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Similarly, I think some core features of consciousness are illusions, and the job of cognitive scientists is not to explain how those features are “real,” but rather to explain why they seem to us to be real (even though they’re not). For example, it seems to us that our conscious experiences have “intrinsic” properties beyond that which could ever be captured by a functional, mechanistic account of consciousness. I agree that our experiences seem to us to have this property, but I think this “seeming” is simply mistaken.<ref>[https://www.openphilanthropy.org/2017-report-consciousness-and-moral-patienthood 2017 Report on Consciousness and Moral Patienthood] by Luke </ref>}}

Similarly, I think some core features of consciousness are illusions, and the job of cognitive scientists is not to explain how those features are “real,” but rather to explain why they seem to us to be real (even though they’re not). For example, it seems to us that our conscious experiences have “intrinsic” properties beyond that which could ever be captured by a functional, mechanistic account of consciousness. I agree that our experiences seem to us to have this property, but I think this “seeming” is simply mistaken.<ref>[https://www.openphilanthropy.org/2017-report-consciousness-and-moral-patienthood 2017 Report on Consciousness and Moral Patienthood] by Luke </ref>}}

== See also ==

== See also ==