Changes

==Youth and personality==

==Youth and personality==

Vicky was a stern mother and dominating figure in Wilhelm's early life. She attempted to indoctrinate him with the values of Britain's nineteenth century Liberal Party. As as result, Wilhelm grew up with conflicted feelings regarding Britain. He respected British values, but felt the need to use militarism to compensate for his mother's un-Germanic influence. He was also a manic depressive, which resulted in inconsistent and erratic decision making. His withered left arm, a congenital defect, led to an inferiority complex.<ref name=stemple>Lewis-Stempel, John, "[https://www.express.co.uk/news/world-war-1/471409/When-Kaiser-Wilhelm-II-ruled-Germany Lunatic in charge of an asylum: When Kaiser Wilhelm II ruled Germany]", ''Sunday Express'', Apr 20, 2014</ref>

Vicky was a stern mother and dominating figure in Wilhelm's early life. She attempted to indoctrinate him with the values of Britain's nineteenth century Liberal Party. As as result, Wilhelm grew up with conflicted feelings regarding Britain. He respected British values, but felt the need to use [[militarism]] to compensate for his mother's un-Germanic influence. He was also a manic depressive, which resulted in inconsistent and erratic decision making. His withered left arm, a congenital defect, led to an inferiority complex.<ref name=stemple>Lewis-Stempel, John, "[https://www.express.co.uk/news/world-war-1/471409/When-Kaiser-Wilhelm-II-ruled-Germany Lunatic in charge of an asylum: When Kaiser Wilhelm II ruled Germany]", ''Sunday Express'', Apr 20, 2014</ref>

Wilhelm was easily entranced by conspiracy theories and was liable to blame foreign policy setbacks on the machinations of his uncle, King Edward VII of Britain. Wilhelm became obsessed with Edward as a youth, when the two future rulers were yachting rivals. After Edward visited Lisbon, Rome, and Paris in 1903, Wilhelm became convinced that his dreams of world power were being thwarted by Edward's efforts to "encircle" Germany.<ref>Röhl, pp. 245-246.</ref>

Wilhelm was easily entranced by conspiracy theories and was liable to blame foreign policy setbacks on the machinations of his uncle, King Edward VII of Britain. Wilhelm became obsessed with Edward as a youth, when the two future rulers were yachting rivals. After Edward visited Lisbon, Rome, and Paris in 1903, Wilhelm became convinced that his dreams of world power were being thwarted by Edward's efforts to "encircle" Germany.<ref>Röhl, pp. 245-246.</ref>

In November 1911, Crown Prince Wilhelm told his father that, "I am convinced that the political situation at home, so fragmented and muddled with its internal party interests, would improve at a stroke if all the country’s sons had to take up arms for their land."<ref>Röhl, p. 876.</ref> German historian Fritz Fischer, author of the most influential theory concerning the origin of the First World War, argues that the elite's anxiety with the domestic political situation was the driving force toward war.

In November 1911, Crown Prince Wilhelm told his father that, "I am convinced that the political situation at home, so fragmented and muddled with its internal party interests, would improve at a stroke if all the country’s sons had to take up arms for their land."<ref>Röhl, p. 876.</ref> German historian Fritz Fischer, author of the most influential theory concerning the origin of the First World War, argues that the elite's anxiety with the domestic political situation was the driving force toward war.

The French emerged from the crisis with a confidence that frightened the Germans. The French army adopted a doctrine called "the cult of the offense" (''guerre à outrance'') and a plan to recover Alsace-Lorraine called Plan XVII.

The French emerged from the crisis with a confidence that frightened the Germans. The army adopted a doctrine called "the cult of the offense" (''guerre à outrance'') and a plan to recover Alsace-Lorraine called Plan XVII.

Unlike Wilhelm's desire to be a modern Napoleon, colonies were a war aim that the average German could relate to. Many argued that it was hugely unfair that Britain, with its vast colonial empire, was thwarting Germany's far more modest ambitions, or "place in the sun." Germany had devoted a great deal of resources to its "naval race" with Britain. The Naval League was a source of propaganda and a focus of German patriotic sentiment. Lloyd George showed that a naval buildup would not deter Britain from interfering in Germany's colonial ambitions. Faced with a combined Anglo-French fleet, German attention shifted to the army.

Unlike Wilhelm's desire to be a modern Napoleon, colonies were a war aim that the average German could relate to. Many argued that it was hugely unfair that Britain, with its vast colonial empire, was thwarting Germany's far more modest ambitions, or "place in the sun." Germany had devoted a great deal of resources to its "naval race" with Britain. The Naval League was a source of propaganda and a focus of German patriotic sentiment. Lloyd George showed that a naval buildup would not deter Britain from interfering in Germany's colonial ambitions. Faced with a combined Anglo-French fleet, German attention shifted to the army.

