Changes

The Marshall Plan played a major role in the [[Cold War]] by restoring Western Europe to prosperity and strengthening the opponenets of Communism.  With the Marshall Plan the years 1948 to 1952 saw the fastest period of growth in European history, returning many of the devastated countries to stability.  

The Marshall Plan played a major role in the [[Cold War]] by restoring Western Europe to prosperity and strengthening the opponenets of Communism.  With the Marshall Plan the years 1948 to 1952 saw the fastest period of growth in European history, returning many of the devastated countries to stability.  

When the [[Joseph Stalin]], Communist dictator of the Soviet Union refused to participate or allow any of his satellites in eastern Europe participate, the plan became exclusive to western Europe. Europe split along East-West lines that defined the [[Cold War]].  Named after U.S. Secretary of State [[George Marshall]], the plan was designed and operated by State Department officials, especially [[Dean Acheson]] in 1947 and began in 1948 when the Republican-controlled Congress authorized the program and the money. The Marshall Plan ended in late 1951, when it gave way to the Mutual Security Program, which combined economic and military aid.  

When the [[Joseph Stalin]], Communist dictator of the Soviet Union refused to participate or allow any of his satellites in eastern Europe participate, the plan became exclusive to western Europe. Europe split along east–west lines that defined the [[Cold War]].  Named after U.S. Secretary of State [[George Marshall]], the plan was designed and operated by State Department officials, especially [[Dean Acheson]] in 1947 and began in 1948 when the Republican-controlled Congress authorized the program and the money. The Marshall Plan ended in late 1951, when it gave way to the Mutual Security Program, which combined economic and military aid.  

[[Image:M-plan$.JPG|thumb|420px]]  

[[Image:M-plan$.JPG|thumb|420px]]  

Historians no longer argue that the Marshall Plan was essential for Europe's recovery, but rather that its political and  psychological impact was decisive in shaping Western Europe. The powerful combination of ERP and NATO gave Europe the assurance of America's commitment to the security and prosperity of Western Europe, and helped the recipients avoid the pessimism and despair that characterized the aftermath of World War I. The Marshall Plan thus created in Europe an unstoppable "revolution of rising expectations," the striking phrase coined in 1950 by Harlan Cleveland, an economist and senior ERP official.

Historians no longer argue that the Marshall Plan was essential for Europe's recovery, but rather that its political and  psychological impact was decisive in shaping Western Europe. The powerful combination of ERP and NATO gave Europe the assurance of America's commitment to the security and prosperity of Western Europe, and helped the recipients avoid the pessimism and despair that characterized the aftermath of World War I. The Marshall Plan thus created in Europe an unstoppable "revolution of rising expectations," the striking phrase coined in 1950 by Harlan Cleveland, an economist and senior ERP official.

==Origins==

==Origins==

Six years of total war in Europe, 1939-1945, brought destruction and economic ruin to both victors and vanquished.  Only the United States emerged from World War II without domestic damage and stronger economically than before the war.  The armadas of heavy bombers that night and day had blasted every industrial area and transportation center in Europe had done a thorough job; recovery was painfully slow.  Economic output in 1948 was 13% below 1938 levels; in Germany it was 55% lower. America, in startling contrast, was 65% higher.   

Six years of total war in Europe, 1939–1945, brought destruction and economic ruin to both victors and vanquished.  Only the United States emerged from World War II without domestic damage and stronger economically than before the war.  The armadas of heavy bombers that night and day had blasted every industrial area and transportation center in Europe had done a thorough job; recovery was painfully slow.  Economic output in 1948 was 13% below 1938 levels; in Germany it was 55% lower. America, in startling contrast, was 65% higher.   

Signs of permanent stagnation were pervasive, coupled with growing frustration and pessimism about the future.  Millions of refugees lived in squalid camps.  Britain had won the war, and it had  received billions of dollars in postwar loans, but its economy was shattered; bread had to be  rationed.  Former prime minister [[Winston Churchill]] said Europe was "a rubble-heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground of pestilence and hate."  Conditions were even worse in the Soviet Union, but Stalin’s army and secret police were everywhere and he used the vacuum in eastern Europe expand Soviet his domains influence and control.  By 1946 Churchill warned that the Soviet Union had drawn an "iron curtain" which divided Europe between rival alliances and ideologies.  Sensing that his dreaded enemy capitalism was collapsing, he Stalin ordered the Communist parties in every country to shift to the left and fight the class enemy.  The danger he saw was that America the American juggernaut would impose its hated values, promoting liberalism, free speech, free elections, and capitalism.   

