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| | Specifically, Blackmun argued that the right to terminate a pregnancy is in the penumbra of privacy rights protected by [[substantive due process]], since pregnancy can occasion life-changing events for women, changes not to be taken lightly. However, he noted that the woman's interest in her own privacy is counterbalanced, obviously, by the fetus' interest in life, and the state's interest in protecting life. The question, then, is when each interest trumps the other, and what that means at law. Blackmun set up this framework specifically: | | Specifically, Blackmun argued that the right to terminate a pregnancy is in the penumbra of privacy rights protected by [[substantive due process]], since pregnancy can occasion life-changing events for women, changes not to be taken lightly. However, he noted that the woman's interest in her own privacy is counterbalanced, obviously, by the fetus' interest in life, and the state's interest in protecting life. The question, then, is when each interest trumps the other, and what that means at law. Blackmun set up this framework specifically: |
| − | #In the first trimester, the right of the fetus is negligible.<ref>Blackmun rejects the idea that life begins at conception in a footnote, referencing Texas' argument in this case that it did, as not compatible with the law of almost all states at the time that a fetus can be aborted in the case of the mother's health. Blackmun argued that, if life began at conception, Texas and other states would not allow this exception.</ref> However, the mother's interest is great, as during the first trimester, the health risks of an abortion are significantly less than the health risks posed by pregnancy. Therefore, during this period, the state cannot regulate abortion. | + | #In the first trimester, the right of the fetus is negligible. The mother can get an abortion at any time and for any reason, provided that a physician is willing to do it. No significant regulation can be required. |
| − | #After the first trimester, the state may regulate abortion procedures ''et al'' but not necessarily ban abortions outright, until, | + | #In the second trimester, the right of the fetus is negligible. The mother can get an abortion at any time and for any reason, provided that a physician is willing to do it. No significant regulation can be required. |
| − | #The fetus' interest in life, and the state's interest in protecting that life, comes into being at the moment of [[viability]] - when a fetus can live on its own. After this moment, the balancing of the mother's interests ''vis a vis'' the fetus should be done by the states, not the Court, but if a state chose to forbid abortions after [[viability]], it would be ''allowed''.<ref>Parts VIII - IX of the Opinion of the Court.</ref> Depending on state law, the mother could still choose to abort her fetus, but the Partial Birth Abortion Act (upheld in [[Gonzales v. Carhart]]), makes third trimester abortion nearly impossible.
| + | #In the third trimester, the right of the fetus is negligible. The mother can get an abortion at any time and for any reason, provided that a physician is willing to do it. No significant regulation can be required. |
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| | + | All state regulations of late-term abortions have since been found unconstitutional. Recently the federal Partial Birth Abortion Act (upheld in [[Gonzales v. Carhart]]) approved a ban on a particular kind of late-term abortion procedure. This was the first significant abortion regulation that the Supreme Court has allowed since Roe v Wade. |
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| | ==Controversy== | | ==Controversy== |