Changes

On New Year's Day, 1945, [[Secretary of State]] [http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/stettinius-edward-reilly Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.] told [[Harry Hopkins]] (whom [[Iskhak Akhmerov|Akhmerov]] called "the most important of all Soviet war-time agents in the United States," according to Gordievsky)<ref>[[#refRomerstein01|Romerstein, Breindel 2001]]: 212-215; cf. Thomas Fleming, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=EyZ3AAAAMAAJ The New Dealers' War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War Within World War II]'' (Basic Books, 2001) ISBN 0465024645, pp. 320-321; [[#refSword|Andrew, Mitrokin 2000]]: 111. Upon being “purged” from AAA, Communist ([[#refHUAC50.2|HUAC 1950, pt. 2]]: 2850 [PDF 16]) lawyer [[Lee Pressman]] was immediately hired back into the government by [[Harry Hopkins|Hopkins]] ([[#refHUAC50.2|HUAC 1950, pt. 2]]: 2849 [PDF 15]), who apparently had little regard for the law: According to Pressman, Hopkins told him, “The first time you tell me I can’t do what I want to do, you’re fired. I’m going to decide what I think has to be done and it’s up to you to see to it that it’s legal.” ([[#refGall99|Gall 1999]]: 32) After carefully examining [[Venona project|Venona]], the late U.S. Air Force historian Eduard Mark identified Hopkins as Soviet agent “19.” Edward Mark, "[http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/ftinterface?content=a789090332&rt=0&format=pdf Venona's Source 19 and the ‘Trident’ Conference of May 1943: Diplomacy or Espionage?]" ''Intelligence and National Security'', Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer 1998), pp.1-31</ref> that he had a meeting scheduled for the next day with [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]], to which he was to bring "people who would be involved in the forthcoming [[Yalta conference|conferences" at Yalta]], in [[Soviet]] [[Crimea]]. According to the Secretary, [[FDR]] "did not want to have anyone accompany him in an advisory capacity, but he felt Messrs. Bowman and Alger Hiss ought to go."<ref>[[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1945/XL/0525.gif 439]</ref> "Bowman" was Isaiah Bowman, the president of Johns Hopkins University [http://www.jhu.edu/~jhumag/0900web/red.html who hired] [[Owen Lattimore]].

On New Year's Day, 1945, [[Secretary of State]] [http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/stettinius-edward-reilly Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.] told [[Harry Hopkins]] (whom [[Iskhak Akhmerov|Akhmerov]] called "the most important of all Soviet war-time agents in the United States," according to Gordievsky)<ref>[[#refRomerstein01|Romerstein, Breindel 2001]]: 212-215; cf. Thomas Fleming, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=EyZ3AAAAMAAJ The New Dealers' War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War Within World War II]'' (Basic Books, 2001) ISBN 0465024645, pp. 320-321; [[#refSword|Andrew, Mitrokin 2000]]: 111. Upon being “purged” from AAA, Communist ([[#refHUAC50.2|HUAC 1950, pt. 2]]: 2850 [PDF 16]) lawyer [[Lee Pressman]] was immediately hired back into the government by [[Harry Hopkins|Hopkins]] ([[#refHUAC50.2|HUAC 1950, pt. 2]]: 2849 [PDF 15]), who apparently had little regard for the law: According to Pressman, Hopkins told him, “The first time you tell me I can’t do what I want to do, you’re fired. I’m going to decide what I think has to be done and it’s up to you to see to it that it’s legal.” ([[#refGall99|Gall 1999]]: 32) After carefully examining [[Venona project|Venona]], the late U.S. Air Force historian Eduard Mark identified Hopkins as Soviet agent “19.” Edward Mark, "[http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/ftinterface?content=a789090332&rt=0&format=pdf Venona's Source 19 and the ‘Trident’ Conference of May 1943: Diplomacy or Espionage?]" ''Intelligence and National Security'', Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer 1998), pp.1-31</ref> that he had a meeting scheduled for the next day with [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]], to which he was to bring "people who would be involved in the forthcoming [[Yalta conference|conferences" at Yalta]], in [[Soviet]] [[Crimea]]. According to the Secretary, [[FDR]] "did not want to have anyone accompany him in an advisory capacity, but he felt Messrs. Bowman and Alger Hiss ought to go."<ref>[[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1945/XL/0525.gif 439]</ref> "Bowman" was Isaiah Bowman, the president of Johns Hopkins University [http://www.jhu.edu/~jhumag/0900web/red.html who hired] [[Owen Lattimore]].