Signs of permanent stagnation were pervasive, coupled with growing frustration and pessimism about the future.  Millions of refugees lived in squalid camps.  Britain had won the war, and it had  received billions of dollars in postwar loans, but its economy was shattered; bread had to be  rationed.  Former prime minister [[Winston Churchill]] said Europe was "a rubble-heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground of pestilence and hate."  Conditions were even worse in the Soviet Union, but Stalin's army and secret police were everywhere and he used the vacuum in eastern Europe expand Soviet his domains influence and control.  By 1946 Churchill warned that the Soviet Union had drawn an "iron curtain" which divided Europe between rival alliances and ideologies.  Sensing that his dreaded enemy capitalism was collapsing, he Stalin ordered the Communist parties in every country to shift to the left and fight the class enemy.  The danger he saw was that America the American juggernaut would impose its hated values, promoting liberalism, free speech, free elections, and capitalism.   

In 1947 the [[Truman Doctrine]] of military support saved Greece from a Communist takeover (and aided Turkey too), but Americans feared that the Communists had a good chance to seize political power in Italy and France, shutting out American trade, cultural exchanges and political values in a victory for totalitarianism over democracy.   

In 1947 the [[Truman Doctrine]] of military support saved Greece from a Communist takeover (and aided Turkey too), but Americans feared that the Communists had a good chance to seize political power in Italy and France, shutting out American trade, cultural exchanges and political values in a victory for totalitarianism over democracy.   

===Postwar ad-hoc grants and loans===

===Postwar ad-hoc grants and loans===

In addition to the $12.4 billion Marshall plan money, the U.S. gave an additional $20 billion in grants and net credits from 1945 through 1951. They were aimed at short-term needs and did not carry the long-terms modernization goals of the Marshall Plan, but they did pump very large sums into war-torn economies.<ref>Historians who downplay the size of the Marshall money usually ignore the other $20 billion, a sum that had considerable impact.</ref> In 1945-47, before the Marshall Plan started, American aid amounted to $13.1 billion.  Postwar relief through the UN (UNNRA) came to $3.5 billion. Britain received a long-term loan of $3.75 billion in 1946. West Germany (that is the Allied-occupied part of the country) received U.S. goods through the GARIOA program (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) valued at $1.7 billion. Aid to Greece and Turkey began in 1947 with the Truman Doctrine's allocation of $650 million.<ref>See [http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1952-12.pdf ''U.S. Statistical Abstract: 1952'' (1953) table 1000 p. 830 online]</ref>

In addition to the $12.4 billion Marshall plan money, the U.S. gave an additional $20 billion in grants and net credits from 1945 through 1951. They were aimed at short-term needs and did not carry the long-terms modernization goals of the Marshall Plan, but they did pump very large sums into war-torn economies.<ref>Historians who downplay the size of the Marshall money usually ignore the other $20 billion, a sum that had considerable impact.</ref> In 1945–47, before the Marshall Plan started, American aid amounted to $13.1 billion.  Postwar relief through the UN (UNNRA) came to $3.5 billion. Britain received a long-term loan of $3.75 billion in 1946. West Germany (that is the Allied-occupied part of the country) received U.S. goods through the GARIOA program (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) valued at $1.7 billion. Aid to Greece and Turkey began in 1947 with the Truman Doctrine's allocation of $650 million.<ref>See [http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1952-12.pdf ''U.S. Statistical Abstract: 1952'' (1953) table 1000 p. 830 online]</ref>

===Long-term solution===

===Long-term solution===

In 1948 State department official Will Clayton found a long-term umbrella solution, named the “European Recovery Program” or ERP.  He envisioned gigantic American gifts of billions of dollars that would never have to be repaid, combined with specific European initiatives that would put the continent’s industry, transportation, finance and farming on a sound basis. That would promote free trade and a healthy environment for economic and political freedoms, and in the long run, lead to the sort of unity that was eventually reached by the European Union.   

In 1948 State department official Will Clayton found a long-term umbrella solution, named the “European Recovery Program” or ERP.  He envisioned gigantic American gifts of billions of dollars that would never have to be repaid, combined with specific European initiatives that would put the continent's industry, transportation, finance and farming on a sound basis. That would promote free trade and a healthy environment for economic and political freedoms, and in the long run, lead to the sort of unity that was eventually reached by the European Union.   

The Administration requested $14.2 billion; Congress authorized $13.4 billion, and $12.5 billion was spent by the time the plan officially ended (and was replaced by another aid program that stressed military support.) The sum of $14 billion is sometimes cited, for it included aid to Japan and other Asian countries given on similar terms (but with a different administrative structure).  In Europe, the largest grants went to Britain ($3.4 billion), France ($2.7 billion), Italy ($1.5 billion), West Germany ($1.4 billion), Netherlands ($1.1 billion), Greece ($796 million), Austria ($678 million), andf Belgium ($559 million).  Spain was excluded because of lingering resentment regarding the Spanish Civil War.

