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==Strategic Setting==
 
==Strategic Setting==
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In January 1943, American President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] and British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] met with their senior military advisers at [[Casablanca, Morocco]], to devise a military strategy for the coming year. The [[United States Army]] had begun ground operations against the European [[Axis Powers]] only two months before as part of a joint Anglo-American invasion of North Africa. With the North African campaign moving toward a successful conclusion, the leaders of the two nations debated where to launch their next blow. After several days of negotiations, they agreed to make Sicily their next target.
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In January 1943, [[U.S. President]] [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] and British [[Prime Minister]] [[Winston Churchill]] met with their senior military advisers at [[Casablanca]], [[Morocco]], to devise a military strategy for the coming year. The [[United States Army]] had begun ground operations against the European [[Axis Powers]] only two months before as part of a joint Anglo-American invasion of North Africa. With the North African campaign moving toward a successful conclusion, the leaders of the two nations debated where to launch their next blow. After several days of negotiations, they agreed to make Sicily their next target.
    
Situated ninety miles off the north coast of Tunisia  and a mere two and one-half miles from the "toe" of the Italian peninsula, Sicily was both a natural bridge between Africa and Europe and a barrier dividing the [[Mediterranean Sea]]. Its rugged topography made it a tough, unsinkable bastion from which Axis air and naval forces could interdict Allied sea lanes through the Mediterranean. Yet despite its strategic location, the Allies were deeply divided over the merits of invading the island, and in the end the decision to invade Sicily represented an uneasy compromise between British and American strategists.
 
Situated ninety miles off the north coast of Tunisia  and a mere two and one-half miles from the "toe" of the Italian peninsula, Sicily was both a natural bridge between Africa and Europe and a barrier dividing the [[Mediterranean Sea]]. Its rugged topography made it a tough, unsinkable bastion from which Axis air and naval forces could interdict Allied sea lanes through the Mediterranean. Yet despite its strategic location, the Allies were deeply divided over the merits of invading the island, and in the end the decision to invade Sicily represented an uneasy compromise between British and American strategists.
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Of the two armies, it was the veteran Eighth to whom Alexander assigned the primary burden of the campaign. The less experienced Seventh was relegated to a secondary role of supporting the British and protecting their flank as they moved up the east coast toward Messina. The unequal allocation of responsibility clearly reflected British skepticism about American capabilities, a skepticism born of the debacle at Kasserine Pass a few months before. Moreover, it made more sense to have only one army advance on Messina than to attempt to coordinate the movements of two such entities upon the same goal, especially given the rather narrow and constrictive terrain of northeastern Sicily. The problem was that Alexander never drew up any detailed plans for the land campaign beyond the initial landings, preferring instead to make those decisions once the troops were firmly ashore and the operation was under way. By failing to assign the Seventh Army any clear objectives beyond the Blue Line, Alexander opened the door for disagreement and contention between his two army commanders once the campaign had begun.
 
Of the two armies, it was the veteran Eighth to whom Alexander assigned the primary burden of the campaign. The less experienced Seventh was relegated to a secondary role of supporting the British and protecting their flank as they moved up the east coast toward Messina. The unequal allocation of responsibility clearly reflected British skepticism about American capabilities, a skepticism born of the debacle at Kasserine Pass a few months before. Moreover, it made more sense to have only one army advance on Messina than to attempt to coordinate the movements of two such entities upon the same goal, especially given the rather narrow and constrictive terrain of northeastern Sicily. The problem was that Alexander never drew up any detailed plans for the land campaign beyond the initial landings, preferring instead to make those decisions once the troops were firmly ashore and the operation was under way. By failing to assign the Seventh Army any clear objectives beyond the Blue Line, Alexander opened the door for disagreement and contention between his two army commanders once the campaign had begun.
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General [[George S. Patton]] organized his invasion force as follows. On the right, Maj. Gen. Troy Middleton's 45th Infantry Division, newly arrived from the United States, would land near Scoglitti and move inland to Comiso and Ragusa where it would link up with the Eighth Army's left flank. In the center, Maj. Gen. Terry de la Mesa Allen's veteran 1st Infantry Division, reinforced by two battalions of Rangers under the command of Lt. Col. William O. Darby, was to secure Gela and its neighboring airfields before pushing north to Niscemi. Paratroopers from the 82d Airborne Division's 505th and 504th Parachute Regiments under the command of Col. James M. Gavin would assist Allen by seizing the high ground north of the 1st Division's beachheads and blocking the road south from Niscemi and the vital road junction at Piano Lupo. On the left, Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott's 3d Division, reinforced by a Ranger battalion and Combat Command A of the 2d Armored Division, was to land at Licata and protect the left flank of the American beachhead. Once these objectives had been achieved, the 1st and 45th Divisions would drive north to Highway 124, the main east-west corridor in the southeastern portion of the island and the boundary of the Yellow Line.
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General [[George S. Patton]] organized his invasion force as follows. On the right, Major General [[Troy H. Middleton]]'s 45th Infantry Division, newly arrived from the United States, would land near Scoglitti and move inland to Comiso and Ragusa where it would link up with the Eighth Army's left flank. In the center, Maj. Gen. Terry de la Mesa Allen's veteran 1st Infantry Division, reinforced by two battalions of Rangers under the command of Lt. Col. William O. Darby, was to secure Gela and its neighboring airfields before pushing north to Niscemi. Paratroopers from the 82d Airborne Division's 505th and 504th Parachute Regiments under the command of Col. James M. Gavin would assist Allen by seizing the high ground north of the 1st Division's beachheads and blocking the road south from Niscemi and the vital road junction at Piano Lupo. On the left, Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott's 3d Division, reinforced by a Ranger battalion and Combat Command A of the 2d Armored Division, was to land at Licata and protect the left flank of the American beachhead. Once these objectives had been achieved, the 1st and 45th Divisions would drive north to Highway 124, the main east-west corridor in the southeastern portion of the island and the boundary of the Yellow Line.
    