[[image:Yaltaconference.JPG|thumb|300px|right|At Yalta, a visibly haggard Roosevelt flanked by Stettinius (left) and Hiss (right); Churchill (foreground right, three-quarters back view); Stalin in shadows (far left). ''Courtesy [http://www.un.org/UN50/Photos/un50-016.gif United Nations Department of Public Information]'']]Hiss served as [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no4/alger_hiss.html aide to] Stettinius, who was considered in some quarters to be "not very bright," according to Ambassador Ellis Briggs.<ref>Ellis Briggs, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=2pflY3LYw88C Proud Public Servant: The Memoirs of a Career Ambassador]'' (Kent State University Press, 1998) ISBN 0873385888, p. 197</ref> State Department [http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/468607241.html?dids=468607241:468607241&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT chief of security and consular affairs] Samuel D. Boykin agreed that Stettinius "was not brilliant." But, he added, the Secretary had the ability to utilize [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCID+mfdip2004boy03) "other people's brains"]. Among those whose brains Stettinius had the ability to use was his [[#refFoote|aide]], the [[#refLindPump|brilliant]] Alger Hiss. According to [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/panuchja.htm J. Anthony Panuch], Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, "Hiss exercises [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/svengali Svengali]-like influence over the mental processes of Junior Stettinius."<ref>Panuch to Russell, March 7, 1946 ([[#refSISS13|SISS pt. 13]]: 853 [PDF 19]). Cf. Louis Francis Budenz, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IkqboMAiCkkC The Techniques of Communism]'' (New York: Ayer Publishing, 1977) ISBN 0405099428, p. 287. Dean Acheson subsequently forced Panuch, not Hiss, out of the State Department. ([[#refSISS53|SISS 1953]]: 9-10 [PDF 15-16])</ref> Indeed, Stettinius gave Hiss control over [[FDR]]'s access to information, directing that "all memoranda for the President on topics to be discussed at the Meeting of the Big Three should be in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss not later than Monday, January 15."<ref>Rothwell to Rockefeller, January 10, 1945, [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=42&isize=XL 42], cf. [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=441&isize=XL p. 441]</ref> With less than three months to live, Roosevelt suffered "occa­sional blackouts of memory, and loss of capacity for mental concen­tration." According to one source, "At Yalta [Roosevelt] could neither think consecutively nor express himself coherently."<ref>William Henry Chamberlin, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=JGQhAAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 America's Second Crusade]'' (Regnery, 1950) ASIN 0865977070, p. 206. At Teheran, Roosevelt actually chose to stay in the Soviet embassy, because it had [[#refBlack06|larger quarters]].</ref> At the conference, Roosevelt “was obviously greatly fatigued,” wrote his cardiologist. “His color was very poor (gray).”<ref>Edward Shorter, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3scUP7B_R7kC Doctors and Their Patients: A Social History]'', 3rd Ed. (Transaction Publishers, 1991) ISBN 088738871X, p. 100</ref> “The President seemed placid and frail,” wrote Churchill. “I felt that he had a slender contact with life.”<ref>Sir Winston Churchill, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=M_6cljKX0uUC Triumph and Tragedy]'' (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1986) ISBN 0395410606, p. 348</ref>The Soviets bugged the U.S. quarters, and [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no3/html_files/FDR_Teheran_12.htm listened avidly].