The Administration requested $14.2 billion; Congress authorized $13.4 billion, and $12.5 billion was spent by the time the plan officially ended (and was replaced by another aid program that stressed military support.) The sum of $14 billion is sometimes cited, for it included aid to Japan and other Asian countries given on similar terms (but with a different administrative structure).  In Europe, the largest grants went to Britain ($3.4 billion), France ($2.7 billion), Italy ($1.5 billion), West Germany ($1.4 billion), Netherlands ($1.1 billion), Greece ($796 million), Austria ($678 million), andf Belgium ($559 million).  Spain was excluded because of lingering resentment regarding the Spanish Civil War.

Success required the use of Secretary of State [[George Marshall]]’s enormous prestige, evident in his speech<ref>For text see [http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/mars1.html "Marshall Announces His Plan"]</ref> at Harvard University in June 1947 and of course in the informal name of the whole program. Even more essential was close collaboration with the Republicans who controlled Congress, especially their foreign policy leader, Senator [[Arthur Vandenberg]].  Vandenberg, who had shepherded the Truman Plan through Congress in 1947, was a critical supporter and  won Congressional approval for the much more expensive Marshall Plan. All of Europe was invited to join, along with much of Latin America.<ref>Switzerland did not officially join, in order to preserve its neutrality. However it was at least partly incorporated into the ERP economic system through the 1949 off-shore trade agreement.</ref>

Success required the use of Secretary of State [[George Marshall]]’s enormous prestige, evident in his speech<ref>For text see [http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/mars1.html "Marshall Announces His Plan"]</ref> at Harvard University in June 1947 and of course in the informal name of the whole program. Even more essential was close collaboration with the Republicans who controlled Congress, especially their foreign policy leader, Senator [[Arthur Vandenberg]].  Vandenberg, who had shepherded the Truman Plan through Congress in 1947, was a critical supporter and  won Congressional approval for the much more expensive Marshall Plan. All of Europe was invited to join, along with much of Latin America.<ref>Switzerland did not officially join, in order to preserve its neutrality. However it was at least partly incorporated into the ERP economic system through the 1949 off-shore trade agreement.</ref>

American and European newspapers, political parties, businesses, labor unions, and intellectuals supported a massive promotional campaign that warned that the isolationist mistakes following World War I must not be repeated. In the United States some critics complained about a "global WPA" (see [[WPA]]) but little organized opposition emerged, apart from far-left elements in some labor unions.  Most Americans were exhausted from war and wanted to return to domestic concerns, and reduce heavy wartime taxes; vast new spending programs threatened these goals. ERP supporters answered that America’s national security was at stake, and rebuilding Europe now would be far cheaper than fighting a third world war.  The isolationism  among conservative Republicans crumbled when the Stalinist seizure of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 showed time was running out.   

American and European newspapers, political parties, businesses, labor unions, and intellectuals supported a massive promotional campaign that warned that the isolationist mistakes following World War I must not be repeated. In the United States some critics complained about a "global WPA" (see [[WPA]]) but little organized opposition emerged, apart from [[far-left]] elements in some labor unions.  Most Americans were exhausted from war and wanted to return to domestic concerns, and reduce heavy wartime taxes; vast new spending programs threatened these goals. ERP supporters answered that America's national security was at stake, and rebuilding Europe now would be far cheaper than fighting a third world war.  The isolationism  among conservative Republicans crumbled when the Stalinist seizure of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 showed time was running out.   

===Building support in Europe===

===Building support in Europe===

At first most European leaders embraced the plan, but the Communists swung into opposition once Stalin signaled his opposition. However the socialist movements endorsed and supported the ERP as did business and liberal elements.  A European organization was formed, the ''' Organization for European Economic Cooperation''' ('''OEEC''') to coordinate policies, and at all times the details and operations of the program was negotiated between the U.S. and European nations.

At first most European leaders embraced the plan, but the Communists swung into opposition once Stalin signaled his opposition. However the socialist movements endorsed and supported the ERP as did business and liberal elements.  A European organization was formed, the ''' Organization for European Economic Cooperation''' ('''OEEC''') to coordinate policies, and at all times the details and operations of the program was negotiated between the U.S. and European nations.

Promotions continued after the plan began, and emphasized its success in contrast to the economic failures under Communism. As the aim of the Marshall Plan was to restore the confidence of the Europeans after the devastation of the war, the ideological and psychological aspects of the plan were as important as the economic ones. Propaganda and publicity campaigns were therefore crucial to the success of the plan and varied little from country to country, as the purpose was to spread the American way of life throughout Europe. For example, American and Danish authorities cooperated with considerable success in 1948-50 to present the Marshall Plan as a program of reciprocal benefit to both nations. Press releases, journalists' tours, and three large exhibitions presented Denmark and the United States as closely related lands with shared values of democracy and freedom. America was depicted as rich and highly developed economically and technologically, while Denmark had superior systems of agriculture and social welfare. Politics was kept in the background in building this image of shared values and interests.<ref>Marianne Rostgaard, "Kampen Om Sjaelene: Dansk Marshallplan Publicity 1948-50" [The Battle for Souls: Publicity for the Marshall Plan in Denmark, 1948-50]. ''Historie'' 2002 (2): 257-291. Issn: 0107-4725</ref>

