Changes

After the sinking of the ''[[Lusitania]]'' in May 1915, tension escalated with Germany and U.S. neutrality was precarious.  House decided the war was an epic battle between democracy and autocracy; he argued the United States ought to help Britain and France win a limited Allied victory.  However, Wilson still insisted on neutrality. Neu argues that by 1915, House had come to view himself as the indispensable man in both foreign and domestic affairs. "The more power he achieved," Neu concludes, "the more his fantasies expanded and his sense of reality weakened."<ref>Neu (1991) pp 261-62.</ref>  In early 1916 Wilson sent House to Europe seeking peace. The proposal was when the Allies were ready, Wilson would invite all the belligerents to a peace conference. Wilson approved the plan but told House not to get involved in territorial issues; House exceeded his instructions and began to examine French and Russian territorial demands with the British leaders. The British had broken the simple code House used to send dispatches to Wilson from London, Paris and Berlin, and cleverly manipulated the American into agreeing to the secret House-Grey Memorandum (22 Feb 1916) that indicated that if the Allies all attended and the Germans refused, the U.S. "would probably enter the war against Germany." Wilson endorsed the scheme, but both London and Berlin thought they could win, and neither side agreed to a conference.<ref>House told Wilson the British supported the plan but British Prime Minister Asquith told his colleagues that the House plan was "humbug and a mere manoeuvre of American politics," in preparation for Wilson's 1916 reelection campaign. Steven Roskill, ''Hankey: Man of Secrets,'' (1970) vol. 1 p. 247.</ref>  

After the sinking of the ''[[Lusitania]]'' in May 1915, tension escalated with Germany and U.S. neutrality was precarious.  House decided the war was an epic battle between democracy and autocracy; he argued the United States ought to help Britain and France win a limited Allied victory.  However, Wilson still insisted on neutrality. Neu argues that by 1915, House had come to view himself as the indispensable man in both foreign and domestic affairs. "The more power he achieved," Neu concludes, "the more his fantasies expanded and his sense of reality weakened."<ref>Neu (1991) pp 261-62.</ref>  In early 1916 Wilson sent House to Europe seeking peace. The proposal was when the Allies were ready, Wilson would invite all the belligerents to a peace conference. Wilson approved the plan but told House not to get involved in territorial issues; House exceeded his instructions and began to examine French and Russian territorial demands with the British leaders. The British had broken the simple code House used to send dispatches to Wilson from London, Paris and Berlin, and cleverly manipulated the American into agreeing to the secret House-Grey Memorandum (22 Feb 1916) that indicated that if the Allies all attended and the Germans refused, the U.S. "would probably enter the war against Germany." Wilson endorsed the scheme, but both London and Berlin thought they could win, and neither side agreed to a conference.<ref>House told Wilson the British supported the plan but British Prime Minister Asquith told his colleagues that the House plan was "humbug and a mere manoeuvre of American politics," in preparation for Wilson's 1916 reelection campaign. Steven Roskill, ''Hankey: Man of Secrets,'' (1970) vol. 1 p. 247.</ref>  

Wilson and his closest advisors, House and Secretary of State [[Robert Lansing]] increasingly realized that Germany threatened both the idealistic and materialistic interests of the nation. By 1917 they viewed Germany as the incarnation of militarism and believed Prussian autocracy needed to be eliminated to make democracy and peace possible. They also viewed Germany as a threat to American commerce on the high seas and to America's internal security through its propaganda and espionage activities in Mexico.  

Wilson and his closest advisors, House and Secretary of State [[Robert Lansing]] increasingly realized that Germany threatened both the idealistic and materialistic interests of the nation. By 1917 they viewed Germany as the incarnation of [[militarism]] and believed Prussian autocracy needed to be eliminated to make democracy and peace possible. They also viewed Germany as a threat to American commerce on the high seas and to America's internal security through its propaganda and espionage activities in Mexico.  

Wilson had House assemble the "Inquiry" &mdash; a team of academic experts to devise efficient postwar solutions to all the world's problems and told House to prepare a charter for a [[League of Nations]].  In October 1918, when Germany petitioned for peace based on the [[Fourteen Points]], Wilson charged House with working out details of an armistice with the Allies. Nelson (1969) contends that House inadvertently compromised Wilson's position at the coming peace conference. The problem lay with House's inability to grasp the full implications and ramifications of Allied military demands for an armistice settlement. The Allies made demands on Germany as to the disposition of her army and navy and as to territorial occupation by Allied forces. While the Allies-based these demands on military considerations, they were in fact tantamount to a political settlement. In accepting these military arrangements, House recognized the validity of Allied political ends.<ref>Keith L. Nelson, "What Colonel House Overlooked in the Armistice." ''Mid-America'' 1969 51(2): 75-91. Issn: 0026-2927</ref>

Wilson had House assemble the "Inquiry" &mdash; a team of academic experts to devise efficient postwar solutions to all the world's problems and told House to prepare a charter for a [[League of Nations]].  In October 1918, when Germany petitioned for peace based on the [[Fourteen Points]], Wilson charged House with working out details of an armistice with the Allies. Nelson (1969) contends that House inadvertently compromised Wilson's position at the coming peace conference. The problem lay with House's inability to grasp the full implications and ramifications of Allied military demands for an armistice settlement. The Allies made demands on Germany as to the disposition of her army and navy and as to territorial occupation by Allied forces. While the Allies-based these demands on military considerations, they were in fact tantamount to a political settlement. In accepting these military arrangements, House recognized the validity of Allied political ends.<ref>Keith L. Nelson, "What Colonel House Overlooked in the Armistice." ''Mid-America'' 1969 51(2): 75-91. Issn: 0026-2927</ref>