[[image:Yaltaconference.JPG|thumb|300px|right|At Yalta, a visibly haggard Roosevelt flanked by Stettinius (left) and Hiss (right); Churchill (foreground right, three-quarters back view); Stalin in shadows (far left). ''Courtesy [http://www.un.org/UN50/Photos/un50-016.gif United Nations Department of Public Information]'']]Hiss served as [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no4/alger_hiss.html aide to] Stettinius, who was considered in some quarters to be "not very bright," according to Ambassador Ellis Briggs.<ref>Ellis Briggs, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=2pflY3LYw88C Proud Public Servant: The Memoirs of a Career Ambassador]'' (Kent State University Press, 1998) ISBN 0873385888, p. 197</ref> State Department [http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/468607241.html?dids=468607241:468607241&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT chief of security and consular affairs] Samuel D. Boykin agreed that Stettinius "was not brilliant." But, he added, the Secretary had the ability to utilize [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCID+mfdip2004boy03) "other people's brains"]. Among those whose brains Stettinius had the ability to use was his [[#refFoote|aide]], the [[#refLindPump|brilliant]] Alger Hiss. According to [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/panuchja.htm J. Anthony Panuch], Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, "Hiss exercises [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/svengali Svengali]-like influence over the mental processes of Junior Stettinius."<ref>Panuch to Russell, March 7, 1946 ([[#refSISS13|SISS pt. 13]]: 853 [PDF 19]). Cf. Louis Francis Budenz, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IkqboMAiCkkC The Techniques of Communism]'' (New York: Ayer Publishing, 1977) ISBN 0405099428, p. 287. Dean Acheson subsequently forced Panuch, not Hiss, out of the State Department. ([[#refSISS53|SISS 1953]]: 9-10 [PDF 15-16])</ref> Indeed, Stettinius gave Hiss control over [[FDR]]'s access to information, directing that "all memoranda for the President on topics to be discussed at the Meeting of the Big Three should be in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss not later than Monday, January 15."<ref>Rothwell to Rockefeller, January 10, 1945, [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=42&isize=XL 42], cf. [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=441&isize=XL p. 441]</ref> With less than three months to live, Roosevelt suffered "occa­sional blackouts of memory, and loss of capacity for mental concen­tration." According to one source, "At Yalta [Roosevelt] could neither think consecutively nor express himself coherently."<ref>William Henry Chamberlin, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=JGQhAAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 America's Second Crusade]'' (Regnery, 1950) ASIN 0865977070, p. 206. At Teheran, Roosevelt actually chose to stay in the Soviet embassy, because it had [[#refBlack06|larger quarters]].</ref> At the conference, Roosevelt “was obviously greatly fatigued,” wrote his cardiologist. “His color was very poor (gray).”<ref>Edward Shorter, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3scUP7B_R7kC Doctors and Their Patients: A Social History]'', 3rd Ed. (Transaction Publishers, 1991) ISBN 088738871X, p. 100</ref> “The President seemed placid and frail,” wrote [[Winston Churchill]]. “I felt that he had a slender contact with life.”<ref>Sir Winston Churchill, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=M_6cljKX0uUC Triumph and Tragedy]'' (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1986) ISBN 0395410606, p. 348</ref>The Soviets bugged the U.S. quarters, and [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no3/html_files/FDR_Teheran_12.htm listened avidly].