Promotions continued after the plan began, and emphasized its success in contrast to the economic failures under Communism. As the aim of the Marshall Plan was to restore the [[confidence]] of the Europeans after the devastation of the war, the ideological and psychological aspects of the plan were as important as the economic ones. Propaganda and publicity campaigns were therefore crucial to the success of the plan and varied little from country to country, as the purpose was to spread the American way of life throughout Europe. For example, American and Danish authorities cooperated with considerable success in 1948–50 to present the Marshall Plan as a program of reciprocal benefit to both nations. Press releases, journalists' tours, and three large exhibitions presented Denmark and the United States as closely related lands with shared values of democracy and freedom. America was depicted as rich and highly developed economically and technologically, while Denmark had superior systems of agriculture and social welfare. Politics was kept in the background in building this image of shared values and interests.<ref>Marianne Rostgaard, "Kampen Om Sjaelene: Dansk Marshallplan Publicity 1948-50" [The Battle for Souls: Publicity for the Marshall Plan in Denmark, 1948-50]. ''Historie'' 2002 (2): 257-291. Issn: 0107-4725</ref>

[[Image:M-plan-1.jpg|thumb|250px|graphic from 1949 leaflet for Dutch audiences, artwork by Jo Spier (1900-1978)]]  

[[Image:M-plan-1.jpg|thumb|250px|graphic from 1949 leaflet for Dutch audiences, artwork by Jo Spier (1900-1978)]]  

A central goal of the ERP was to promote the growth of productivity along the lines of American management and labor practices. Obstacles arose in [[Belgium, history|Belgium]], which clearly limited its impact. The interest among some Belgian employers in increasing rates of productivity per worker was motivated by the evolution of wage levels. But the Americans also intended to inject a new "spirit of productivity" in Belgian industries, which implied, among other measures, a reinforcement of structures of corporatist negotiation between the social partners at a local level. The ambitions of the American strategy therefore extended beyond the defined goal of introducing a [[Fordism|Fordist]] type of economic system with high wages, high productivity, and low prices to consumers. After the belated establishment of the Belgian Office for the Increase of Productivity in 1952, the political character of the program became apparent. By incorporating American management principles, while at the same time decoding them and adapting them to the national situation, Belgian employers' organizations and trade unions skillfully exploited their position as intermediaries in order to appropriate the "modernist" label that they advocated. The "policy of productivity" was successful for a certain time because it matched the contours of the evolution of social reforms in Belgium. This policy success, however, was rendered impotent by the failure of the economic dimension of the productivity campaigns. The Americans had in effect failed to recognize the structural importance of the major financial groups which dominated heavy industry in Belgium. By not adopting the American notions of productivity, and more generally by not carrying out any large-scale programs of innovation and investment in the key sectors that they controlled in the aftermath of the war, these holding companies greatly restricted the scope for American influence. Consequently, it was by other means, such as the training of managers, that the American paradigms entered into Belgian economic culture.<ref>Kenneth Bertrams, "Productivite Economique et Paix Sociale au sein du Plan Marshall: Les Limites de l'influence Americaine aupres des Industriels et Syndicats Belges, 1948-1960,"  [Economic Productivity and Social Peace Within the Marshall Plan: the Limits of American Influence on Belgian Industrialists and Trade Unionists, 1948-60]. ''Cahiers D'histoire du Temps Présent'' 2001 (9): 191-235. Issn: 0771-6435</ref>

A central goal of the ERP was to promote the growth of productivity along the lines of American management and labor practices. Obstacles arose in [[Belgium, history|Belgium]], which clearly limited its impact. The interest among some Belgian employers in increasing rates of productivity per worker was motivated by the evolution of wage levels. But the Americans also intended to inject a new "spirit of productivity" in Belgian industries, which implied, among other measures, a reinforcement of structures of corporatist negotiation between the social partners at a local level. The ambitions of the American strategy therefore extended beyond the defined goal of introducing a [[Fordism|Fordist]] type of economic system with high wages, high productivity, and low prices to consumers. After the belated establishment of the Belgian Office for the Increase of Productivity in 1952, the political character of the program became apparent. By incorporating American management principles, while at the same time decoding them and adapting them to the national situation, Belgian employers' organizations and trade unions skillfully exploited their position as intermediaries in order to appropriate the "modernist" label that they advocated. The "policy of productivity" was successful for a certain time because it matched the contours of the evolution of social reforms in Belgium. This policy success, however, was rendered impotent by the failure of the economic dimension of the productivity campaigns. The Americans had in effect failed to recognize the structural importance of the major financial groups which dominated heavy industry in Belgium. By not adopting the American notions of productivity, and more generally by not carrying out any large-scale programs of innovation and investment in the key sectors that they controlled in the aftermath of the war, these holding companies greatly restricted the scope for American influence. Consequently, it was by other means, such as the training of managers, that the American paradigms entered into Belgian economic culture.<ref>Kenneth Bertrams, "Productivite Economique et Paix Sociale au sein du Plan Marshall: Les Limites de l'influence Americaine aupres des Industriels et Syndicats Belges, 1948-1960,"  [Economic Productivity and Social Peace Within the Marshall Plan: the Limits of American Influence on Belgian Industrialists and Trade Unionists, 1948-60]. ''Cahiers D'histoire du Temps Présent'' 2001 (9): 191-235. Issn: 0771-6435</ref>

