| Line 12: |
Line 12: |
| | | | |
| | ==Issues== | | ==Issues== |
| − | From the British perspective, the war with France made it imperative to improve relations with the U.S., lest that country fall into the French orbit. From the American viewpoint, the most pressing foreign policy issues were normalizing trade relations with Britain, America's leading trading partner, and resolving issues left over from the American Revolution. As one observer explained, the British government was "well disposed to America....They have made their arrangements upon a plan that comprehends the neutrality of the United States, and are anxious that it should be preserved."<ref>Gouverneur Morris quoted in Perkins (1955) p. 22; the British foreign minister felt, "this Country is anxious to keep the Americans in good humour." ibid.</ref> Even more serious were the issues arising from the ongoing war between Britain and France. In 1793-1794, the British Navy captured hundreds of American neutral ships and the British in Canada were supporting Indian tribes fighting the U.S. in Ohio (territory the British gave the U.S. in 1783). Congress voted an embargo for two months. Hamilton and the Federalists favored Britain over France, and sought to normalize relations. Hamilton designed the plan and Washington sent Chief Justice Jay to London to negotiate a comprehensive treaty. | + | From the British perspective, the war with France made it imperative to improve relations with the U.S., lest that country fall into the French orbit. From the American viewpoint, the most pressing foreign policy issues were normalizing trade relations with Britain, America's leading trading partner, and resolving issues left over from the American Revolution. As one observer explained, the British government was "well disposed to America....They have made their arrangements upon a plan that comprehends the neutrality of the United States, and are anxious that it should be preserved."<ref>Gouverneur Morris quoted in Perkins (1955) p. 22; the British foreign minister felt, "this Country is anxious to keep the Americans in good humour." ibid.</ref> Even more serious were the issues arising from the ongoing war between Britain and France. In 1793–1794, the British Navy captured hundreds of American neutral ships and the British in Canada were supporting Indian tribes fighting the U.S. in Ohio (territory the British gave the U.S. in 1783). Congress voted an embargo for two months. Hamilton and the Federalists favored Britain over France, and sought to normalize relations. Hamilton designed the plan and Washington sent Chief Justice Jay to London to negotiate a comprehensive treaty. |
| | | | |
| | The American government had a number of issues it wanted dealt with: | | The American government had a number of issues it wanted dealt with: |
| | *Britain was still occupying a number of forts on U.S. territory in the Great Lakes region. | | *Britain was still occupying a number of forts on U.S. territory in the Great Lakes region. |
| − | *American merchants wanted compensation for 350 ships confiscated during 1793-94. | + | *American merchants wanted compensation for 350 ships confiscated during 1793–94. |
| | *Southerners wanted compensation for the slaves the British had taken from them during the Revolution. | | *Southerners wanted compensation for the slaves the British had taken from them during the Revolution. |
| | *Merchants wanted the [[British West Indies]] reopened to American trade. | | *Merchants wanted the [[British West Indies]] reopened to American trade. |
| Line 26: |
Line 26: |
| | ==Approval and dissent== | | ==Approval and dissent== |
| | Washington submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification in June 1795. The treaty was unpopular at first, and gave the Jeffersonians a platform to rally new supporters. As Varg (1963) explains, "The Jay Treaty was a reasonable give-and-take compromise of the issues between the two countries. What rendered it so assailable was not the compromise spelled out between the two nations but the fact that it was not a compromise between the two political parties at home. Embodying the views of the Federalists, the treaty repudiated the foreign policy of the opposing party."