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| | === There Is No Alternative === | | === There Is No Alternative === |
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| − | No other nation offers anything close to the [[United States Treasury security|U.S. Treasury market]], a safe asset worth more than $27 trillion.<ref></ref> Global institutions need a market deep enough to absorb massive inflows and outflows without breaking, and every would-be rival falls short: | + | No other nation offers anything close to the U.S. Treasury market, a safe asset worth more than $27 trillion. Global institutions need a market deep enough to absorb massive inflows and outflows without breaking, and every would-be rival falls short: |
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| | * The [[eurozone]]'s debt is split among member states with very different credit quality. | | * The [[eurozone]]'s debt is split among member states with very different credit quality. |
| − | * [[Japan]] offers low yields and carries one of the world's highest [[debt-to-GDP ratio]]s. | + | * [[Japan]] offers low yields and carries one of the world's highest debt-to-GDP ratios. |
| − | * [[China]] keeps its [[capital account]] closed, so foreign holders cannot count on getting their money out. | + | * [[China]] keeps its capital account closed, so foreign holders cannot count on getting their money out. |
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| − | The dollar also has powerful [[network effect]]s working for it. As Eichengreen notes, businesses and banks use the dollar because everyone else does.<ref></ref> Countries that abandon it for bilateral local-currency deals take on higher [[transaction cost]]s, conversion headaches, and [[exchange-rate risk]]. That cost is the reason most such arrangements stay marginal. | + | The dollar also has powerful [[network effect]]s working for it. As Eichengreen notes, businesses and banks use the dollar because everyone else does. Countries that abandon it for bilateral local-currency deals take on higher transaction costs, conversion headaches, and exchange-rate risk. That cost is the reason most such arrangements stay marginal. |
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| | === Stablecoins: Digital Dollarization === | | === Stablecoins: Digital Dollarization === |
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| − | Promoters of de-dollarization point to [[central bank digital currency|central bank digital currencies]] such as [[mBridge]], but the real digital revolution is moving in the opposite direction. Dollar-pegged stablecoins like Tether (cryptocurrency) (USDT) and USD Coin (USDC) are spreading the dollar further into the developing world than ever before.<ref></ref> | + | Promoters of de-dollarization point to [[central bank digital currency|central bank digital currencies]] such as [[mBridge]], but the real digital revolution is moving in the opposite direction. Dollar-pegged stablecoins like Tether (cryptocurrency) (USDT) and USD Coin (USDC) are spreading the dollar further into the developing world than ever before. |
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| − | In [[Argentina]], [[Nigeria]], [[Turkey]], and other countries suffering high inflation or [[capital control]]s, ordinary people are voting with their smartphones. They bypass failing local banking systems to save and transact in digital dollars.<ref></ref> This is dollarization from the grassroots up. | + | In [[Argentina]], [[Nigeria]], [[Turkey]], and other countries suffering high inflation or capital controls, ordinary people are voting with their smartphones. They bypass failing local banking systems to save and transact in digital dollars.<ref></ref> This is dollarization from the grassroots up. |
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| | === The Reserve-Share Illusion === | | === The Reserve-Share Illusion === |
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| − | The statistic most often cited as proof of decline, the drop in the dollar's share of global [[foreign-exchange reserves]] from about 70 percent in 2000 to about 58 percent recently, is misleading.<ref></ref> Setser and Kamin show that much of the drop comes from exchange-rate swings and rising [[gold]] prices, not from central banks dumping dollars.<ref></ref> Where central banks have diversified, they have moved mainly into the Australian dollar and Canadian dollars, currencies of close U.S. allies, not into the [[renminbi]] or any BRICS currency. | + | The statistic most often cited as proof of decline, the drop in the dollar's share of global [[foreign-exchange reserves]] from about 70 percent in 2000 to about 58 percent recently, is misleading.<ref></ref> Setser and Kamin show that much of the drop comes from exchange-rate swings and rising [[gold]] prices, not from central banks dumping dollars. Where central banks have diversified, they have moved mainly into the Australian dollar and Canadian dollars, currencies of close U.S. allies, not into the [[renminbi]] or any BRICS currency. |
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| − | Outside official reserves, the picture is even clearer. In private global debt issuance, cross-border bank lending, and [[foreign exchange market|foreign-exchange]] trading, the dollar's share has held steady or grown over the past twenty years.<ref></ref> | + | Outside official reserves, the picture is even clearer. In private global debt issuance, cross-border bank lending, and foreign-exchange trading, the dollar's share has held steady or grown over the past twenty years. |
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| | === Why the Challengers Cannot Succeed == | | === Why the Challengers Cannot Succeed == |