Patton grouped the 45th and 1st Divisions (minus one regiment) together under Lt. Gen. [[Omar Nelson Bradley]]'s II Corps while keeping Truscott's 3d Division under his personal supervision. In reserve were the balance of the 2d Armored and 82d Airborne Divisions, the 9th Infantry Division, a regiment from the 1st Infantry Division, and a battalion of French Moroccans. With the exception of Gavin's paratroopers, who were to precede the waterborne assault force by a few hours, all of the amphibious landings were to occur simultaneously at 0245, 10 July 1943.
 
Patton grouped the 45th and 1st Divisions (minus one regiment) together under Lt. Gen. [[Omar Nelson Bradley]]'s II Corps while keeping Truscott's 3d Division under his personal supervision. In reserve were the balance of the 2d Armored and 82d Airborne Divisions, the 9th Infantry Division, a regiment from the 1st Infantry Division, and a battalion of French Moroccans. With the exception of Gavin's paratroopers, who were to precede the waterborne assault force by a few hours, all of the amphibious landings were to occur simultaneously at 0245, 10 July 1943.
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==Operations==
 
==Operations==
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The invasion got off to a rough start during the night of 9–10 July 1943. As the Allied armada steamed toward the island a fierce, forty-mile-per-hour gale, dubbed the "Mussolini wind" by seasick G.I.s, whipped up the seas, seriously endangering some of the smaller craft. The situation in the air was even worse. Buffeted by the winds and confused by an overly complex flight plan, the inexperienced pilots ferrying Allied airborne forces became disoriented in the darkness and strayed from their courses. Of the 144 gliders bearing British paratroops to landing zones outside of Syracuse, only 12 landed on target, while 69 crashed into the sea and the rest dispersed over a wide area. In the American sector, Colonel Gavin's 3,400 paratroopers were even more widely scattered. Gavin himself landed twenty-five miles southeast of his intended drop zone. The wide dispersion of paratroopers seriously jeopardized Seventh Army's invasion plan by weakening the buffer these men were supposed to form in front of the 1st Division's beachhead. Nevertheless, the men of the 82d Airborne went right to work wherever chance landed them. Operating in small, isolated groups, the paratroopers created considerable confusion in Axis rear areas, attacking patrols and cutting communication lines.
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The airborne forces had begun landing about 2330 on 9 July, and by midnight General Guzzoni was fully apprised of their presence. He was not surprised. Axis air reconnaissance had spotted Allied convoys moving toward Sicily earlier that day, and Guzzoni had ordered a full alert at 2200 on the 9th. Based upon the reported airborne drops, Guzzoni correctly surmised that the Allies intended to come ashore in the southeast, and he issued orders to that effect at 0145 on 10 July, nearly an hour before the first assault wave hit the beach. Nevertheless, the dispirited and ill-equipped Italian coastal units hardly put up a fight. Opposition in the Eighth Army's sector was negligible. By the end of the first day the British were firmly ashore and well on their way toward Augusta, having walked into Syracuse virtually unopposed. Resistance was not much stronger in the American zone, and the Seventh Army had little trouble moving ashore despite sporadic air and artillery attacks.
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The invasion got off to a rough start during the night of 9–10 July 1943. As the Allied armada steamed toward the island a fierce, forty-mile-per-hour gale, dubbed the "Mussolini wind" by seasick G.I.s, whipped up the seas, seriously endangering some of the smaller craft. The situation in the air was even worse. Buffeted by the winds and confused by an overly complex flight plan, the inexperienced pilots ferrying Allied airborne forces became disoriented in the darkness and strayed from their courses. Of the 144 gliders bearing British paratroops to landing zones outside of Syracuse, only 12 landed on target, while 69 crashed into the sea and the rest dispersed over a wide area. Nevertheless, a company of the British 1st Airborne Division captured Ponte Grande from Italian sailors but the Italian 385th Coastal Battalion and Colonel Francesco Ronco's 75th Regiment from General Giulio Porcinari's 'Napoli' Division counterattack, forcing the British ''Red Devils'' to surrender.<ref>"Two companies of sailors attacked first but were beaten back. Gradually they were reinforced as the Italians shelled the bridge with mortars and, finally, field guns. The Italian 385th Coastal Battalion joined the battle, and at about 11:30 A.M., the 1st Battalion of the Italian 75th (Napoli) Infantry Regiment came up ... The Red Devils held on, but by 2:45 P.M. there were fifteen unwounded survivors, although several of the wounded continued to fight. Finally, at 3:30 P.M., the end came when the ammunition ran out." The Battle of Sicily: How the Allies Lost Their Chance for Total Victory, Samuel W. Mitcham, Friedrich von Stauffenberg, p. 76, Stackpole Books, 2007</ref> Only a small number escape when Alled reinforements arrive. The shocked British survivors would later claim that German troops had overwhelmed them.<ref>"Lt. Withers led a small force across the river to attack the far end of the Ponte Grande; they succeeded, and, as stragglers gathered around them, they began a desperate defence of the bridge against enemy counter-attacks. With never more than 90 men, they held out until about 1500 hrs, on the afternoon of the 10th, when the last 15 or so men were overrun by the Germans." The Paras, 1940-1984, Gregor Ferguson, Kevin Lyles, p. 12, Osprey Publishing, 1984</ref>