====France====

====France====

Although the economic situation in France was grim in 1945, resources did exist. The US government had planned a major aid program, but President [[Harry S. Truman]] unexpectedly ended [[Lend Lease]] in late summer 1945, and additional aid was stymied by Congress in 1945-46.  France managed to regain its international status thanks to a successful production strategy, a demographic spurt, and technical and political innovations. Conditions varied from firm to firm. Some had been destroyed or damaged, nationalized or requisitioned, but the majority carried on, sometimes working harder and more efficiently than before the war. Industries were reorganized on a basis that ranged from consensual (electricity) to conflictual (machine tools), therefore producing uneven results. Despite strong American pressure through the ERP, there was little change in the organization and content of the training for French industrial managers until the late 1950s. This was mainly due to the reticence of the existing institutions and the struggle among different economic and political interest groups for control over efforts to improve the further training of practitioners.<ref>John S. Hill, "American Efforts to Aid French Reconstruction Between Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan." ''Journal of Modern History'' 1992 64(3): 500-524. Issn: 0022-2801  [http://www.jstor.org/pss/2124596 in jstor]</ref>

Although the economic situation in France was grim in 1945, resources did exist. The US government had planned a major aid program, but President [[Harry S. Truman]] unexpectedly ended [[Lend Lease]] in late summer 1945, and additional aid was stymied by Congress in 1945–46.  France managed to regain its international status thanks to a successful production strategy, a demographic spurt, and technical and political innovations. Conditions varied from firm to firm. Some had been destroyed or damaged, nationalized or requisitioned, but the majority carried on, sometimes working harder and more efficiently than before the war. Industries were reorganized on a basis that ranged from consensual (electricity) to conflictual (machine tools), therefore producing uneven results. Despite strong American pressure through the ERP, there was little change in the organization and content of the training for French industrial managers until the late 1950s. This was mainly due to the reticence of the existing institutions and the struggle among different economic and political interest groups for control over efforts to improve the further training of practitioners.<ref>John S. Hill, "American Efforts to Aid French Reconstruction Between Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan." ''Journal of Modern History'' 1992 64(3): 500-524. Issn: 0022-2801  [http://www.jstor.org/pss/2124596 in jstor]</ref>

The Monnet Plan provided a coherent framework for economic policy, and it was strongly supported by the Marshall Plan. It was inspired by moderate, Keynesian free-trade ideas rather than state control. Although relaunched in an original way, the French economy was about as productive as comparable West European countries.<ref>Philippe Mioche, "Le Demarrage de l'economie Française au lendemain de la Guerre," [Restarting the French Economy after the War]. ''Historiens et Géographes'' 1998 89(361): 143-156. Issn: 0046-757x</ref>

The Monnet Plan provided a coherent framework for economic policy, and it was strongly supported by the Marshall Plan. It was inspired by moderate, Keynesian free-trade ideas rather than state control. Although relaunched in an original way, the French economy was about as productive as comparable West European countries.<ref>Philippe Mioche, "Le Demarrage de l'economie Française au lendemain de la Guerre," [Restarting the French Economy after the War]. ''Historiens et Géographes'' 1998 89(361): 143-156. Issn: 0046-757x</ref>

    

    

