Difference between revisions of "Russell's teapot"

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'''Russell's teapot''', sometimes called the '''Celestial Teapot''', was an analogy first coined by the philosopher [[Bertrand Russell]] (1872–1970), intended to refute the idea that the [[burden of proof]] lies upon the sceptic to disprove [[Falsifiability|unfalsifiable]] claims of [[religion]]s. In an article entitled "Is There a God?"<ref>[http://www.cfpf.org.uk/articles/religion/br/br_god.html Bertrand Russell: Is There a God?] </ref> commissioned (but never published) by ''Illustrated'' magazine in 1952, Russell wrote:
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'''Russel's Teapot''' is an [[argument]] first formulated by the [[philosopher]] [[Bertrand Russell]] as a [[reductio ad absurdum]] of the notion that in an argument about the possible existence of an [[unseen]] entity, the burden of proof is upon the skeptic.
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{{cquote|If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is an intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time.<ref>[http://www.cfpf.org.uk/articles/religion/br/br_god.html Is There A God?]</ref>}}
  
{{cquote|If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is an intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time.}}
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The fallacy in the argument is that there is in fact nothing absurd about believing the teapot to be there, if those "ancient books" were written by an ancient astronaut or other being who placed the teapot there.
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The argument ''presumes'' that such is not the case, so presumes what it sets out to prove, and is thus a [[circular argument]].
  
Russell's teapot analogy is still used in the debate over religious belief.  [[Richard Dawkins]] used it in his [[2003]] book ''[[A Devil's Chaplain]]'',<ref>{{cite book| title = [[A Devil's Chaplain]]
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That is, the argument is based on the ''presumption'' that there is no valid reason, beyond widespread belief, to believe that the teapot exists.
| author = [[Richard Dawkins]]
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But if the validity of those ancient books could be established, there is indeed reason to believe that the teapot exists, and thus the presumption in the argument is false.
| publisher = [[Houghton Mifflin]]
 
| release_date = 2003
 
| media_type =
 
| pages =
 
| isbn = ISBN 0-618-33540-4
 
}}</ref>
 
  
{{cquote|The reason organized religion merits outright hostility is that, unlike belief in Russell's teapot, religion is powerful, influential, tax-exempt and systematically passed on to children too young to defend themselves. Children are not compelled to spend their formative years memorizing loony books about teapots. Government-subsidized schools don't exclude children whose parents prefer the wrong shape of teapot. Teapot-believers don't stone teapot-unbelievers, teapot-apostates, teapot-heretics and teapot-blasphemers to death. Mothers don't warn their sons off <!-- Please do not change "off" to "of" (again!). "Off" is correct, and is what Dawkins wrote.--> marrying teapot-[[shiksa]]s whose parents believe in three teapots rather than one. People who put the milk in first don't [[Knee-capping|kneecap]] those who put the tea in first.}}
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==References==
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<references />
  
Dawkins' use of the analogy was criticized by theologian [[Alister McGrath]] in ''[[The Dawkins Delusion?]]''<ref>{{cite book| title = [[The Dawkins Delusion?]]
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[[Category:Philosophy]]
| author = [[Alister McGrath]] and Joanna Collicutt McGrath
 
| publisher = [[Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge|Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (SPCK)]]
 
| release_date = February 15, 2007
 
| media_type =
 
| isbn = 978-0-281-05927-0
 
| page = 75
 
}}</ref>
 

Revision as of 10:49, February 1, 2009

Russel's Teapot is an argument first formulated by the philosopher Bertrand Russell as a reductio ad absurdum of the notion that in an argument about the possible existence of an unseen entity, the burden of proof is upon the skeptic.

If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is an intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time.[1]

The fallacy in the argument is that there is in fact nothing absurd about believing the teapot to be there, if those "ancient books" were written by an ancient astronaut or other being who placed the teapot there. The argument presumes that such is not the case, so presumes what it sets out to prove, and is thus a circular argument.

That is, the argument is based on the presumption that there is no valid reason, beyond widespread belief, to believe that the teapot exists. But if the validity of those ancient books could be established, there is indeed reason to believe that the teapot exists, and thus the presumption in the argument is false.

References