During pre-conference negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, regarding the war with Japan, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," according to Stettinius, "and stressed the importance which the United States attaches to U.S.-British-Soviet encouragement and support for an agreement between the [[Comintern|Commintern]] [sic] and the Chinese Congress [sic]."<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 229. The official State Department record uses the passive voice to expunge Hiss' role in this maneuver: "The desirability of unity being achieved between the [[Kuomintang]] and the [[Communists]] was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity." Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 1, 1945, 10:30 A.M., on Board H. M. S. "Sirius" in Grand Harbor. [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&isize=XL&submit=Go+to+page&page=502 502] Press accounts relying on this bowdlerized official account thus reported, e.g.: "Alger Hiss, whose role at the Yalta conference long has been a subject for hostile speculation, spent his time there [http://select.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F40C11F6345A107A93CAA81788D85F418585F9 exclusively on planning for the United Nations]."</ref> The British, due to their interests in Hong Kong and Singapore, had influence with the [[Kuomintang]], but none with the [[Communists]]; the Soviets, who did have influence with the Communists, were not present (because they were [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/smenu.asp not at war with Japan]). The only effect Hiss had in bringing up the issue therefore was to co-opt the British to pressure the Chinese government into acquiescing to a [[Kremlin]]-backed power-sharing arrangement with the rebels, thus granting a measure of legitimacy to forces dedicated to its destruction&mdash;a policy that would prove [http://www.hawaiireporter.com/story.aspx?1c1d76bb-290c-447b-82dd-e295ff0d3d59 catastrophic for the Chinese].<ref>After the fall of the Nationalist Chinese government, Communist Chinese dictator Mao Zedong "was responsible for [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1069136,00.html well over 70 million] deaths in peacetime, more than any other 20th-century leader," according to Jung Chang, a former [http://www.harpercollins.com/harperimages/ommoverride/teacher_guide_wild_swans.pdf member of Mao's Red Guards]. [[#refChang05|Chang 2005]]: 3</ref>

During pre-conference negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, regarding the war with Japan, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," according to Stettinius, "and stressed the importance which the United States attaches to U.S.-British-Soviet encouragement and support for an agreement between the [[Comintern|Commintern]] [sic] and the Chinese Congress [sic]."<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 229. The official State Department record uses the passive voice to expunge Hiss' role in this maneuver: "The desirability of unity being achieved between the [[Kuomintang]] and the [[Communists]] was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity." Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 1, 1945, 10:30 A.M., on Board H. M. S. "Sirius" in Grand Harbor. [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&isize=XL&submit=Go+to+page&page=502 502] Press accounts relying on this bowdlerized official account thus reported, e.g.: "Alger Hiss, whose role at the Yalta conference long has been a subject for hostile speculation, spent his time there [http://select.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F40C11F6345A107A93CAA81788D85F418585F9 exclusively on planning for the United Nations]."</ref> The British, due to their interests in Hong Kong and Singapore, had influence with the [[Kuomintang]], but none with the [[Communists]]; the Soviets, who did have influence with the Communists, were not present (because they were [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/smenu.asp not at war with Japan]). The only effect Hiss had in bringing up the issue therefore was to co-opt the British to pressure the Chinese government into acquiescing to a [[Kremlin]]-backed power-sharing arrangement with the rebels, thus granting a measure of legitimacy to forces dedicated to its destruction&mdash;a policy that would prove [http://www.hawaiireporter.com/story.aspx?1c1d76bb-290c-447b-82dd-e295ff0d3d59 catastrophic for the Chinese].<ref>After the fall of the Nationalist Chinese government, Communist Chinese dictator Mao Zedong "was responsible for [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1069136,00.html well over 70 million] deaths in peacetime, more than any other 20th-century leader," according to Jung Chang, a former [http://www.harpercollins.com/harperimages/ommoverride/teacher_guide_wild_swans.pdf member of Mao's Red Guards]. [[#refChang05|Chang 2005]]: 3</ref>

Ultimately, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), giving [[Moscow]] rights to the main Manchurian railroad and territory in northern China.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref> U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley resigned in protest, alleging the existence of a "[http://www.usdiplomacy.org/history/service/chinahands.php Communist conspiracy] within the [State] Department." Hiss would later deny under oath any role in China policy at Yalta, or in the subsequent State Department proclamation calling for "peace and unity with the Communists in China," saying "It was not in my area of activity at all." Hiss admitted that he "had been connected with far eastern affairs before," but protested that after "about February 1944, [a year before he "stressed the importance" of unity with the Communists] I was assigned to United Nations work and specialized entirely in that field thereafter."<ref>[[#refHUAC48|HUAC 1948]]: 657 (PDF 167)</ref>