==Comparisons==

==Comparisons==

Western Europe recovered much faster after World War II than after World War I, despite far greater physical and economic damage in 1945 than in 1918. Output grew at 7.5% annually from 1945 to 1950, more than double the 3.5% of 1919-24. Indeed, the rapid recovery in the late 1940s took economists by surprise. One explanation was the large output gap (that is, economic output in 1945 was further below the level of 1938 than that of 1919 to 1914) and a greater capacity to fill that gap (increased industrial capacity as a result of expanded wartime production). Another reason for the improved economic performance in the late 1940s was a general change in domestic political attitudes. After 1918 there were conscious hopes and efforts to revive prewar economic and political structures; no such reactionary calls for a return to the prewar [[Great Depression]] existed after 1945. Instead there was a clear desire for change. One measure of a commitment to change was the far slower decontrol of wages, prices, and rents after 1945 to ensure economic stability. Another difference between 1919 and 1946, from a macroeconomic standpoint, was that post-1918 politicians committed themselves to an immediate return to the gold standard with little clear understanding of how national economies worked or were interconnected. In contrast, after 1945 most countries pursued expansionary economic policies with little regard for hard currency stability. A final reason for the difference in the success of postwar reconstruction was a marked change in the nature of international politics, with far more effort being made toward international cooperation after World War II, especially by the 1950s, compared to what happened in the 1920s. This sense of cooperation was complemented by a radically new attitude of the United States toward world affairs: a willingness to participate in the UN; modest reparations demands on Germany; no demand for repayment of war debts; and an active American aid program abroad, in particular the Marshall Plan.<ref>Andrea Boltho, "Reconstruction after Two World Wars: Why the Differences?" ''Journal of European Economic History'' 2001 30(2): 429-456. Issn: 0391-5115</ref>

Western Europe recovered much faster after World War II than after World War I, despite far greater physical and economic damage in 1945 than in 1918. Output grew at 7.5% annually from 1945 to 1950, more than double the 3.5% of 1919–24. Indeed, the rapid recovery in the late 1940s took economists by surprise. One explanation was the large output gap (that is, economic output in 1945 was further below the level of 1938 than that of 1919 to 1914) and a greater capacity to fill that gap (increased industrial capacity as a result of expanded wartime production). Another reason for the improved economic performance in the late 1940s was a general change in domestic political attitudes. After 1918 there were conscious hopes and efforts to revive prewar economic and political structures; no such reactionary calls for a return to the prewar [[Great Depression]] existed after 1945. Instead there was a clear desire for change. One measure of a commitment to change was the far slower decontrol of wages, prices, and rents after 1945 to ensure economic stability. Another difference between 1919 and 1946, from a macroeconomic standpoint, was that post-1918 politicians committed themselves to an immediate return to the gold standard with little clear understanding of how national economies worked or were interconnected. In contrast, after 1945 most countries pursued expansionary economic policies with little regard for hard currency stability. A final reason for the difference in the success of postwar reconstruction was a marked change in the nature of international politics, with far more effort being made toward international cooperation after World War II, especially by the 1950s, compared to what happened in the 1920s. This sense of cooperation was complemented by a radically new attitude of the United States toward world affairs: a willingness to participate in the UN; modest [[reparations]] demands on Germany; no demand for repayment of war debts; and an active American aid program abroad, in particular the Marshall Plan.<ref>Andrea Boltho, "Reconstruction after Two World Wars: Why the Differences?" ''Journal of European Economic History'' 2001 30(2): 429-456. Issn: 0391-5115</ref>

==Memory==

==Memory==

==See also==

==See also==

*[[Harold Glasser]]

*[[Harold Glasser]]

==Bibliography==

==Bibliography==

* Agnew, John, and J. Nicholas Entrikin, eds. ''The Marshall Plan Today: Model and Metaphor.'' (2004), 274pp; essays by economic historians; [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108516906 online edition]

* Agnew, John, and J. Nicholas Entrikin, eds. ''The Marshall Plan Today: Model and Metaphor.'' (2004), 274pp; essays by economic historians; [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108516906 online edition]

* Bischof, Günter, Anton Pelinka, and Dieter Stiefel, eds. ''The Marshall Plan in Austria'' (2000) essays by Austrian scholars

* Bischof, Günter, Anton Pelinka, and Dieter Stiefel, eds. ''The Marshall Plan in Austria'' (2000) essays by Austrian scholars

* Behrman, Greg. ''The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and How America Helped Rebuild Europe'' (2008) [http://www.amazon.com/Most-Noble-Adventure-Marshall-America/dp/0743282647/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1257924250&sr=1-1 excerpt and text search]

* Behrman, Greg. ''The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and How America Helped Rebuild Europe'' (2008) [https://www.amazon.com/Most-Noble-Adventure-Marshall-America/dp/0743282647/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1257924250&sr=1-1 excerpt and text search]

* Burk, Kathleen. "The Marshall Plan: Filling in Some of the Blanks," ''Contemporary European History,'' Vol. 10, No. 2 (July 2001), pp.&nbsp;267–294.  

* Burk, Kathleen. "The Marshall Plan: Filling in Some of the Blanks," ''Contemporary European History,'' Vol. 10, No. 2 (July 2001), pp.&nbsp;267–294.  