<ref>Varg, 1963 p. 95</ref> The Jeffersonians feared that close economic ties to Britain would strengthen monarchism in the U.S.; they strongly supported France in the war between Britain and France that began in 1794, and arguing the treaty with France from 1778 was still in effect. They looked at Britain as the center of aristocracy and the main threat to America's republican values. Therefore, they denounced Hamilton and Jay (and even Washington) as monarchists who betrayed American values. They organized public protests against Jay and his treaty; one of their rallying cries went: ''Damn John Jay! Damn everyone that won't damn John Jay! Damn every one that won't put lights in his window and sit up all night damning John Jay!'' <ref>William Weeks, ''Building the Continental Empire'', p. 23</ref> | | Washington submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification in June 1795. The treaty was unpopular at first, and gave the Jeffersonians a platform to rally new supporters. As Varg (1963) explains, "The Jay Treaty was a reasonable give-and-take compromise of the issues between the two countries. What rendered it so assailable was not the compromise spelled out between the two nations but the fact that it was not a compromise between the two political parties at home. Embodying the views of the Federalists, the treaty repudiated the foreign policy of the opposing party."<ref>Varg, 1963 p. 95</ref> The Jeffersonians feared that close economic ties to Britain would strengthen monarchism in the U.S.; they strongly supported France in the war between Britain and France that began in 1794, and arguing the treaty with France from 1778 was still in effect. They looked at Britain as the center of aristocracy and the main threat to America's republican values. Therefore, they denounced Hamilton and Jay (and even Washington) as monarchists who betrayed American values. They organized public protests against Jay and his treaty; one of their rallying cries went: ''Damn John Jay! Damn everyone that won't damn John Jay! Damn every one that won't put lights in his window and sit up all night damning John Jay!'' <ref>William Weeks, ''Building the Continental Empire'', p. 23</ref> |
| − | Jefferson and Madison strongly opposed the Treaty—they favored France—thus setting up foreign policy as a major dispute between the recently established Federalist party and the new Republican party. Furthermore, they had a counterproposal designed to establish "a direct system of commercial hostility with Great Britain," even at the risk of war. The Jeffersonians raised public opinion to fever pitch by accusing the British of promoting Indian atrocities on the frontier.<ref>Elkins and McKitrick, p. 405</ref> The fierce debates over the Treaty in 1794-95, according to one historian, "transformed the Republican movement into a Republican party." To fight the treaty the Jeffersonians "established coordination in activity between leaders at the capital, and leaders, actives and popular followings in the states, counties and towns."<ref>William Nisbet Chambers. ''Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, 1776-1809'' (1963), p. 80</ref> Jay's failure to obtain compensation for "lost" slaves galvanized the South into opposition.<ref>Sean Wilentz, ''The Rise of American Democracy'' (2006) 67-68</ref> | + | Jefferson and Madison strongly opposed the Treaty—they favored France—thus setting up foreign policy as a major dispute between the recently established Federalist party and the new Republican party. Furthermore, they had a counterproposal designed to establish "a direct system of commercial hostility with Great Britain," even at the risk of war. The Jeffersonians raised public opinion to fever pitch by accusing the British of promoting Indian atrocities on the frontier.<ref>Elkins and McKitrick, p. 405</ref> The fierce debates over the Treaty in 1794–95, according to one historian, "transformed the Republican movement into a Republican party." To fight the treaty the Jeffersonians "established coordination in activity between leaders at the capital, and leaders, actives and popular followings in the states, counties and towns."<ref>William Nisbet Chambers. ''Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, 1776-1809'' (1963), p. 80</ref> Jay's failure to obtain compensation for "lost" slaves galvanized the South into opposition.<ref>Sean Wilentz, ''The Rise of American Democracy'' (2006) 67-68</ref> |
| | | | |
| − | The Federalists fought back and Congress rejected the Jefferson-Madison counterproposals. Washington threw his enormous prestige behind the treaty, and Federalists rallied public opinion more effectively than the opponents.<ref>Estes 2001</ref> Hamilton convinced President Washington it was the best treaty that could be expected. Washington, who insisted the U.S. must remain neutral in the European wars then raging, signed it and his prestige carried the day in Congress. The Federalists made a strong, systematic appeal to public opinion which rallied their own supporters and shifted the debate. Washington and Hamilton outmaneuvered Madison as opposition leader.<ref>Estes pp 398-99</ref> Hamilton, now out of the government, was the dominant figure who helped secure its approval in the Senate by the needed 2/3 vote. In mid-August, the Senate ratified the treaty 20-10. President Washington signed it in late August. The Treaty was proclaimed in effect on February 29, 1796 and in the series of close votes after another bitter fight the House funded the Treaty in April 1796. | + | The Federalists fought back and Congress rejected the Jefferson-Madison counterproposals. Washington threw his enormous prestige behind the treaty, and Federalists rallied public opinion more effectively than the opponents.