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The only serious fighting occurred in the American center, where Axis mobile forces tried to throw the Americans back into the sea before they had a chance to become firmly established. Fortunately for the Americans, the attacks were poorly coordinated. At Gela, the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions, assisted by the 1st Battalion of the 39th Engineer Combat Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 531st Engineer Shore Regiment, mortar fire from the 83d Chemical Battalion, and naval gunfire, repulsed two Italian attacks, one by a battalion of infantry and the other by a column of thirteen tanks. Nine or ten of the latter managed to penetrate the town before the Rangers drove them off in a confused melee. Meanwhile, at the vital Piano Lupo crossroads, those few paratroopers who had been fortunate enough to land near their objective repulsed a column of about twenty Italian tanks with the help of naval gunfire and the advancing infantrymen of the 16th Regimental Combat Team. Shortly thereafter they rebuffed a more serious attack made by ninety German Mark III and IV medium tanks, two armored artillery battalions, an armored reconnaissance battalion, and an engineer battalion from the Hermann Goering Division. Naval gunfire played a crucial role in stopping this German thrust. The worst event of the day occurred when seventeen German Tiger I heavy tanks, an armored artillery battalion, and two battalions of motorized infantry from the Hermann Goering Division overran the 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry (45th Division), after a stiff fight, capturing its commander and many of its men.  
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In the American sector, Colonel Gavin's 3,400 paratroopers were even more widely scattered. Gavin himself landed twenty-five miles southeast of his intended drop zone. The wide dispersion of paratroopers seriously jeopardized Seventh Army's invasion plan by weakening the buffer these men were supposed to form in front of the 1st Division's beachhead. Nevertheless, the men of the 82d Airborne went right to work wherever chance landed them. Operating in small, isolated groups, the paratroopers created considerable confusion in Axis rear areas, attacking patrols and cutting communication lines.
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The airborne forces had begun landing about 2330 on 9 July, and by midnight General Guzzoni was fully apprised of their presence. He was not surprised. Axis air reconnaissance had spotted Allied convoys moving toward Sicily earlier that day, and Guzzoni had ordered a full alert at 2200 on the 9th. Based upon the reported airborne drops, Guzzoni correctly surmised that the Allies intended to come ashore in the southeast, and he issued orders to that effect at 0145 on 10 July, nearly an hour before the first assault wave hit the beach. Major Marco Rubellino's 429th Coastal Battalion puts up a tough fight, suffering 45 percent killed or wounded defending Gela.<ref>"The 429th suffered 45 percent combat casualties, including 5 officers killed and 4 wounded and 185 enlisted men killed or wounded." The Battle of Sicily: How the Allies Lost Their Chance for Total Victory, Samuel W. Mitcham, Friedrich von Stauffenberg, Stackpole Books, 2007</ref> The US Ranger Battalion loses several men killed or wounded assaulting the Italian minefields, machineguns and anti-tanks.<ref>"The 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions hit the beach at 3:00 A.M. and antipersonnel mines and rifle fire took a heavy toll. D Company of the 4th Battalion, for example, lost all of its officers. After moving off the beach and destroying several pillboxes, the Rangers entered Gela. Fighting was house-to-house, but by midmorning the Rangers had the town. The victory was interrupted around 10:30 A.M., when the seasoned Italian Livorno Division counterattacked and nine Italian light tanks broke the Rangers' outer defensive positions." Beyond Valor: World War II's Ranger and Airborne Veterans Reveal the Heart of Combat, Patrick K. O'Donnell, p. 38, Simon and Schuster, 2001</ref> Opposition in the Eighth Army's sector was largely neutralized thanks to Allied air power. By the end of the first day the British were firmly ashore and well on their way toward Augusta, with one Allied war correspondent reporting the scene of devastation in the march to Syracuse:{{cquote|Large numbers of Italians fought hard and well. The road on which I rode across to Syracuse and beyond proves that. The road to Syracuse was strewn with bodies and shattered pillboxes. Our troops are not winning because of an Italian collapse but because the Allied soldiers are fighting better, with better and more equipment. They are fighting smoothly and efficiently mile by mile — not walking in unopposed.<ref>The Western Australian, 15 July 1943</ref>}}
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Resistance had also been weakened in the American zone, and the Seventh Army had little trouble moving ashore despite sporadic air and artillery attacks.
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Nevertheless, General Domenico Chirieleison from the Italian ''Livorno'' Division with help from the 155th Bersaglieri Motorcycle Company, tried to throw the Americans back into the sea before they had a chance to become firmly established. Fortunately for the Americans, the attacks were poorly coordinated. At Gela, the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions, assisted by the 1st Battalion of the 39th Engineer Combat Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 531st Engineer Shore Regiment, mortar fire from the 83d Chemical Battalion, and naval gunfire, repulsed two Italian attacks, one by a battalion of ''Livorno'' infantry and the other by a column of tanks from the ''Niscemi'' Armoured Combat Group . A squadron of Italian tanks managed to overrun the forward defences and penetrate the town before the Rangers drove them off in a confused battle that nearly resulted in the capture of General Patton.<ref>"Chirieleison's troops nearly reached Patton, who had joined a group of Rangers on the 1st Infantry Division front. Little did the Italians know that Patton was watching them from a house on the edge of Gela." Fighting Patton: George S. Patton Jr. Through the Eyes of His Enemies, Harry Yeide, p. 202</ref>
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Meanwhile, at the vital Piano Lupo crossroads, those few paratroopers who had been fortunate enough to land near their objective repulsed a column of about twenty Italian tanks with the help of naval gunfire and the advancing infantrymen of the 16th Regimental Combat Team. Shortly thereafter they rebuffed another attack made by ninety German Mark III and IV medium tanks, two armored artillery battalions, an armored reconnaissance battalion, and an engineer battalion from the ''Hermann Goering'' Division. Naval gunfire played a crucial role in stopping this German thrust. Sseventeen German Tiger I heavy tanks, an armored artillery battalion, and two battalions of motorized infantry from the ''Hermann Goering Division'' overran the 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry (45th Division), after a stiff fight, capturing its commander and many of its men.  
    