* Carew, Anthony. ''Labour under the Marshal Plan'' (1987), in Britain

* Carew, Anthony. ''Labour under the Marshal Plan'' (1987), in Britain

* Cox, Michael, and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe. "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 7.1 (2005) 97-134 in [[Project Muse]], a controversial article that says the Soviet Union's reaction caused it to repress Eastern Europe

* Cox, Michael, and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe. "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 7.1 (2005) 97–134 in [[Project Muse]], a controversial article that says the Soviet Union's reaction caused it to repress Eastern Europe

** Maier, Charles S. "The Marshall Plan and the Division of Europe." ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 2005 7(1): 168-174. in [[Project Muse]], a rebuttal saying the ERP was the single event most responsible for confirming the division of Europe, not for initiating that division.  

** Maier, Charles S. "The Marshall Plan and the Division of Europe." ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 2005 7(1): 168–174. in [[Project Muse]], a rebuttal saying the ERP was the single event most responsible for confirming the division of Europe, not for initiating that division.  

* Cromwell, William. "The Marshall Plan, Britain and the Cold War," ''Review of International Studies,'' Vol. 8, No. 4 (October 1982), pp.&nbsp;233–249.  

* Cromwell, William. "The Marshall Plan, Britain and the Cold War," ''Review of International Studies,'' Vol. 8, No. 4 (October 1982), pp.&nbsp;233–249.  

* DeLong, J. Bradford and Barry Eichengreen, eds. ''The Marshall Plan'' (1991). advanced econometric history [http://econ161.berkeley.edu/pdf_files/Marshall_Large.pdf online edition]

* DeLong, J. Bradford and Barry Eichengreen, eds. ''The Marshall Plan'' (1991). advanced econometric history [http://econ161.berkeley.edu/pdf_files/Marshall_Large.pdf online edition]

* Grose, Peter, ed., ''The Marshall Plan and Its Legacy'' (1997), essays by American scholars

* Grose, Peter, ed., ''The Marshall Plan and Its Legacy'' (1997), essays by American scholars

* Hoffmann, Stanley,  and Charles S. Maier, eds. ''The Marshall Plan: A Retrospective'' (1984), essays by scholars

* Hoffmann, Stanley,  and Charles S. Maier, eds. ''The Marshall Plan: A Retrospective'' (1984), essays by scholars

* Hogan, Michael J. ''The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952'' (1989) major history, with diplomatic emphasis [http://www.amazon.com/Marshall-Plan-Reconstruction-1947-1952-Twentieth/dp/0521378400/ref=sr_1_9?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211605361&sr=1-9 excerpt and text search]

* Hogan, Michael J. ''The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952'' (1989) major history, with diplomatic emphasis [https://www.amazon.com/Marshall-Plan-Reconstruction-1947-1952-Twentieth/dp/0521378400/ref=sr_1_9?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211605361&sr=1-9 excerpt and text search]

**Charles S. Maier, "Review: American Visions and British Interests: Hogan's Marshall Plan," ''Reviews in American History,'' Vol. 18, No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp.&nbsp;102–111 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2702734  in JSTOR]  

**Charles S. Maier, "Review: American Visions and British Interests: Hogan's Marshall Plan," ''Reviews in American History,'' Vol. 18, No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp.&nbsp;102–111 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2702734  in JSTOR]  

* Hogan, Michael J. "American Marshall Planners and the Search for a European Neocapitalism." ''The American Historical Review,'' Vol. 90, No. 1 (Feb., 1985), pp.&nbsp;44–72  [http://www.jstor.org/pss/1860748 in JSTOR]

* Hogan, Michael J. "American Marshall Planners and the Search for a European Neocapitalism." ''The American Historical Review,'' Vol. 90, No. 1 (Feb., 1985), pp.&nbsp;44–72  [http://www.jstor.org/pss/1860748 in JSTOR]

* Leffler, Melvyn P. "The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," ''Diplomatic History,'' Vol. 12, No. 3 (July 1998), pp.&nbsp;277–306.  

* Leffler, Melvyn P. "The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," ''Diplomatic History,'' Vol. 12, No. 3 (July 1998), pp.&nbsp;277–306.  

* McKenzie, Brian Angus.  ''France: Americanization, Public Diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan.'' (2005). 259 pp.   

* McKenzie, Brian Angus.  ''France: Americanization, Public Diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan.'' (2005). 259 pp.   

* Mills, Nicolaus. ''Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America's Coming of Age as a Superpower'' (2008) [http://www.amazon.com/Winning-Peace-Marshall-Americas-Superpower/dp/0470097558/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1257924250&sr=1-2 excerpt and text search]

* Mills, Nicolaus. ''Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America's Coming of Age as a Superpower'' (2008) [https://www.amazon.com/Winning-Peace-Marshall-Americas-Superpower/dp/0470097558/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1257924250&sr=1-2 excerpt and text search]

* Milward, Alan. ''The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951'' (1984). Major study that argues the economic recovery might have happened anyway

* Milward, Alan. ''The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951'' (1984). Major study that argues the economic recovery might have happened anyway

* Milward, Alan S. "Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?" ''Diplomatic History'' 1989 13(2): 231-253.  

