Changes

===Sea power===

===Sea power===

====Mahan====

====Mahan====

[[Alfred Thayer Mahan]] (1840-1914) was the most influential military historian in the world in the era before World War I.  His concept of "sea power" had an enormous influence in shaping the strategic thought of naval officials across the world, especially in the United States, Germany, Japan and Britain. His ideas still permeate the U.S. Navy. He used history as a stock of lessons to be learned--or more exactly, as a pool of examples that exemplified his theories. Mahan believed that national greatness was inextricably associated with the sea, with its commercial usage in peace and its control in war. His goal was to discover the laws of history that determined who controlled the  seas.  His theoretical framework came from Jomini, with an emphasis on strategic locations (such as chokepoints, canals. and coaling stations), as well as quantifiable levels of fighting power in a fleet. The primary mission of a navy was to secure the command of the sea. This not only permitted the maintenance of sea communications for one's own ships while denying their use to the enemy but also, if necessary, provided the means for close supervision of neutral trade. This control of the sea could not be achieved by destruction of commerce but only by destroying or neutralizing the enemy fleet. This called for concentration of naval forces composed of capital ships, not overly large but numerous, well manned with crews thoroughly trained, and operating under the principle that the best defense is an aggressive offense.

[[Alfred Thayer Mahan]] (1840-1914) was the most influential military historian in the world in the era before World War I.  His concept of "sea power" had an enormous influence in shaping the strategic thought of naval officials across the world, especially in the United States, Germany, Japan and Britain. His ideas still permeate the U.S. Navy. He used history as a stock of lessons to be learned--or more exactly, as a pool of examples that exemplified his theories. Mahan believed that national greatness was inextricably associated with the sea, with its commercial usage in peace and its control in war. His goal was to discover the laws of history that determined who controlled the  seas.  His theoretical framework came from Jomini, with an emphasis on strategic locations (such as chokepoints, canals. and coaling stations), as well as quantifiable levels of fighting power in a fleet. The primary mission of a navy was to secure the command of the sea. This not only permitted the maintenance of sea communications for one's own ships while denying their use to the enemy but also, if necessary, provided the means for close supervision of neutral trade. This control of the sea could not be achieved by destruction of commerce but only by destroying or neutralizing the enemy fleet. This called for concentration of naval forces composed of capital ships, not overly large but numerous, well manned with crews thoroughly trained, and operating under the principle that the best defense is an aggressive offense.

====Corbett====

====Corbett====

British theorist Sir [[Julian Corbett]] (1854-1922), was second only to Mahan as an influential exponent of sea power during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Mahan emphasized the need for concentration of forces and the decisive battle. In contrast, Corbett advised that protection of shipping lanes and local control in decisive areas was more important. While Mahan overstated the value of colonies to national strength, he overlooked "guerre de course" (attacks on merchant ships) and technological innovation. Corbett erred both by ignoring convoy warfare and in advocating a passive strategy out of keeping with the aggressive naval tradition of his British constituency.<ref> J. J. Widen, "Sir Julian Corbett and the Theoretical Study of War." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 2007 30(1): 109-127. Issn: 0140-2390 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]] </ref>

British theorist Sir [[Julian Corbett]] (1854-1922), was second only to Mahan as an influential exponent of sea power during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Mahan emphasized the need for concentration of forces and the decisive battle. In contrast, Corbett advised that protection of shipping lanes and local control in decisive areas was more important. While Mahan overstated the value of colonies to national strength, he overlooked "guerre de course" (attacks on merchant ships) and technological innovation. Corbett erred both by ignoring convoy warfare and in advocating a passive strategy out of keeping with the aggressive naval tradition of his British constituency.<ref> J. J. Widen, "Sir Julian Corbett and the Theoretical Study of War." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 2007 30(1): 109-127. Issn: 0140-2390 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]] </ref>

===Maritime strategy of 1980s===

===Maritime strategy of 1980s===

Washington's so-called maritime strategy, which sought to apply US naval might against Soviet vulnerabilities on its maritime flanks, came to operation during the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] administration in the 1980s. The strategy, which witnessed a major buildup of US naval forces and aggressive exercising in seas proximate to the USSR, also explicitly targeted Moscow's strategic missile submarines with the aim of pressuring the Kremlin during crises or the early phases of global war.<ref> Christopher A. Ford and Rosenberg, David A. "The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of Reagan's Maritime Strategy." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 2005 28(2): 379-409. Issn: 0140-2390 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>  

Washington's so-called maritime strategy, which sought to apply US naval might against Soviet vulnerabilities on its maritime flanks, came to operation during the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] administration in the 1980s. The strategy, which witnessed a major buildup of US naval forces and aggressive exercising in seas proximate to the USSR, also explicitly targeted Moscow's strategic missile submarines with the aim of pressuring the Kremlin during crises or the early phases of global war.<ref> Christopher A. Ford and Rosenberg, David A. "The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of Reagan's Maritime Strategy." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 2005 28(2): 379-409. Issn: 0140-2390 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>