While Rangers, paratroopers, and infantrymen repelled Axis counterattacks, an even more serious struggle was being waged against mother nature. Although 10 July dawned bright and sunny, the rough seas of the previous night had disorganized several units. The worst case was that of the 45th Division's 180th Regiment, which had been scattered over a ten-mile front. Nor did the beaches prove to be as favorable as anticipated. Soft sand, shifting sandbars, and difficult exits created congestion on the beaches that was further aggravated by enemy air and artillery barrages. By midmorning, between 150 and 200 landing craft were stranded on the shoreline. Nevertheless, American service troops performed herculean feats to keep the men in the front lines supplied and supported. During the first three days the U.S. Army and Navy moved 66,285 personnel, 17,766 deadweight tons of cargo, and 7,396 vehicles over Sicily's southern shores. An entirely new generation of landing craft and ships—LSTs, LCTs, LCIs, and LCVPs—greatly facilitated the logistical effort. Even more remarkable was the innovative DUKW amphibious truck that could move directly from offshore supply ships to inland depots.
 
While Rangers, paratroopers, and infantrymen repelled Axis counterattacks, an even more serious struggle was being waged against mother nature. Although 10 July dawned bright and sunny, the rough seas of the previous night had disorganized several units. The worst case was that of the 45th Division's 180th Regiment, which had been scattered over a ten-mile front. Nor did the beaches prove to be as favorable as anticipated. Soft sand, shifting sandbars, and difficult exits created congestion on the beaches that was further aggravated by enemy air and artillery barrages. By midmorning, between 150 and 200 landing craft were stranded on the shoreline. Nevertheless, American service troops performed herculean feats to keep the men in the front lines supplied and supported. During the first three days the U.S. Army and Navy moved 66,285 personnel, 17,766 deadweight tons of cargo, and 7,396 vehicles over Sicily's southern shores. An entirely new generation of landing craft and ships—LSTs, LCTs, LCIs, and LCVPs—greatly facilitated the logistical effort. Even more remarkable was the innovative DUKW amphibious truck that could move directly from offshore supply ships to inland depots.
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By the end of the first day, the Seventh Army had established a beachhead two to four miles deep and fifty miles wide. In the process it had captured over 4,000 prisoners at the cost of 58 killed, 199 wounded, and 700 missing. But the situation was still perilous. Axis counterattacks had created a dangerous bulge in the center of the American line, the very point where the bulk of the 505th Parachute Regiment should have been if its drop had been accurate.
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By the end of the first day, the Seventh Army had established a beachhead two to four miles deep and fifty miles wide. In the process it had captured over 4,000 prisoners at the cost of 58 killed, 199 wounded, and 700 missing. But the situation was still perilous. Axis counterattacks had created a dangerous bulge in the center of the American line, the very point where the bulk of the 505th Parachute Regiment should have been if its drop had been accurate. Italian Stukas from ''103° Gruppo'' and ''121° Gruppo'' had also sunk the destroyer USS ''Maddox''<ref>"Therefore, when Allied forces crosssed the narrows to launch Operation Husky on 10 July 1943, the dive-bomber response was entirely in the hands of the Italians ... The Regia Aeronautica had taken delivery of a bunch of Ju 87Ds earlier in the year, but rather than re-equip their existing dive-bomber units, the 'Doras' had been used to form two new gruppi: 103° and 121° ... Still working up on Sardinia, the largely inexperienced crews were dispatched at once to southern Italy and Sicily to counter the invasion ... A bomb from an unseen aircraft struck the destroyer's stern, blowing it apart 'in a gust of flame, smoke and debris'. In less than two minutes she had disappeared beneath the waves ... The surviving Doras of 121 Gruppo were to retire back to Sardina before the Sicilian campaign had run its 38-day course." Junkers Ju 87 Stukageschwader of North Africa and the Mediterranean, John Weal, Pag.81-82, Osprey Publishing, 1998</ref><ref>"The first victim of the air attack was USS Maddox (DD-622), which was steaming alone on antisubmarine patrol when she was hit by a bomb dropped by an Italian Ju 87 Stuka at 0421. One of the bombs exploded Maddox's aft magazine, causing the ship to roll over and sink within two minutes, taking 210 of her crew with her. The Stuka returned, strafing the 74 survivors before departing." Bloodstained Sands: U.S. Amphibious Operations in World War II, Michael G. Walling, p. 270, Bloomsbury Publishing, 20 Apr. 2017</ref>and the British hospital ship HM ''Talamba'',<ref>WITNESS DESCRIBES HOSPITAL SHIP LOSS; Injured Paratrooper Relates How Italian Plane Bombed Fully Lighted Talamba, The New York Time, 19 July 1943</ref> killing 200 sailors and several hundred wounded American soldiers.
