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2023 Ukraine summer counteroffensive (view source)
Revision as of 16:01, December 8, 2023
, 16:01, December 8, 2023→WaPo blames US & UK planning for the disaster
The reporters admitted that the United States could not supply the artillery shells Ukraine required: "A far bigger problem was the supply of 155mm shells, which would enable Ukraine to compete with Russia’s vast artillery arsenal. The Pentagon calculated that Kyiv needed 90,000 or more a month. While U.S. production was increasing, it was barely more than a tenth of that." Former [[CIA]] analyst [[Larry Johnson]] summarized:
The reporters admitted that the United States could not supply the artillery shells Ukraine required: "A far bigger problem was the supply of 155mm shells, which would enable Ukraine to compete with Russia’s vast artillery arsenal. The Pentagon calculated that Kyiv needed 90,000 or more a month. While U.S. production was increasing, it was barely more than a tenth of that." Former [[CIA]] analyst [[Larry Johnson]] summarized:
{{quotebox-float|"the U.S. took the lead in coming up with a battle plan that it had ZERO experience in executing. It agreed to provide limited, inadequate training to Ukraine. It could not supply artillery shells or fixed wing aircraft required to pull off such an operation, and U.S. leaders were “surprised” that Ukraine’s counter offensive failed."<ref>[https://sonar21.com/dissecting-the-washington-posts-analysis-of-ukraines-failed-counter-offensive-part-1/ DISSECTING THE WASHINGTON POST’S “ANALYSIS” OF UKRAINE’S FAILED COUNTER OFFENSIVE — PART 1], [[Larry Johnson]], 7 December 2023. sonar21.com</ref>}}
{{quotebox-float|"the U.S. took the lead in coming up with a battle plan that it had ZERO experience in executing. It agreed to provide limited, inadequate training to Ukraine. It could not supply artillery shells or fixed wing aircraft required to pull off such an operation, and U.S. leaders were “surprised” that Ukraine’s counter offensive failed."<ref>[https://sonar21.com/dissecting-the-washington-posts-analysis-of-ukraines-failed-counter-offensive-part-1/ DISSECTING THE WASHINGTON POST’S “ANALYSIS” OF UKRAINE’S FAILED COUNTER OFFENSIVE — PART 1], [[Larry Johnson]], 7 December 2023. sonar21.com</ref>}}
Part 2, ''In Ukraine, A War Of Incremental Gains As Counteroffensive Stalls'', describes in detail how the U.S. designed plan of attack fell apart during the first week of the counter offensive.
{{quotebox-float|'''In Ukraine, a war of incremental gains as counteroffensive stalls'''
The Ukrainian troops had expected minefields but were blindsided by the density. The ground was carpeted with explosives, so many that some were buried in stacks. The soldiers had been trained to drive their Bradleys at a facility in [[Germany]], on smooth terrain. But on the mushy soil of the [[Zaporizhzhia]] region, in the deafening noise of battle, they struggled to steer through the narrow lanes cleared of mines by advance units. . . .
By day four, Gen. [[Valery Zaluzhny]], Ukraine’s top commander, had seen enough. Incinerated Western military hardware — American Bradleys, German Leopard tanks, mine-sweeping vehicles — littered the battlefield. The numbers of dead and wounded sapped morale. . . .
Seventy percent of troops in one of the brigades leading the counteroffensive, and equipped with the newest Western weapons, entered battle with no [[combat]] experience.
Rather than try to breach Russian defenses with a massed, mechanized attack and supporting artillery fire, as his American counterparts had advised, Zaluzhny decided that Ukrainian soldiers would go on foot in small groups of about 10 — a process that would save equipment and lives but would be much slower.}}
Zaluzhny’s alternative proved to be equally ineffective. Sending troops in on foot over several kilometers required them to carry in excess of 60 kilograms of gear, ammunition, food and water. Once the soldiers reached the line of conflict, they ran out of ammunition within a half hour, with no one to resupply them. The Key Findings from Part 2 were:
{{quotebox-float|Seventy percent of troops in one of the brigades leading the counteroffensive, and equipped with the newest Western weapons, entered battle with no [[combat]] experience.
Ukraine’s setbacks on the battlefield led to rifts with the [[United States]] over how best to cut through deep Russian defenses.
Ukraine’s setbacks on the battlefield led to rifts with the [[United States]] over how best to cut through deep Russian defenses.