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=== There Is No Alternative ===
 
=== There Is No Alternative ===
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No other nation offers anything close to the [[United States Treasury security|U.S. Treasury market]], a safe asset worth more than $27 trillion.<ref></ref> Global institutions need a market deep enough to absorb massive inflows and outflows without breaking, and every would-be rival falls short:
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No other nation offers anything close to the U.S. Treasury market, a safe asset worth more than $27 trillion. Global institutions need a market deep enough to absorb massive inflows and outflows without breaking, and every would-be rival falls short:
    
* The [[eurozone]]'s debt is split among member states with very different credit quality.
 
* The [[eurozone]]'s debt is split among member states with very different credit quality.
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* [[Japan]] offers low yields and carries one of the world's highest [[debt-to-GDP ratio]]s.
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* [[Japan]] offers low yields and carries one of the world's highest debt-to-GDP ratios.
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* [[China]] keeps its [[capital account]] closed, so foreign holders cannot count on getting their money out.
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* [[China]] keeps its capital account closed, so foreign holders cannot count on getting their money out.
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The dollar also has powerful [[network effect]]s working for it. As Eichengreen notes, businesses and banks use the dollar because everyone else does.<ref></ref> Countries that abandon it for bilateral local-currency deals take on higher [[transaction cost]]s, conversion headaches, and [[exchange-rate risk]]. That cost is the reason most such arrangements stay marginal.
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The dollar also has powerful [[network effect]]s working for it. As Eichengreen notes, businesses and banks use the dollar because everyone else does. Countries that abandon it for bilateral local-currency deals take on higher transaction costs, conversion headaches, and exchange-rate risk. That cost is the reason most such arrangements stay marginal.
    
=== Stablecoins: Digital Dollarization ===
 
=== Stablecoins: Digital Dollarization ===
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Promoters of de-dollarization point to [[central bank digital currency|central bank digital currencies]] such as [[mBridge]], but the real digital revolution is moving in the opposite direction. Dollar-pegged stablecoins like Tether (cryptocurrency) (USDT) and USD Coin (USDC) are spreading the dollar further into the developing world than ever before.<ref></ref>
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Promoters of de-dollarization point to [[central bank digital currency|central bank digital currencies]] such as [[mBridge]], but the real digital revolution is moving in the opposite direction. Dollar-pegged stablecoins like Tether (cryptocurrency) (USDT) and USD Coin (USDC) are spreading the dollar further into the developing world than ever before.
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In [[Argentina]], [[Nigeria]], [[Turkey]], and other countries suffering high inflation or [[capital control]]s, ordinary people are voting with their smartphones. They bypass failing local banking systems to save and transact in digital dollars.<ref></ref> This is dollarization from the grassroots up.
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In [[Argentina]], [[Nigeria]], [[Turkey]], and other countries suffering high inflation or capital controls, ordinary people are voting with their smartphones. They bypass failing local banking systems to save and transact in digital dollars.<ref></ref> This is dollarization from the grassroots up.
    
=== The Reserve-Share Illusion ===
 
=== The Reserve-Share Illusion ===
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The statistic most often cited as proof of decline, the drop in the dollar's share of global [[foreign-exchange reserves]] from about 70 percent in 2000 to about 58 percent recently, is misleading.<ref></ref> Setser and Kamin show that much of the drop comes from exchange-rate swings and rising [[gold]] prices, not from central banks dumping dollars.<ref></ref> Where central banks have diversified, they have moved mainly into the Australian dollar and Canadian dollars, currencies of close U.S. allies, not into the [[renminbi]] or any BRICS currency.
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The statistic most often cited as proof of decline, the drop in the dollar's share of global [[foreign-exchange reserves]] from about 70 percent in 2000 to about 58 percent recently, is misleading.<ref></ref> Setser and Kamin show that much of the drop comes from exchange-rate swings and rising [[gold]] prices, not from central banks dumping dollars. Where central banks have diversified, they have moved mainly into the Australian dollar and Canadian dollars, currencies of close U.S. allies, not into the [[renminbi]] or any BRICS currency.
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Outside official reserves, the picture is even clearer. In private global debt issuance, cross-border bank lending, and [[foreign exchange market|foreign-exchange]] trading, the dollar's share has held steady or grown over the past twenty years.<ref></ref>
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Outside official reserves, the picture is even clearer. In private global debt issuance, cross-border bank lending, and foreign-exchange trading, the dollar's share has held steady or grown over the past twenty years.
    
=== Why the Challengers Cannot Succeed ==
 
=== Why the Challengers Cannot Succeed ==
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