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July 11, the second day of the invasion, was the Seventh Army's most perilous day in Sicily. Early that morning, General Guzzoni renewed his attack against the shallow center of the American line—Piano Lupo, Gela, and the beaches beyond. Guzzoni committed the better part of two divisions in the attack, the Hermann Goering Division and the Italian Livorno Division. He backed them up with heavy air attacks by Italian and German planes based in Italy. Congestion on the beaches hampered Bradley's efforts to send tanks forward, so that the defending infantrymen had nothing but artillery and naval gunfire to support them. Cooks, clerks, and Navy shore personnel were pressed into service to help the 1st and 45th Division infantrymen, Rangers, and paratroopers repel the Axis attacks. The fighting was fierce. A few German tanks broke into Gela, while two panzer battalions closed to within two thousand yards of the vulnerable beaches before being repulsed by ground and naval gunfire. Several miles southeast of Gela, Colonel Gavin and an impromptu assembly of paratroopers and 45th Division soldiers effectively thwarted another German column consisting of 700 infantry, a battalion of self-propelled artillery, and a company of Tiger tanks at Biazzo Ridge. By day's end, the Seventh Army had suffered over 2,300 casualties, the Army's greatest one-day loss during the campaign. But as darkness descended, the Americans still held, and in some areas had actually expanded, their narrow foothold on the island.  
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July 11, the second day of the invasion, was the Seventh Army's most perilous day in Sicily. Early that morning, General Guzzoni renewed his attack against the shallow center of the American line—Piano Lupo, Gela, and the beaches beyond. Guzzoni committed the better part of two divisions in the attack, the Hermann Goering Division and the Italian Livorno Division. He backed them up with heavy air attacks by Italian and German planes based in Italy. Congestion on the beaches hampered Bradley's efforts to send tanks forward, so that the defending infantrymen had nothing but artillery and naval gunfire to support them. Cooks, clerks, and Navy shore personnel were pressed into service to help the 1st and 45th Division infantrymen, Rangers, and paratroopers repel the Axis attacks. The fighting was fierce. A few German tanks broke into Gela, while two panzer battalions closed to within two thousand yards of the vulnerable beaches before being repulsed by ground and naval gunfire. Several miles southeast of Gela, Colonel Gavin and an impromptu assembly of paratroopers and 45th Division soldiers effectively thwarted another Axis column consisting of 700 infantry, a battalion of self-propelled artillery, and a company of Tiger tanks at Biazzo Ridge. By day's end, the Seventh Army had suffered over 2,300 casualties, the Army's greatest one-day loss during the campaign. But as darkness descended, the Americans still held, and in some areas had actually expanded, their narrow foothold on the island. The attack from the ''Livorno'' Division makes headlines in the major US newspapers:{{cquote|The heaviest of seven Italian counter-attacks was met and beaten back by American troops in the Gela area. The attack was launched by the Italian's Fourth Livorno Division with 45 tanks in support.<ref>[https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1755&dat=19430712&id=Ta4qAAAAIBAJ&sjid=lmQEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5834,604843&hl=en  Allies' Mighty Invasion Force Beats Back Seven Italian Counter Attacks, Sarasota Herald Tribune, 12 July 1943]</ref>}}
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After a day of heavy fighting, Patton decided to reinforce his battle-weary center with over 2,000 additional paratroopers from his reserves in North Africa. He ordered that the 1st and 2d Battalions, 504th Paratroop Regiment, the 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, and a company from the 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion be dropped near Gela on the night of 11 July. German aircraft had been active over the American sector all day, and consequently senior Army and Navy officers went to great lengths to inform everyone of the impending nighttime paratroop drop lest overanxious gunners fire on the friendly aircraft. Nevertheless, when the transport planes arrived over the beaches in the wake of a German air raid, nervous antiaircraft gunners ashore and afloat opened fire with devastating effect. Allied antiaircraft guns shot down 23 and damaged 37 of the 144 American transport planes. The paratroop force suffered approximately 10 percent casualties and was badly disorganized. Later investigation would reveal that not everyone had been informed of the drop despite the Seventh Army's best efforts.  
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That day, General Enrico Francisci from Sicilian headquarters is reported killed leading Semovente self-propelled guns from ''Gruppo Tattico Venturi'' against the US 3rd Infantry Division and is posthumously decorated with the Gold Medal for Military Valour.<ref>"Rome Radio says Lieutenant-General Enrico Francisci, of the Fascist Militia, commander of the 13th zone of Blackshirts and general liaison officer to the Sicilian Command, has been killed in action." [https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1301&dat=19430714&id=3epjAAAAIBAJ&sjid=4ZQDAAAAIBAJ&pg=4058,4506694&hl=en BATTLE IS GETTING FIERCER," SAYS ALGIERS]</ref>