<ref>Estes 2001</ref> Hamilton convinced President Washington it was the best treaty that could be expected. Washington, who insisted the U.S. must remain neutral in the European wars then raging, signed it and his prestige carried the day in Congress. The Federalists made a strong, systematic appeal to public opinion which rallied their own supporters and shifted the debate. Washington and Hamilton outmaneuvered Madison as opposition leader.<ref>Estes pp 398-99</ref> Hamilton, now out of the government, was the dominant figure who helped secure its approval in the Senate by the needed 2/3 vote. In mid-August, the Senate ratified the treaty 20–10. President Washington signed it in late August. The Treaty was proclaimed in effect on February 29, 1796 and in the series of close votes after another bitter fight the House funded the Treaty in April 1796. |
| | | | |
| | After defeat in Congress, the Jeffersonian Republicans fought and lost the 1796 presidential election on the issue, as [[John Adams]] narrowly defeated Jefferson. | | After defeat in Congress, the Jeffersonian Republicans fought and lost the 1796 presidential election on the issue, as [[John Adams]] narrowly defeated Jefferson. |
| Line 51: |
Line 51: |
| | *Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, ''The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800.'' (1994), ch. 9 | | *Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, ''The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800.'' (1994), ch. 9 |
| | * Estes, Todd, "The Art of Presidential Leadership: George Washington and the Jay Treaty," ''Virginia Magazine of History and Biography'', 2001, vol 109, no. 2. | | * Estes, Todd, "The Art of Presidential Leadership: George Washington and the Jay Treaty," ''Virginia Magazine of History and Biography'', 2001, vol 109, no. 2. |
| − | * Estes, Todd, "Shaping the Politics of Public Opinion: Federalists and the Jay Treaty Debate." ''Journal of the Early Republic'' (2000) 20(3): 393-422. ISSN 0275-1275; [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0275-1275%28200023%2920%3A3%3C393%3ASTPOPO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D online at JSTOR] | + | * Estes, Todd, "Shaping the Politics of Public Opinion: Federalists and the Jay Treaty Debate." ''Journal of the Early Republic'' (2000) 20(3): 393–422. ISSN 0275-1275; [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0275-1275%28200023%2920%3A3%3C393%3ASTPOPO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D online at JSTOR] |
| | * Estes, Todd. ''The Jay Treaty Debate, Public Opinion, And the Evolution of Early American Political Culture'' (2006) | | * Estes, Todd. ''The Jay Treaty Debate, Public Opinion, And the Evolution of Early American Political Culture'' (2006) |
| − | * Farrell, James M. "Fisher Ames and Political Judgment: Reason, Passion, and Vehement Style in the Jay Treaty Speech," ''Quarterly Journal of Speech'' 1990 76(4): 415-434. | + | * Farrell, James M. "Fisher Ames and Political Judgment: Reason, Passion, and Vehement Style in the Jay Treaty Speech," ''Quarterly Journal of Speech'' 1990 76(4): 415–434. |
| − | * Fewster, Joseph M. "The Jay Treaty and British Ship Seizures: the Martinique Cases." ''William and Mary Quarterly'' 1988 45(3): 426-452. ISSN 0043-5597 22:09, [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-5597%28198807%293%3A45%3A3%3C426%3ATJTABS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4 online at JSTOR] | + | * Fewster, Joseph M. "The Jay Treaty and British Ship Seizures: the Martinique Cases." ''William and Mary Quarterly'' 1988 45(3): 426–452. ISSN 0043-5597 22:09, [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-5597%28198807%293%3A45%3A3%3C426%3ATJTABS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4 online at JSTOR] |
| | * Perkins, Bradford. ''The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805'' 1955. | | * Perkins, Bradford. ''The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805'' 1955. |
| | * Perkins, Bradford. "Lord Hawkesbury and the Jay-Grenville Negotiations," ''The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,'' Vol. 40, No. 2. (Sep., 1953), pp. 291–304. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0161-391X%28195309%2940%3A2%3C291%3ALHATJN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0 JSTOR] | | * Perkins, Bradford. "Lord Hawkesbury and the Jay-Grenville Negotiations," ''The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,'' Vol. 40, No. 2. (Sep., 1953), pp. 291–304. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0161-391X%28195309%2940%3A2%3C291%3ALHATJN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0 JSTOR] |