Changes

In a much discussed episode, Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] had tea with Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar in Beijing on October 2. Zhou told Panikkar that China would intervene if American forces crossed 38th parallel. The South Korean forces that had already crossed were acceptable to China, he added.<ref name="Chang"/>

In a much discussed episode, Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] had tea with Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar in Beijing on October 2. Zhou told Panikkar that China would intervene if American forces crossed 38th parallel. The South Korean forces that had already crossed were acceptable to China, he added.<ref name="Chang"/>

The Zhou-Panikkar meeting is generally remembered as a example of American hubris, with Zhou's "warnings" airily brushed aside by arrogant American leaders. That may be valid as far as it goes. But the episode also led to misunderstanding concerning China's motives. The request received from Stalin the day before suggests that intervention was not China's decision to make. Mao had unveiled his plan to intervene to the Politburo on the same day as the Zhou Panikkar meeting. His was the only vote that mattered in Beijing. To make sure that Mao followed through, Stalin sent a bullying telegram on October 5. So the communist response was already in place before the UN vote on October 7 and before American forces crossed the parallel, which was later the same day.<ref name="Chang"/>

The Zhou-Panikkar meeting is generally remembered as a example of American hubris, with Zhou's "warnings" airily brushed aside by arrogant American leaders. That may be valid as far as it goes. But the episode also led to misunderstanding concerning China's motives. The request received from Stalin the day before suggests that intervention was not China's decision to make. Mao had unveiled his plan to intervene to the Politburo on the same day as the Zhou-Panikkar meeting. His was the only vote that mattered in Beijing. To make sure that Mao followed through, Stalin sent a bullying telegram on October 5. So the communist response was already in place before the UN vote on October 7 and before American forces crossed the parallel, which was later the same day.<ref name="Chang"/>

Learning all the wrong lessons from Korea, Vietnam-era policymakers never violated that country's partition line. Thus Vietnam's communists had less motivation to seek a ceasefire than did those in Korea. In both countries, a defensible a northern border was required to allow a viable non-communist state to develop in the South. But this line was not necessarily the same as the legal partition line, which in both cases was drawn in a hasty and arbitrary way.

Learning all the wrong lessons from Korea, Vietnam-era policymakers never violated that country's partition line. Thus Vietnam's communists had less motivation to seek a ceasefire than did those in Korea. In both countries, a defensible a northern border was required to allow a viable non-communist state to develop in the South. But this line was not necessarily the same as the legal partition line, which in both cases was drawn in a hasty and arbitrary way.