Changes

== History ==

== History ==

42 U.S.C. § 1981 was originally adopted by Congress immediately after the Civil War on April 9, 1866. It was enacted by virtue of the Thirteenth Amendment and was intended to rectify some of the disabilities of slavery. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676 (1879); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 27 L. Ed. 290, 1 S. Ct. 601 (1883); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1872)(Act enacted to guarantee certain privileges and immunities to eliminate vestiges of involuntary servitude). "The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was the first federal statute to provide broad protection in the field of civil rights. Its purpose was to give the newly emancipated Negro equality with whites before the law." Bernard Schwartz, Statutory History of the United States: Civil Rights Vol. 1, p.99 (1970). The original statute provided that persons "born in the United States, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime where the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every state and territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherent, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens…" The purpose of the original legislation was to promote equality it did not create or relate to political rights.

42 U.S.C. § 1981 was originally adopted by Congress immediately after the Civil War on April 9, 1866. It was enacted by virtue of the Thirteenth Amendment and was intended to rectify some of the disabilities of slavery. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676 (1879); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 27 L. Ed. 290, 1 S. Ct. 601 (1883); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1872)(Act enacted to guarantee certain privileges and immunities to eliminate vestiges of involuntary servitude). "The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was the first federal statute to provide broad protection in the field of civil rights. Its purpose was to give the newly emancipated Negro equality with whites before the law." Bernard Schwartz, Statutory History of the United States: Civil Rights Vol. 1, p. 99 (1970). The original statute provided that persons "born in the United States, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime where the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every state and territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherent, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens…" The purpose of the original legislation was to promote equality it did not create or relate to political rights.

In 1991 Congress reenacted the statute with amendments which expand on the limiting interpretive decision of the United States Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 104 L. Ed. 2d 733, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). The requirement of citizen standing was eliminated and the statute was modernized and expanded as to contractual rights. The essence of the statute in its relevant part is similar to the 1866 statute.

In 1991 Congress reenacted the statute with amendments which expand on the limiting interpretive decision of the United States Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 104 L. Ed. 2d 733, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). The requirement of citizen standing was eliminated and the statute was modernized and expanded as to contractual rights. The essence of the statute in its relevant part is similar to the 1866 statute.

Some courts have found 42 U.S.C. § 1981 applicable in the context of a civil suit to police misconduct in detaining or arresting a person solely on the basis of race. Grier by Grier v. Galinac, 740 F. Supp. 338 (D.M.D. Pa. 1990); Melson v. Kroger, 550 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Ohio 1982); Spriggs v. City of Chicago, 523 F. Supp. 138 (D. III. 1981). Without critically analyzing these pre-1991 cases, it is sufficient to note the cases did not consider the issue of suppression of evidence or dismissal of a criminal prosecution. They concerned a civil remedy and appear to be generous in the interpretation of § 1981 as distinct from 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute is not applicable to the relief sought in this case or to a situation where no seizure has occurred. The exclusionary rule sought to be applied in this case comes from the Fourth Amendment Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 58 L. Ed. 652, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914). 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not have application to the issue of suppression of evidence, that remedy must be based on a constitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment. c.f. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976). The remedy of suppression is one provided by judicial decision for protection of Fourth Amendment interests. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). Congress has provided no such remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Some courts have found 42 U.S.C. § 1981 applicable in the context of a civil suit to police misconduct in detaining or arresting a person solely on the basis of race. Grier by Grier v. Galinac, 740 F. Supp. 338 (D.M.D. Pa. 1990); Melson v. Kroger, 550 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Ohio 1982); Spriggs v. City of Chicago, 523 F. Supp. 138 (D. III. 1981). Without critically analyzing these pre-1991 cases, it is sufficient to note the cases did not consider the issue of suppression of evidence or dismissal of a criminal prosecution. They concerned a civil remedy and appear to be generous in the interpretation of § 1981 as distinct from 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute is not applicable to the relief sought in this case or to a situation where no seizure has occurred. The exclusionary rule sought to be applied in this case comes from the Fourth Amendment Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 58 L. Ed. 652, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914). 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not have application to the issue of suppression of evidence, that remedy must be based on a constitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment. c.f. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976). The remedy of suppression is one provided by judicial decision for protection of Fourth Amendment interests. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). Congress has provided no such remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

== Sources ==

== Sources ==

* United States v. Ruiz, 961 F. Supp. 1524 (D. Utah 1997)

* United States v. Ruiz, 961 F. Supp. 1524 (D. Utah 1997)

[[category:Section 1981]]

[[category:Section 1983]]

 

[[Category:Section 1981]]

[[Category:Section 1983]]