Ultimately, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), giving [[Moscow]] rights to the main Manchurian railroad and territory in northern China.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref> U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley resigned in protest, alleging the existence of a "[http://www.usdiplomacy.org/history/service/chinahands.php Communist conspiracy] within the [State] Department." Hiss would later deny under oath any role in China policy at Yalta, or in the subsequent State Department proclamation calling for "peace and unity with the Communists in China," saying "It was not in my area of activity at all." Hiss admitted that he "had been connected with far eastern affairs before," but protested that after "about February 1944, [a year before he "stressed the importance" of unity with the Communists] I was assigned to United Nations work and specialized entirely in that field thereafter."<ref>[[#refHUAC48|HUAC 1948]]: 657 (PDF 167)</ref>

On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Winston Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. According to Sudoplatov, "One of the officials [at Yalta] we had established confidential relations with was Alger Hiss," who was "highly sympathetic to the interests of the Soviet Union."<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref> According to confidential [[GRU]] sources, during the conference, Hiss gave daily briefings to Stalin's military adviser, General Mikhail Abramovich Milshtein (deputy director of the GRU), revealing not only the American negotiating strategy but insights into the attitudes of the American negotiators.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 130</ref> Sudoplatov added:

On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Churchill|Winston Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. According to Sudoplatov, "One of the officials [at Yalta] we had established confidential relations with was Alger Hiss," who was "highly sympathetic to the interests of the Soviet Union."<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref> According to confidential [[GRU]] sources, during the conference, Hiss gave daily briefings to Stalin's military adviser, General Mikhail Abramovich Milshtein (deputy director of the GRU), revealing not only the American negotiating strategy but insights into the attitudes of the American negotiators.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 130</ref> Sudoplatov added:

{{cquote|In conversation, Hiss disclosed to [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,851866,00.html Oumansky], and then Litvinov,<ref>Hugh D. Phillips, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=qjWPAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov]'' (New York: Westview Press, 1992) ISBN 0813310385</ref> official U.S. attitudes and plans; he was also very close to our sources who were cooperating with Soviet intelligence and to our active intelligence operators in the United States. Within this framework of exchange of confidential information were references to Hiss as the source who told us the Americans were prepared to make a deal in Europe.<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref>}}

{{cquote|In conversation, Hiss disclosed to [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,851866,00.html Oumansky], and then Litvinov,<ref>Hugh D. Phillips, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=qjWPAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov]'' (New York: Westview Press, 1992) ISBN 0813310385</ref> official U.S. attitudes and plans; he was also very close to our sources who were cooperating with Soviet intelligence and to our active intelligence operators in the United States. Within this framework of exchange of confidential information were references to Hiss as the source who told us the Americans were prepared to make a deal in Europe.<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref>}}

When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>[[#refDallas05|Dallas 2005]]: 557</ref> [http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9140-17.cfm essentially ratifying] what Eden called [[#refBlack06|the "Ribbentrop-Molotov" line]], the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the "[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E8A8-96B6-175C-955B60FB1DA40BCC&sort=Coverage&item=Soviet%20Union secret protocols]" of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. It was agreed to keep these plans [[#refBlack06|entirely secret]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over [[#refYalta45|the document]], I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56. When Truman became President and saw the secret codicils, he was "amazed the Polish agreement 'wasn't more clear cut'." Wilson D. Miscamble, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=QWc58mXB5uUC From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007) ISBN 0521862442, p. 112</ref>

When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>[[#refDallas05|Dallas 2005]]: 557</ref> [http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9140-17.cfm essentially ratifying] what Eden called [[#refBlack06|the "Ribbentrop-Molotov" line]], the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the "[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E8A8-96B6-175C-955B60FB1DA40BCC&sort=Coverage&item=Soviet%20Union secret protocols]" of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. It was agreed to keep these plans [[#refBlack06|entirely secret]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over [[#refYalta45|the document]], I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56. When Truman became President and saw the secret codicils, he was "amazed the Polish agreement 'wasn't more clear cut'." Wilson D. Miscamble, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=QWc58mXB5uUC From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007) ISBN 0521862442, p. 112</ref>