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Over the next two days the Seventh Army gradually pushed its way out of the coastal plain and into the hills ringing the American beachhead. Fighting between the 1st Division and the Hermann Goering Division was occasionally stiff, but General Allen moved his men relentlessly forward through Niscemi and on toward the Yellow Line. On the right, Middleton's 45th Division likewise made good progress toward Highway 124, while to the left Truscott's 3d Division infantrymen, supported by 2d Armored Division tanks, moved beyond their initial Yellow Line objectives. The British matched American progress, and by the 13th they had advanced as far as Vizzini in the west and Augusta in the east. Resistance in the British zone was stiffening, however, due to difficult terrain and the arrival from France of elements of Germany's elite 1st Parachute Division. As the Eighth Army's drive toward Catania and Gerbini bogged down in heavy fighting, Montgomery persuaded Alexander to shift the boundary line between the American Seventh and British Eighth Armies west, thereby permitting him to advance on a broader front into central Sicily and sidestep the main centers of Axis resistance. The boundary change, which Alexander communicated to Patton just before midnight on 13 July, stripped Highway 124 away from Seventh Army and assigned it instead to the Eighth Army. Under the new instructions, a portion of the Eighth Army would advance up Highway 124 to Enna, the key road junction in central Sicily, before turning northeast toward Messina. In essence, Alexander was interposing British forces between the Americans and the Germans, allowing the Eighth Army to monopolize the primary approaches to Messina and giving it complete responsibility for the Allied main effort. With its original line of advance blocked, Seventh Army was thus relegated to protecting the Eighth Army's flank and rear from possible attack by Axis forces in western Sicily—a distinctly secondary mission.
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After another day of heavy fighting, Patton decided to reinforce his battle-weary center with over 2,000 additional paratroopers from his reserves in North Africa. He ordered that the 1st and 2d Battalions, 504th Paratroop Regiment, the 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, and a company from the 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion be dropped near Gela on the night of 11 July. German aircraft had been active over the American sector all day, and consequently senior Army and Navy officers went to great lengths to inform everyone of the impending nighttime paratroop drop lest overanxious gunners fire on the friendly aircraft. Nevertheless, when the transport planes arrived over the beaches in the wake of a German air raid, nervous antiaircraft gunners ashore and afloat opened fire with devastating effect. Allied antiaircraft guns shot down 23 and damaged 37 of the 144 American transport planes. The paratroop force suffered approximately 10 percent casualties and was badly disorganized. Later investigation would reveal that not everyone had been informed of the drop despite the Seventh Army's best efforts.
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Over the next two days the Seventh Army gradually pushed its way out of the coastal plain and into the hills ringing the American beachhead. Fighting between the 1st Division and the Hermann Goering Division was occasionally stiff, but General Allen moved his men relentlessly forward through Niscemi and on toward the Yellow Line. On the right, Middleton's 45th Division likewise made good progress toward Highway 124, while to the left Truscott's 3d Division infantrymen, supported by 2d Armored Division tanks, moved beyond their initial Yellow Line objectives.  
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The British matched American progress, and by the 13th they had advanced as far as Vizzini in the west and Augusta in the east. Resistance in the British zone was stiffening, however, with a battalion from the 'Napoli' Division recapturing the Augusta Naval Base and British Royal Marine Commandos (under Lieutenant-Colonel John Durnford-Slater) losing Malati Bridge when Semoventes from Lieutenant-Colonel Francesco Tropea's 4th Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion, and supporting infantry from the 372nd Coastal Defence Battalion and Italian 53rd Motorcycle Company counterattack.  
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As the Eighth Army's drive toward Catania and Gerbini bogged down in heavy fighting with the arrival from France of elements of Germany's elite 1st Parachute Division, Montgomery persuaded Alexander to shift the boundary line between the American Seventh and British Eighth Armies west, thereby permitting him to advance on a broader front into central Sicily and sidestep the main centers of Axis resistance. The boundary change, which Alexander communicated to Patton just before midnight on 13 July, stripped Highway 124 away from Seventh Army and assigned it instead to the Eighth Army. Under the new instructions, a portion of the Eighth Army would advance up Highway 124 to Enna, the key road junction in central Sicily, before turning northeast toward Messina. In essence, Alexander was interposing British forces between the Americans and the Germans, allowing the Eighth Army to monopolize the primary approaches to Messina and giving it complete responsibility for the Allied main effort. With its original line of advance blocked, Seventh Army was thus relegated to protecting the Eighth Army's flank and rear from possible attack by Axis forces in western Sicily—a distinctly secondary mission.
    
