Changes

A special case of substantive due process jurisprudence are those rights which involve a degree of "third-party harm"; that is, the chance that someone or something else may suffer by exercise of the right.  Depending on the nature of the right involved, and its balance against the possibility of harm, rights involving a third-party harm may be curtailed or completely engulfed by the potential for harm.  The right to assisted suicide, for instance, is wholly subsumed by the potential for abuse.<ref>Washington v. Glucksberg.</ref>

A special case of substantive due process jurisprudence are those rights which involve a degree of "third-party harm"; that is, the chance that someone or something else may suffer by exercise of the right.  Depending on the nature of the right involved, and its balance against the possibility of harm, rights involving a third-party harm may be curtailed or completely engulfed by the potential for harm.  The right to assisted suicide, for instance, is wholly subsumed by the potential for abuse.<ref>Washington v. Glucksberg.</ref>

The right to choice in family planning, or, the right to an abortion, is another third-party harm right.  The Court held in ''Casey'' that this right, by nature of the balance of the harm against the right, would be managed by the "undue burden" test.<ref>Casey, supra.</ref>

The right to choice in family planning, or, the right to an abortion, is another right carrying a possibility of a third-party harm .  The Court held in ''Casey'' that this right, by nature of the balance of the harm against the right, would be managed by the "undue burden" test.<ref>Casey, supra.</ref> That is that the exercise of the right will not be unduly burdened.  A burden that is "due," however, may be one that recognizes the state's interest in preventing abortions where avoidable.  This is the ultimate synthesis of the ''[[Roe v. Wade]]'' debate, an attempt at a synthesis between the far-left view (abortion is a right that cannot be abridged) and the far-right view (abortion is always wrong) that allows for exercise of the right under limited circumstances.  This framework fits neatly within Justice Stevens' view of fundamental rights law as an expression of the freedom from "arbitrary restraint": that is, the restraint upon abortion rights, where not "undue," are not "arbitrary."

== References ==

== References ==

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