Changes

==Economics==

==Economics==

The Truman Administration before 1950 had focused on budget cutting and sharply reduced military spending. NSC-68 rejected the cost-cutting approach which limited defense expenditures to under $15 billion dollars annually. Reflecting the views of senior State Department officials, especially Nitze and Secretary of State [[Dean Acheson]], it portrayed a well-armed Soviet Union bent on world domination, and argued that only a substantial increase in American military capabilities could save the West from conquest or subservience. The report called for a rearmament balanced between nuclear and conventional forces, and rejected the extreme reliance on strategic air power of previous years as unsuitable, for the American monopoly on [[nuclear weapon]]s (called at the time the "atomic bomb") had ended in 1949. NSC-68 also rejected the prevailing notion that there were inherent limits on the amount of federal spending that the economy could tolerate, and called for a more aggressive approach to the cold war. The report was under consideration when the outbreak of the Korean War moved public opinion to strong support of whatever additional spending was needed. Defense spending soared from 3.0% of GNP in 1950 to 5.1% in 1952 (when the Korean War was in full swing), to 11.1% in 1954, when the war was over but the buildup was in full operation.

The Truman Administration before 1950 had focused on budget cutting and sharply reduced military spending. NSC-68 rejected the cost-cutting approach which limited defense expenditures to under $15 billion annually. Reflecting the views of senior State Department officials, especially Nitze and Secretary of State [[Dean Acheson]], it portrayed a well-armed Soviet Union bent on world domination, and argued that only a substantial increase in American military capabilities could save the West from conquest or subservience. The report called for a rearmament balanced between nuclear and conventional forces, and rejected the extreme reliance on strategic air power of previous years as unsuitable, for the American monopoly on [[nuclear weapon]]s (called at the time the "atomic bomb") had ended in 1949. NSC-68 also rejected the prevailing notion that there were inherent limits on the amount of federal spending that the economy could tolerate, and called for a more aggressive approach to the cold war. The report was under consideration when the outbreak of the Korean War moved public opinion to strong support of whatever additional spending was needed. Defense spending soared from 3.0% of GNP in 1950 to 5.1% in 1952 (when the Korean War was in full swing), to 11.1% in 1954, when the war was over but the buildup was in full operation.

General [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] became president in 1953, and thought the NSC-68 program was too expensive, and feared that a too-large federal budget would create long-term economic weaknesses that would undermine American military capability. His "New Look" approach cut the overall budget and shifted reliance away from expensive Army divisions to less expensive bombers and (later) [[ICBM]] missiles.  Eisenhower did, however, step up the covert operations of the [[CIA]] and sponsored psychological and cultural warfare against Communism.<ref>Saki Dockrill, "Dealing with Soviet Power and Influence: Eisenhower's Management of U.S. National Security." ''Diplomatic History'' 2000 24(2): 345-352. Issn: 0145-2096 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>

General [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] became president in 1953, and thought the NSC-68 program was too expensive, and feared that a too-large federal budget would create long-term economic weaknesses that would undermine American military capability. His "New Look" approach cut the overall budget and shifted reliance away from expensive Army divisions to less expensive bombers and (later) [[ICBM]] missiles.  Eisenhower did, however, step up the covert operations of the [[CIA]] and sponsored psychological and cultural warfare against Communism.<ref>Saki Dockrill, "Dealing with Soviet Power and Influence: Eisenhower's Management of U.S. National Security." ''Diplomatic History'' 2000 24(2): 345-352. Issn: 0145-2096 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>