The change in front was one of the most important and controversial operational decisions of the campaign. It clearly reflected the British belief that the veteran Eighth Army was better qualified to carry the main burden of the campaign than its junior partner from across the Atlantic. Indeed, the decision did little more than make explicit the priorities and assumptions that had been implicit in the campaign plan all along. On the other hand, by ordering the Seventh Army to stop short of Highway 124 and redirecting its advance, Alexander lost momentum and provided the Axis valuable time to withdraw to a new defensive line between Catania and Enna. The loss of momentum was best illustrated by the repositioning of the 45th Division, which had to return almost to the shoreline before it could sidestep around the 1st Division and take up its new position for a northwestward advance. Given the circumstances, Alexander might have been better served by reinforcing success and shifting the main emphasis of the campaign to the Seventh Army. This was not his choice, however, and his decision stirred up a storm of controversy in the American camp.
 
The change in front was one of the most important and controversial operational decisions of the campaign. It clearly reflected the British belief that the veteran Eighth Army was better qualified to carry the main burden of the campaign than its junior partner from across the Atlantic. Indeed, the decision did little more than make explicit the priorities and assumptions that had been implicit in the campaign plan all along. On the other hand, by ordering the Seventh Army to stop short of Highway 124 and redirecting its advance, Alexander lost momentum and provided the Axis valuable time to withdraw to a new defensive line between Catania and Enna. The loss of momentum was best illustrated by the repositioning of the 45th Division, which had to return almost to the shoreline before it could sidestep around the 1st Division and take up its new position for a northwestward advance. Given the circumstances, Alexander might have been better served by reinforcing success and shifting the main emphasis of the campaign to the Seventh Army. This was not his choice, however, and his decision stirred up a storm of controversy in the American camp.
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The fall of Palermo was quickly followed by even more startling news. Disenchanted by the long and costly war, [[Benito Mussolini]]'s opponents ousted the dictator from power on 25 July. Although the Allies had hoped that Operation "Husky" would destabilize the Fascist regime, the coup took them by surprise. Mussolini's downfall did not immediately terminate Italy's participation in the war. Nevertheless, the invasion of Sicily had acted as a catalyst in bringing about an important crack in the [[Rome-Berlin Axis]].
 