In November 1912, Wilhelm approved a proposal to support Austria-Hungary against Serbia even if this led to war with both France and Russia. This proposal was presented to the kaiser jointly by both Bethmann and Moltke, as well as by Kiderlen, the foreign secretary.<ref>Moltke understood the war would be long and bloody, but he misled the civilian leadership: "As Kurt Riezler, the chancellor's private secretary, recorded retrospectively in 1915 (p.212): 'Bethmann can blame the coming of the war on the answer that Moltke gave him. He did say yes! We would succeed.'" ("[http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/199 Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]")</ref> These advisers misled the kaiser into believing that the British might support an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia. In December, Lichnowsky, the German ambassador to Britain, informed the kaiser that Britain would likely side with France in the event of such a war. The kaiser responded by ordering a "postponement of the great fight" until the summer of 1914 so that additional preparations could be made.<ref name=rohl18 /> Wilhelm was anxious that 1913, his jubilee, be a year of peace.<ref>Röhl, p. 954.</ref>

In November 1912, Wilhelm approved a proposal to support Austria-Hungary against Serbia even if this led to war with both France and Russia. This proposal was presented to the kaiser jointly by both Bethmann and Moltke, as well as by Kiderlen, the foreign secretary.<ref>Moltke understood the war would be long and bloody, but he misled the civilian leadership: "As Kurt Riezler, the chancellor's private secretary, recorded retrospectively in 1915 (p.212): 'Bethmann can blame the coming of the war on the answer that Moltke gave him. He did say yes! We would succeed.'" ("[http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/199 Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]")</ref> These advisers misled the kaiser into believing that the British might support an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia. In December, Lichnowsky, the German ambassador to Britain, informed the kaiser that Britain would likely side with France in the event of such a war. The kaiser responded by ordering a "postponement of the great fight" until the summer of 1914 so that additional preparations could be made.<ref name=rohl18 /> Wilhelm was anxious that 1913, his jubilee, be a year of peace.<ref>Röhl, p. 954.</ref>

Fischer identifies a meeting of the German Imperial War Council on December 8, 1912 as the moment when the imperial government resolved upon war.<ref name=rohl18 /> The meeting was attended by the kaiser and four advisors.<ref name=stemple /> In April 1913, Moltke discontinued work on a longstanding plan for an offensive against Russia. The move was intended to rule out "half measures" and left the [[Schlieffen Plan]] as Germany's only war plan.<ref>''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=t4gDyLfeUEQC&dq= Helmuth Von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]'', p. 103.</ref>  In June, the Reichstag passed a bill to expand the army from 544,000 soldiers to 870,000 soldiers. It was the largest expansion since 1871.<ref name="ArmyExpand" />

Fischer identified a meeting of the German Imperial War Council on December 8, 1912 as the moment when the imperial government resolved upon war.<ref name=rohl18 /> The meeting was attended by the kaiser and four advisors.<ref name=stemple /> In April 1913, Moltke discontinued work on a longstanding plan for an offensive against Russia. The move was intended to rule out "half measures" and left the [[Schlieffen Plan]] as Germany's only war plan.<ref>''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=t4gDyLfeUEQC&dq= Helmuth Von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]'', p. 103.</ref>  In June, the Reichstag passed a bill to expand the army from 544,000 soldiers to 870,000 soldiers. It was the largest expansion since 1871.<ref name="ArmyExpand" />

The assasination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serb nationalist in Sarejevo triggered a final diplomatic crisis in July 1914. This time, Bethmann withheld and even falsified the increasingly urgent messages sent by the troublesome Lichnowsky.<ref>Röhl, p. 1052</ref> When Wilhelm realized that the British still intended to side with the French, he attempted to reverse course. His last minute change of heart proved to be too little, too late.<ref name=rohl18 />

The assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serb nationalist in Sarejevo triggered a final diplomatic crisis in July 1914. This time, Bethmann withheld and even falsified the increasingly urgent messages sent by the troublesome Lichnowsky.<ref>Röhl, p. 1052</ref> When Wilhelm realized that the British still intended to side with the French, he attempted to reverse course. His last minute change of heart proved to be too little, too late.<ref name=rohl18 />

==World War I (1914-1918)==

==World War I (1914-1918)==

Wilhelm's correspondence with Tsar Nicholas was published in 1918 as the ''Willy-Nicky Correspondence''. (The two rulers had corresponded in English.) Monarchists were disillusioned by the revelation that the kaiser had brushed aside the tsar's peace proposals. Some supporters of the four-day Kapp Putsch of 1920 were monarchists. This was the closest that Germany ever came to a serious attempt to restore the monarchy.

Wilhelm's correspondence with Tsar Nicholas was published in 1918 as the ''Willy-Nicky Correspondence''. (The two rulers had corresponded in English.) Monarchists were disillusioned by the revelation that the kaiser had brushed aside the tsar's peace proposals. Some supporters of the four-day Kapp Putsch of 1920 were monarchists. This was the closest that Germany ever came to a serious attempt to restore the monarchy.

Guests at Doorn often heard the former kaiser threaten vengeance against a wide variety of opponents.<ref>Röhl, p. 1221.</ref> When Finance Minister Matthias Erzberger was murdered in 1921, Wilhelm celebrated with champagne.<ref>Röhl, p. 1222.</ref> Erzberger had forced Bethmann's resignation as chancellor in 1917, thus ending the kaiser's political role.

Guests at Doorn often heard the former kaiser threaten [[vengeance]] against a wide variety of opponents.<ref>Röhl, p. 1221.</ref> When Finance Minister Matthias Erzberger was murdered in 1921, Wilhelm celebrated with champagne.<ref>Röhl, p. 1222.</ref> Erzberger had forced Bethmann's resignation as chancellor in 1917, thus ending the kaiser's political role.

A 1925 biography by Emil Ludwig did much to undermine Wilhelm's reputation.

A 1925 biography by Emil Ludwig did much to undermine Wilhelm's reputation.