Difference between revisions of "Austin v. McNamara"
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| − | In ''Austin v. McNamara'', 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1992), the Court of Appeals for the [[Ninth Circuit]] interpreted [[HCQIA]] to bestow immunity on a hospital regardless of its "animosity," "hostility," or "bad faith" in revoking a physician's privileges at the hospital. The Court held that "the test [for immunity under §11112(a)] is an objective one."<ref>979 F.2d at 734.</ref> | + | In '''''Austin v. McNamara''''', 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1992), the Court of Appeals for the [[Ninth Circuit]] interpreted [[HCQIA]] to bestow immunity on a hospital regardless of its "animosity," "hostility," or "bad faith" in revoking a physician's privileges at the hospital. The Court held that "the test [for immunity under §11112(a)] is an objective one."<ref>979 F.2d at 734.</ref> |
This precedent has been widely followed to exclude evidence of bad faith from lawsuits against hospitals for [[sham peer review]]. | This precedent has been widely followed to exclude evidence of bad faith from lawsuits against hospitals for [[sham peer review]]. | ||
Revision as of 04:21, April 30, 2008
In Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1992), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted HCQIA to bestow immunity on a hospital regardless of its "animosity," "hostility," or "bad faith" in revoking a physician's privileges at the hospital. The Court held that "the test [for immunity under §11112(a)] is an objective one."[1]
This precedent has been widely followed to exclude evidence of bad faith from lawsuits against hospitals for sham peer review.
This precedent was distinguished by Clark v. Columbia/HCA Info. Servs., 117 Nev. 468, 477-78, 25 P.3d 215, 2001 Nev. LEXIS 46, 117 Nev. Adv. Rep. 42 (2001), as follows:
- The presumption of immunity has been interpreted by the federal courts almost exclusively in favor of finding immunity for peer review board members. [citing Austin as an example] In fact, in only two cases have federal courts reversed an order of summary judgment based on immunity because the physician demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the board failed to give appropriate fair notice and procedures in accordance with § 11112(a)(3) - Islami v. Covenant Medical Center, Inc. and LeMasters v. Christ Hospital. In addition, in Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Services, the Tenth Circuit upheld a district court's finding that the peer review board lacked immunity because the board only investigated two patient charts before deciding to revoke the physician's privileges, which was not a reasonable effort to obtain facts under § 11112(a)(4). Moreover, in Brown the board reported false findings to the National Practitioner Data Bank pursuant to § 11137(c).
References
- ↑ 979 F.2d at 734.