Difference between revisions of "Compatibilism"

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'''Compatibilism''' is the belief that there is no conflict between the ideas of [[free will]] and [[determinism]].  In other words, it is possible for all our actions to be determined by natural forces, and for us to have a meaningfully free will.  They base this belief on a particular definition of "free will" -- to them, an action is "free" if it is not ''forced'' upon a person by an outside force.  [[Incompatibilism|Incompatibilists]], by contrast, define an action as "free" if it is ''independent of prior physical cause'', and conclude that if everything has a physical cause, then nothing is free, and therefore that free will and determinism are incompatible.
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'''Compatibilism''' is the belief that there is no conflict between the ideas of [[free will]] and [[determinism]].  In other words, it is possible for all our actions to be determined by natural forces, and for us to have a meaningfully free will.  They base this belief on a particular definition of "free will" -- to them, an action is "free" if it is not ''forced'' upon a person by compulsion outside the actor.  [[Incompatibilism|Incompatibilists]], by contrast, define an action as "free" if it is ''independent of prior physical cause'', and conclude that if everything has a physical cause, then nothing is free, and therefore that free will and determinism are incompatible.
  
 
[[Category:Philosophy]]
 
[[Category:Philosophy]]

Revision as of 23:56, September 21, 2007

Compatibilism is the belief that there is no conflict between the ideas of free will and determinism. In other words, it is possible for all our actions to be determined by natural forces, and for us to have a meaningfully free will. They base this belief on a particular definition of "free will" -- to them, an action is "free" if it is not forced upon a person by compulsion outside the actor. Incompatibilists, by contrast, define an action as "free" if it is independent of prior physical cause, and conclude that if everything has a physical cause, then nothing is free, and therefore that free will and determinism are incompatible.