The fall of Palermo was quickly followed by even more startling news. Disenchanted by the long and costly war, [[Benito Mussolini]]'s opponents ousted the dictator from power on 25 July. Although the Allies had hoped that Operation "Husky" would destabilize the Fascist regime, the coup took them by surprise. Mussolini's downfall did not immediately terminate Italy's participation in the war. Nevertheless, the invasion of Sicily had acted as a catalyst in bringing about an important crack in the [[Rome-Berlin Axis]].
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On July 29, General Eisonhower in an open broadcast to the Italian people promised that if the Allied prisoners of war in Italian hands were set free, all Italian POWs would be returned to their families.<ref>[https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1913&dat=19430729&id=rn8jAAAAIBAJ&sjid=u2kFAAAAIBAJ&pg=878,1782475&hl=en  Eisenhower Offers Italy Immediate Honorable Peace In Five-Point Program]</ref>
    
===Drive to Messina===
 
===Drive to Messina===
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While the 1st Infantry Division battled for possession of Troina, General Truscott's 3d Division faced equally stiff opposition at San Fratello Ridge, the northern terminus of the Etna Line. Here the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division had entrenched itself on San Fratello overlooking the coastal highway with fire support and supporting infantry from the ''Assietta'' Division.<ref>"The 2d Battalion, 71st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, plus part of the Assietta Division's 29th Infantry Regiment (most of this regiment was left alogn the San Fratello ridge to delay American follow-up movments) started across the bypass."  Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, Albert N. Garland, Howard McGaw Smyth, p. 363, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1965</ref>
 
While the 1st Infantry Division battled for possession of Troina, General Truscott's 3d Division faced equally stiff opposition at San Fratello Ridge, the northern terminus of the Etna Line. Here the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division had entrenched itself on San Fratello overlooking the coastal highway with fire support and supporting infantry from the ''Assietta'' Division.<ref>"The 2d Battalion, 71st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, plus part of the Assietta Division's 29th Infantry Regiment (most of this regiment was left alogn the San Fratello ridge to delay American follow-up movments) started across the bypass."  Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, Albert N. Garland, Howard McGaw Smyth, p. 363, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1965</ref>
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Truscott made repeated attempts to crack the San Fratello position beginning on 3 August, but failed to gain much ground. The strength of the German position and supporting Italian artillery fire<ref>"The Axis units held their positions through several days of attack, much thanks due to Italian artillery support." The Regio Esercito: The Italian Royal Army in Mussolini's Wars, 1935-1943, Patrick Cloutier, p. 202, Lulu Press, 2013</ref>prompted him to try and outflank it by an amphibious end run. On the night of 7–8 August, while the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, and 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, seized a key hill along the San Fratello Line, Lt. Col. Lyle Bernard led the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, reinforced by two batteries from the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, a platoon of medium tanks, and a platoon of combat engineers, in an amphibious landing at Sant'Agata, a few miles behind San Fratello. The amphibious assault force achieved complete surprise and quickly blocked the coastal highway. Unfortunately, the Germans had selected that night to withdraw from San Fratello, and most of their troops had already retired past Bernard's position by the time the Americans arrived. Nevertheless, the 3d Infantry Division's combined land and sea offensive bagged over 1,000 prisoners.
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Truscott made repeated attempts to crack the San Fratello position beginning on 3 August, but failed to gain much ground. The strength of the German position and supporting Italian artillery fire<ref>"The Axis units held their positions through several days of attack, much thanks due to Italian artillery support." The Regio Esercito: The Italian Royal Army in Mussolini's Wars, 1935-1943, Patrick Cloutier, p. 202, Lulu Press, 2013</ref> prompted him to try and outflank it by an amphibious end run. On the night of 7–8 August, while the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, and 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, seized a key hill along the San Fratello Line, Lt. Col. Lyle Bernard led the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, reinforced by two batteries from the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, a platoon of medium tanks, and a platoon of combat engineers, in an amphibious landing at Sant'Agata, a few miles behind San Fratello. The amphibious assault force achieved complete surprise and quickly blocked the coastal highway. Unfortunately, the Germans had selected that night to withdraw from San Fratello, and most of their troops had already retired past Bernard's position by the time the Americans arrived. Nevertheless, the 3d Infantry Division's combined land and sea offensive bagged over 1,000 prisoners.
    
Allied pressure at Troina, San Fratello, and in the British sector had broken the Etna Line, but there would be no lightning exploitation of the victory. Taking maximum advantage of the constricting terrain and armed with a seemingly inexhaustible supply of mines, General Hube withdrew his XIV Panzer Corps in orderly phases toward Messina.
 
Allied pressure at Troina, San Fratello, and in the British sector had broken the Etna Line, but there would be no lightning exploitation of the victory. Taking maximum advantage of the constricting terrain and armed with a seemingly inexhaustible supply of mines, General Hube withdrew his XIV Panzer Corps in orderly phases toward Messina.
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!style=" background-color: #000088; color:white;"|Source:
 
!style=" background-color: #000088; color:white;"|Source:
 
|style="background-color: none;border-top: 2px solid black"| <small>File available from the {{{1|[[United States Federal Government]] [http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/72-16/72-16.htm]</small>}}}.
 
|style="background-color: none;border-top: 2px solid black"| <small>File available from the {{{1|[[United States Federal Government]] [http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/72-16/72-16.htm]</small>}}}.
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==References==
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{{Reflist}}
    
[[Category:World War II]]
 
[[Category:World War II]]
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