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Going to the "gates of Vladivostok" was likely to provoke a Soviet response, according to George Kennan, a leading Soviet specialist.<ref>Chi Young Pak, ''Korea and the United Nations''</ref> As an alternative, the French and British proposed a defensive line across the waist of Korea, located just north of Pyongyang. America's intention to advance north became public on September 29 when the Joint Chiefs authorized operations north of the 38th parallel. Stalin responded by secretly requesting Chinese intervention on October 1.<ref name="Chang">Chang, Jung; Halliday, Jon. Mao: ''The Unknown Story.'' Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. "Why Mao and Stalin Started the Korean War." Chang had access to the Russian archive, which is ignored by most writers on this subject.</ref>

Going to the "gates of Vladivostok" was likely to provoke a Soviet response, according to George Kennan, a leading Soviet specialist.<ref>Chi Young Pak, ''Korea and the United Nations''</ref> As an alternative, the French and British proposed a defensive line across the waist of Korea, located just north of Pyongyang. America's intention to advance north became public on September 29 when the Joint Chiefs authorized operations north of the 38th parallel. Stalin responded by secretly requesting Chinese intervention on October 1.<ref name="Chang">Chang, Jung; Halliday, Jon. Mao: ''The Unknown Story.'' Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. "Why Mao and Stalin Started the Korean War." Chang had access to the Russian archive, which is ignored by most writers on this subject.</ref>

In a much discussed episode, Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] had tea with Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar in Beijing on October 2. Zhou told Panikkar that China would intervene if American forces crossed 38th parallel. The South Korean forces that had already crossed were acceptable to China, he added.<ref name="Chang"/>

In a much discussed episode, Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] had tea with Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar in Beijing in wee hours of October 3. Zhou told Panikkar that China would intervene if American forces crossed 38th parallel. The South Korean forces that had already crossed were acceptable to China, he added.<ref name="Chang"/>

The Zhou-Panikkar meeting is generally remembered as a example of American hubris, with Zhou's "warnings" airily brushed aside by arrogant American leaders. That may be valid as far as it goes. But the episode also led to misunderstanding concerning China's motives. The request received from Stalin the day before suggests that intervention was not China's decision to make. Mao had unveiled his plan to intervene to the Politburo on the same day as the Zhou-Panikkar meeting. His was the only vote that mattered in Beijing.

The Zhou-Panikkar meeting is generally remembered as a example of American hubris, with Zhou's "warnings" airily brushed aside by arrogant American leaders. That may be valid as far as it goes. But the episode also led to misunderstanding concerning China's motives. The request received from Stalin the on October 1 suggests that intervention was not China's decision to make. Mao had unveiled his plan to intervene to the Politburo the following day. His was the only vote that mattered in Beijing.

When Stalin reneged on a promise of air support, he followed up with a bullying telegram to Mao on October 5 to ensure that Mao would still invade Korea. The UN General Assembly voted on October 7 and American forces crossed the parallel later that day.<ref name="Chang"/>

When Stalin reneged on a promise of air support, he followed up with a bullying telegram to Mao on October 5 to ensure that Mao would still invade Korea. The UN General Assembly voted on October 7 and American forces crossed the parallel later that day.<ref name="Chang"/>