's position at the coming peace conference. The problem lay with House's inability to grasp the full implications and ramifications of Allied military demands for an armistice settlement. The Allies made demands on Germany as to the disposition of her army and navy and as to territorial occupation by Allied forces. While the Allies based these demands on military considerations, they were in fact tantamount to a political settlement. In accepting these military arrangements, House recognized the validity of Allied political ends.<ref>Keith L. Nelson, "What Colonel House Overlooked in the Armistice." ''Mid-America'' 1969 51(2): 75-91. Issn: 0026-2927</ref>

Wilson had House assemble the "Inquiry" &mdash; a team of academic experts to devise efficient postwar solutions to all the world's problems and told House to prepare a charter for a [[League of Nations]].  In October 1918, when Germany petitioned for peace based on the [[Fourteen Points]], Wilson charged House with working out details of an armistice with the Allies. Nelson (1969) contends that House inadvertently compromised Wilson's position at the coming peace conference. The problem lay with House's inability to grasp the full implications and ramifications of Allied military demands for an armistice settlement. The Allies made demands on Germany as to the disposition of her army and navy and as to territorial occupation by Allied forces. While the Allies-based these demands on military considerations, they were in fact tantamount to a political settlement. In accepting these military arrangements, House recognized the validity of Allied political ends.<ref>Keith L. Nelson, "What Colonel House Overlooked in the Armistice." ''Mid-America'' 1969 51(2): 75-91. Issn: 0026-2927</ref>

   

   

House played a major role as the chief American negotiator and Wilson's chief advisor at the Paris peace conference in 1919.  He adopted much of the French hard-line anti-German position.<ref>Floto (1973)</ref> During and after the war House misled the Italian premier Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, by accepting the borders established for Italy in the secret 1915 [[Treaty of London]], which the United States had not signed. Without mentioning his meeting with Orlando, House assured Wilson that nothing would embarrass the president or compromise his principles for peace. When an agreement seemed reachable at the Paris, Wilson, urged by the American delegates who denounced the "immorality" of the Italian demands, withdrew his support for House's plans. House thus exhibited indifference, ignorance, distrust, and miscommunication that worsened relations with Italy and, ultimately leading to the Fiume crisis at the peace conference.<ref>Daniela Rossini, "'For Sheer Deviltry': Colonel House and Italian-American Relations During World War I.' ''Annales du Monde Anglophone'' 1999 (2): 175-203. Issn: 1259-5098</ref>

House played a major role as the chief American negotiator and Wilson's chief advisor at the Paris peace conference in 1919.  He adopted much of the French hard-line anti-German position.<ref>Floto (1973)</ref> During and after the war House misled the Italian premier Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, by accepting the borders established for Italy in the secret 1915 [[Treaty of London]], which the United States had not signed. Without mentioning his meeting with Orlando, House assured Wilson that nothing would embarrass the president or compromise his principles for peace. When an agreement seemed reachable at the Paris, Wilson, urged by the American delegates who denounced the "immorality" of the Italian demands, withdrew his support for House's plans. House thus exhibited indifference, ignorance, distrust, and miscommunication that worsened relations with Italy and, ultimately leading to the Fiume crisis at the peace conference.<ref>Daniela Rossini, "'For Sheer Deviltry': Colonel House and Italian-American Relations During World War I.' ''Annales du Monde Anglophone'' 1999 (2): 175-203. Issn: 1259-5098</ref>