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The issue was not the treatment of slaves.  It was fear of slave oligarchs. Men and women could differ on scores of issues, hate blacks or like them, denounce slavery as a sin or promise to guarantee its protection in the Deep South, and still attack the "Slaveocracy."  It mattered not where one stood on the other issues. One could still hate the slavemasters with a passion.<ref>Leonard L. Richards, ''Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860'' (2000) (p. 3)</ref>

The issue was not the treatment of slaves.  It was fear of slave oligarchs. Men and women could differ on scores of issues, hate blacks or like them, denounce slavery as a sin or promise to guarantee its protection in the Deep South, and still attack the "Slaveocracy."  It mattered not where one stood on the other issues. One could still hate the slavemasters with a passion.<ref>Leonard L. Richards, ''Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860'' (2000) (p. 3)</ref>

The term was popularized by antislavery intellectuals such as John Gorham Palfrey, Josiah Quincy, Horace Bushnell, [[James Shepherd Pike]],  [[Horace Greeley]] and Henry Wilson. They showed through a combination of emotive argument and hard statistical data that the South had long held a disproportionate level of power within the nation.  Did the slave power really exist? Millions in the North thought so, and acted upon it. However the notion was ridiculed by Southerners at the time, and rejected as false by historians of the 1920s and 1930s, who stressed that the South was internally divided before 1850.<ref>See Chauncey S. Boucher, "In Re That Aggressive Slavocracy," ''Mississippi Valley Historical Review'' Vol. 8, No. 1/2 (Jun., 1921), pp. 13-79; Craven (1936)</ref> The idea that the Slave Power existed has partly come back at the hands of [[neoabolitionist]] historians since 1970, and few historians now disagree that it was a powerful factor in the beliefs of Northerners.

The term was popularized by antislavery intellectuals such as John Gorham Palfrey, Josiah Quincy, Horace Bushnell, [[James Shepherd Pike]],  [[Horace Greeley]] and Henry Wilson. They showed through a combination of emotive argument and hard statistical data that [[the South]] had long held a disproportionate level of power within the nation.  Did the slave power really exist? Millions in the North thought so, and acted upon it. However the notion was ridiculed by Southerners at the time, and rejected as false by historians of the 1920s and 1930s, who stressed that the South was internally divided before 1850.<ref>See Chauncey S. Boucher, "In Re That Aggressive Slavocracy," ''Mississippi Valley Historical Review'' Vol. 8, No. 1/2 (Jun., 1921), pp. 13-79; Craven (1936)</ref> The idea that the Slave Power existed has partly come back at the hands of [[neoabolitionist]] historians since 1970, and few historians now disagree that it was a powerful factor in the beliefs of Northerners.

 

==Southern power==

==Southern power==

Slave Power derived from a combination of factors. The "three-fifths clause," (counting 100 slaves as 60 people for seats in the House and thus for electoral votes) gave the South additional representation at the national level.<ref>Garry Wills, ''"Negro President": Jefferson and the Slave Power,'' (2005)</ref> Parity in the Senate was critical, whereby a new slave state was admitted in tandem with a new free state. Regional unity across party lines was essential on key votes.  In the [[Democratic party]], the a presidential candidate had to carry the national convention by a two-thirds vote to get nominated.  It was also essential for  some northerners--"Doughfaces"<ref>Most Doughfaces were [[Jacksonian Democracy|Jacksonian Democrats]] like [[Franklin Pierce]] and [[James Buchanan]]; few were Whigs.</ref>—to collaborate with the South proved crucial, as in the debates surrounding the three-fifths clause itself in 1787, the Missouri Compromise of 1820, the gag rule in the House (1836-1844), and the wider subject of the [[Wilmot Proviso]] and slavery expansion in the Southwest after the Mexican war of 1846-48.<ref>Richards (2000)</ref>  However, the North was adding population—and House seats—much faster than the South, so the handwriting was on the wall. With the implacable Republicans gaining every year, the secession option became more and more attractive to the South.  Secession was suicidal, as some leaders realized—and as [[John Quincy Adams]] had long prophesied.  Secession,  argued  James Henry Hammond of South Carolina, reminded him of "the Japanese who when insulted rip open their own bowels." And yet when secession came in 1860 Hammond followed. Richards concludes, "It was men like Hammond who finally destroyed the Slave Power. Thanks to their leading the South out of the Union, seventy-two years of slaveholder domination came to an end." <ref>Richards (2000) pp. 214-15.</ref>

Slave Power derived from a combination of factors. The "three-fifths clause," (counting 100 slaves as 60 people for seats in the House and thus for electoral votes) gave the South additional representation at the national level.<ref>Garry Wills, ''"Negro President": Jefferson and the Slave Power,'' (2005)</ref> Parity in the Senate was critical, whereby a new slave state was admitted in tandem with a new free state. Regional unity across party lines was essential on key votes.  In the [[Democratic party]], the a presidential candidate had to carry the national convention by a two-thirds vote to get nominated.  It was also essential for  some northerners--"Doughfaces"<ref>Most Doughfaces were [[Jacksonian Democracy|Jacksonian Democrats]] like [[Franklin Pierce]] and [[James Buchanan]]; few were Whigs.</ref>—to collaborate with the South proved crucial, as in the debates surrounding the three-fifths clause itself in 1787, the Missouri Compromise of 1820, the gag rule in the House (1836-1844), and the wider subject of the [[Wilmot Proviso]] and slavery expansion in the Southwest after the Mexican war of 1846-48.<ref>Richards (2000)</ref>  However, the North was adding population—and House seats—much faster than the South, so the handwriting was on the wall. With the implacable Republicans gaining every year, the secession option became more and more attractive to the South.  Secession was suicidal, as some leaders realized—and as [[John Quincy Adams]] had long prophesied.  Secession,  argued  James Henry Hammond of South Carolina, reminded him of "the Japanese who when insulted rip open their own bowels." And yet when secession came in 1860 Hammond followed. Richards concludes, "It was men like Hammond who finally destroyed the Slave Power. Thanks to their leading the South out of the Union, seventy-two years of slaveholder domination came to an end." <ref>Richards (2000) pp. 214-15.</ref>