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For more information, please see: [[Growth of global desecularization#Growth of evangelicalism in the world and in the United States|Growth of evangelicalism in the world and in the United States]] and [[Desecularization#American culture war, demographics and expected tipping point after 2020|American culture war, demographics and expected tipping point after 2020]]
 
For more information, please see: [[Growth of global desecularization#Growth of evangelicalism in the world and in the United States|Growth of evangelicalism in the world and in the United States]] and [[Desecularization#American culture war, demographics and expected tipping point after 2020|American culture war, demographics and expected tipping point after 2020]]
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In 2022, Pew Research reported:
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{{Cquote|Looking at the experience of 80 countries, we find that the share of people who were raised as Christians and switch away from Christianity has not risen much above 50% anywhere, even in highly secular Western European countries. For American Christians concerned about these trends, that could be the demographic good news of the day. If there truly is a floor under Christian retention rates, the net movement from the ranks of Christian to the ranks of the [[Nones|religiously unaffiliated]] eventually may stop.<ref>[https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/09/29/religious-switching-patterns-will-help-determine-christianitys-course-in-u-s/ Religious ‘switching’ patterns will help determine Christianity’s course in U.S.], Pew Research, 2022</ref>
    
=== Fertility rates, secularism, religiosity and future U.S. trends ===
 
=== Fertility rates, secularism, religiosity and future U.S. trends ===
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