* Milward, Alan S. "Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?" ''Diplomatic History'' 1989 13(2): 231–253.  

* Pelling, Henry. ''Britain and the Marshall Plan'' (1988), a light study; less useful than Hogan (1989)

* Pelling, Henry. ''Britain and the Marshall Plan'' (1988), a light study; less useful than Hogan (1989)

* Roberts, Geoffrey. "Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology and the Onset of Cold War, 1947," ''Europe-Asia Studies,'' Vol. 46, No. 8 (December 1994), pp.&nbsp;1371–1386 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/152768  in JSTOR]

* Roberts, Geoffrey. "Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology and the Onset of Cold War, 1947," ''Europe-Asia Studies,'' Vol. 46, No. 8 (December 1994), pp.&nbsp;1371–1386 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/152768  in JSTOR]

* Schain, Martin, and Tony Judt, eds. ''The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After'' (2001). essays by scholars [http://www.amazon.com/Marshall-Plan-Transition-European-Studies/dp/0312229623/ref=sr_1_11?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211605361&sr=1-11 excerpt and text search]

* Schain, Martin, and Tony Judt, eds. ''The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After'' (2001). essays by scholars [https://www.amazon.com/Marshall-Plan-Transition-European-Studies/dp/0312229623/ref=sr_1_11?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211605361&sr=1-11 excerpt and text search]

* Vickers, Rhiannon. ''Manipulating Hegemony: State Power, Labour and the Marshall Plan in Britain'' (2000), 185pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=101528686 online edition]

* Vickers, Rhiannon. ''Manipulating Hegemony: State Power, Labour and the Marshall Plan in Britain'' (2000), 185pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=101528686 online edition]

* Wasser, Solidelle F. and Michael L. Dolfman. "BLS and the Marshall Plan: The Forgotten Story: The Statistical Technical Assistance of BLS Increased Productive Efficiency and Labor Productivity in Western European Industry after World War II; Technological Literature Surveys and Plan-Organized Plant Visits Supplemented Instruction in Statistical Measurement," ''Monthly Labor Review'', Vol. 128, (June 2005) pp 44–52 [http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2005/06/art4full.pdf online edition]

* Wasser, Solidelle F. and Michael L. Dolfman. "BLS and the Marshall Plan: The Forgotten Story: The Statistical Technical Assistance of BLS Increased Productive Efficiency and Labor Productivity in Western European Industry after World War II; Technological Literature Surveys and Plan-Organized Plant Visits Supplemented Instruction in Statistical Measurement," ''Monthly Labor Review'', Vol. 128, (June 2005) pp 44–52 [https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2005/06/art4full.pdf online edition]

* Wend, Henry Burke. ''Recovery and Restoration: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Politics of Reconstruction of West Germany's Shipbuilding Industry, 1945–1955.'' (2001) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=106990622 online edition]

* Wend, Henry Burke. ''Recovery and Restoration: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Politics of Reconstruction of West Germany's Shipbuilding Industry, 1945–1955.'' (2001) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=106990622 online edition]

* Wexler, Imanuel. ''The Marshall Plan Revisited: The European Recovery Program in Economic Perspective'' (1983), a major economic history; says ERP was major economic success  

* Wexler, Imanuel. ''The Marshall Plan Revisited: The European Recovery Program in Economic Perspective'' (1983), a major economic history; says ERP was major economic success  

* Whelan, Bernadette. ''Ireland and the Marshall Plan 1947-1957'' (2000).  

* Whelan, Bernadette. ''Ireland and the Marshall Plan 1947-1957'' (2000).  

* Whelan, Bernadette. "Ireland, the Marshall Plan, and U.S. Cold War Concerns." ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 2006 8(1): 68-94. Issn: 1520-3972 Fulltext: [[Project Muse]]

* Whelan, Bernadette. "Ireland, the Marshall Plan, and U.S. Cold War Concerns." ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 2006 8(1): 68–94. Issn: 1520-3972 Fulltext: [[Project Muse]]

===Primary sources===

===Primary sources===

* [http://www.marshallfoundation.org/about_gcm/marshall_plan.htm Marshall Foundation]

* [http://www.marshallfoundation.org/about_gcm/marshall_plan.htm Marshall Foundation]

* [http://www.germany.info/relaunch/culture/history/marshall.html Susan Stern, "Marshall Plan 1947-1997: A German View", from the German Embassy]  

* [http://www.germany.info/relaunch/culture/history/marshall.html Susan Stern, "Marshall Plan 1947-1997: A German View", from the German Embassy]  

*[http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/marshall_plan/ Marshall Plan] at the U.S. National Archives

*[https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/marshall_plan/ Marshall Plan] at the U.S. National Archives

*[http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/index.php Marshall Plan collection] at the Truman Library

*[http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/index.php Marshall Plan collection] at the Truman Library

====notes====

====notes====

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